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Abstract 
This thesis builds on the recent developments in methods of panel estimation to 
investigate four questions in the economics of growth and development, 
concentrating on the effects of three variables of interest – ad-valorem tariff rates, 
military expenditure shares and natural resource windfalls. Particularly, in the light 
of endogeneity concerns, the analysis employs the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) framework to investigate whether the effects of all three variables of interest 
are heterogeneous across the income distribution, i.e. contingent on a country’s 
economic development level, and what are the potential sources of exogenous 
variation for externalities that might drive this heterogeneity leading to contradicting 
outcomes found in the literature. 
The first chapter examines the effects of tariff rates on indicators of long-run 
development by analysing the effects of ad-valorem tariffs on fertility rates, life 
expectancy, infant mortality and education contingent on income levels. The analysis 
confirms previous findings of a differential effect of tariffs on economic growth, 
suggesting a detrimental impact of trade limitations for high income level countries, 
but not for low income level economies. In addition, the investigation contributes to 
the literature showing that for high income economies, tariffs are harmful not only 
for economic growth, but also for long-run development. However, these effects are 
less clear for lower income economies. In particular, for developing countries there 
is a paucity of evidence for the effects of tariffs on indicators of long-run 
development. The investigation also attempts to identify the channels through which 
tariffs might affect the economic growth and development indicators for lower 
income economies, the results suggesting infrastructure as a potential driver. 
The second chapter clarifies the ambiguous results found in the military spending 
and economic growth literature, where the impact of military expenditure is 
frequently found to be non-significant or negative. The investigation examines the 
effects of military spending on growth by analysing this relationship contingent on 
initial income per capita using a large dataset on military expenditure. The findings 
reveal that while growth falls with higher levels of military spending, the marginal 
impact of military spending is increasing in initial income levels. In contrast to 
previous findings from the literature, this increase is consistent across different 
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income groups and type of economies, and is monotonic in direction, going towards 
zero for sufficiently high income level countries. 
The third chapter examines the potential sources of externalities for the relationship 
between economic growth and military spending using a large panel dataset on 
military spending and variety of conflict measures. The investigation reproduces 
many of the results of the existing literature and provides a new analysis on the 
relationship between conflict, corruption, natural resources and military expenditure 
and their direct and indirect effects on economic growth. The analysis finds that the 
impact of military expenditure on growth is generally negative as found in the 
literature, but that it is not significantly detrimental for countries facing either higher 
internal or external threats, and for countries with large natural resource wealth, once 
corruption levels are accounted for.   
The fourth chapter empirically investigates the relationships between resource 
windfalls, political regimes, conflict and growth employing a distinctive commodity 
price shock measurement. The analysis clarifies the potential mechanism behind the 
ambiguous outcomes of the existing resource literature, particularly showing that 
resource windfalls have significant effects on conflict only in politically unstable 
autocracies, where these effects are heterogeneous in the response, conditional on a 
country’s initial political violence level. The findings also demonstrate that resource 
shocks are positively associated with economic performance in democracies and in 
politically stable autocracies, while reducing growth for unstable autocracies. 
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1.   Introduction 
The recent developments in panel estimation methods have enabled economists to 
shed new light on economic growth. This thesis applies these developments to 
investigate four questions in the economics of growth and development 
concentrating on the effects of three variables of interest – ad-valorem tariff rates, 
military expenditure shares and natural resource windfalls. In particular, the analysis 
employs the generalized method of moments (GMM) framework to overcome the 
shortcomings, such as inconsistency and endogeneity, experienced when using many 
of the other panel estimators that have been employed in the literature. The 
endogeneity issue is of particular concern for the investigation in this thesis, 
considering the results indicate that the effects on growth from all three variables of 
interest are heterogeneous across the income distribution, i.e. contingent on a 
country’s economic development level, implying that there may be other factors 
which might drive this heterogeneity leading to contradicting results as found in the 
literature. Therefore it is of importance to investigate the potential sources of 
exogenous variation for externalities that might generate this heterogeneity. 
How do the changes in the variables of interest affect a country’s economic growth 
and development level? And what factors drive heterogeneous outcomes for these 
relationships? These are the key important questions that this thesis attempts to 
address which are particularly interesting from a policy perspective, since for the 
variables of interest to be associated with long-run improvement, no matter whether 
this improvement is represented by income growth or development in health, 
education, socioeconomic and political stability or institutional quality, it is 
necessary that income inflows generated by the changes in the variables under 
consideration are spent productively and not frittered away, and hence the 
investigation of the channels which induce these heterogeneous outcomes is 
required.      
Beyond the findings of the analysis, the thesis also makes an exceptional data 
contribution by providing the literature with a large dataset on military expenditure 
and a distinctive measurement for commodity price shocks. In particular, since 
online data tables for military spending are only available from the period 1988 and 
onwards, military expenditure shares for the previous periods have been collected 
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and manually inputted directly from the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute) Yearbooks enabling the investigation to employ, to the best of 
my knowledge, a dataset with the largest coverage period in the current defence 
literature. Additionally, in the light of endogeneity concerns associated with the 
measurements of natural resource abundance which have been previously employed 
in the literature, a country-specific geometrically weighted index of commodity net 
export prices is constructed facilitating the clarification of ambiguous outcomes in 
the resource literature.  
The first chapter empirically examines the effects of tariff rates on indicators of 
long-run development by analysing the effects of ad-valorem tariffs on fertility rates, 
life expectancy, infant mortality and education contingent on income levels. The 
analysis confirms previous findings of a differential effect of tariffs on economic 
growth, suggesting a detrimental impact of trade limitations for high income level 
countries, but not for low income level economies. In addition, the investigation 
contributes to the literature showing that for high income economies, tariffs are 
harmful not only for economic growth, but also for long-run development. However, 
these effects are less clear for lower income economies. In particular, for developing 
countries there is a paucity of evidence for the effects of tariffs on indicators of long-
run development. The investigation also attempts to identify the channels through 
which tariffs might affect economic growth and development indicators for lower 
income economies, the results suggesting infrastructure as a potential driver. This 
chapter has been re-submitted to the OECD Journal: Economic Studies. 
The second chapter clarifies the ambiguous results found in the military spending 
and economic growth literature, where the impact of military expenditure on growth 
is frequently found to be non-significant or negative. The investigation examines 
effects of military spending on growth by analysing this relationship contingent on 
initial income per capita using a large dataset on military expenditure. The findings 
reveal that while growth falls with higher levels of military spending, the marginal 
impact of military expenditure is increasing in initial income levels. In contrast to 
previous findings from the literature, this increase is consistent across different 
income groups and type of economies, and is monotonic in direction going towards 
zero for sufficiently high income level countries. This chapter has been submitted to 
the Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 
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The third chapter examines the potential sources of externalities for the relationship 
between military spending and economic growth using a large panel dataset on 
military spending and variety of conflict measures. The investigation reproduces 
many of the results of the existing literature and provides a new analysis on the 
relationship between conflict, corruption, natural resources and military expenditure 
and their direct and indirect effects on economic growth. The analysis finds that the 
impact of military expenditure on growth is generally negative as found in the 
existing literature, but that it is not significantly detrimental for countries facing 
either higher internal or external threats, and for countries with large natural resource 
wealth, once corruption levels are accounted for. This chapter is published in the 
journal of Defence and Peace Economics.  
The fourth chapter empirically investigates the relationships between resource 
windfalls, political regimes, conflict and growth using a distinctive commodity price 
shock measurement. The analysis clarifies the potential mechanism behind the 
ambiguous outcomes of the existing resource literature, particularly showing that 
resource windfalls have significant effects on conflict only in politically unstable 
autocracies, where these effects are heterogeneous in the response, conditional on a 
country’s initial political violence level. Investigation of how these relationships are 
reflected onto the economic growth reveals that, resource windfalls are positively 
associated with growth in democracies and in politically stable autocracies. In 
contrast, an increase in resource windfalls reduces growth for politically unstable 
autocracies. This chapter has been submitted to the Journal of Development 
Economics. 
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2.   Are Tariffs Good for Development? 
2.1. Introduction 
The effect of tariffs on the growth prospects of lower income economies is a 
perennially important topic in the development economics literature. How does 
international trade or limitations to trade affect a country’s economic growth? And 
how do these changes generated by barriers to trade reflect on an economy’s 
development level? These are important questions, as the effects of tariffs may just 
represent short-run gains or losses which do not feed into future development.  
While a large body of research in economic literature concentrates on the 
investigation of the links between development and international trade as a proxy for 
the openness of the economy, investigation of the relationships between long-run 
development indicators with the most direct measures of openness such as tariff rates 
as a trade policy tool has received much less attention. As the effects of income 
changes generated by trade barriers cannot be referred as generic income changes, 
for tariffs to be advocated as a development tool it is necessary to show that tariffs 
are associated with long-run improvement in an economy’s development, i.e. the 
additional revenues from tariffs are being spent productively and not frittered away. 
Therefore, in order to motivate the empirical analysis and facilitate the interpretation 
of the results, the paper opens the discussion, firstly, by replicating the DeJong and 
Ripoll (2006) results which demonstrate that although tariff rates have a significant 
negative association with growth in high income economies, this association for low 
income economies is positive. Given these findings, the analysis then concentrates 
on the investigation of how additional income revenues (losses) generated by change 
in tariff rates for low (high) income economies are transferred onto the indicators 
associated with long-run development such as the fertility rate, life expectancy, 
infant mortality and education, conditional on everything else in the economy being 
constant (including generic income level of the economy). 
The analysis finds that while tariffs do have detrimental impacts on economic growth 
and long-run development indicators for higher income economies, as would be 
suggested by standard neoclassical theory, for lower income economies the effects of 
tariffs on development indicators are less clear. These results therefore confirm the 
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findings of a differential effect of tariff rates on economic growth for high and low 
income economies, but in fact find little evidence of the effects of tariff rates on the 
indicators of long-run development in lower income economies. In addition, the 
investigation also attempts to find a mechanism through which tariff rates might 
affect economic growth and development indicators for lower income economies. 
The results suggest infrastructure as one of the potential channels that might drive 
the effect of tariffs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
related literature regarding the impact of international trade on economic growth and 
development with a brief discussion of how income changes are associated with 
long-run development indicators across income distribution. Section 2.2 reviews the 
data and methodology used during the analysis. Section 2.3 presents the estimation 
results and Section 2.4 concludes. 
2.1.1. Related Literature 
While a large body of empirical research based on cross-country analysis has 
generally found a positive relationship between trade openness and growth (see e.g., 
Dollar, 1992; Ben-David, 1993; Lee, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Harrison, 1996; 
Edwards 1998; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Wacziarg, 2001), recent empirical studies 
have found that this effect may be asymmetric depending on a country’s level of 
development.
1
 The literature investigating this contingency provides evidence that 
tariffs have the potential to improve developing economies’ growth prospects.2 In 
                                                          
1
 The findings of positive relationship between trade openness and growth support the view that the 
limitations on trade have only detrimental impact on economies’ growth prospects. However, the 
empirical validity of the evidence from this literature has been criticized by Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(2001), who argued that for the most part, the results in this literature are driven either by 
methodological problems with the empirical strategies, or by application of poor measures of 
openness that are highly correlated with other sources of bad economic performance, such as policy or 
institutional variables that have an independent damaging effect on growth. 
2
 A variety of theoretical and empirical models in the literature of comparative advantage considered 
the potential presence of a contingent relationship between trade and economic growth (see e.g., 
Findlay and Kierzkowski, 1983; Lucas, 1988; Stokey, 1991; Young, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 
1991; Matsuyama, 1992; Atkeson and Kehoe, 2000). The presumption in these models (endogenous 
growth, skill-acquisition or learning-by-doing and other forms of endogenous technological change), 
is that lower trade limitations enhance output growth in the world as a whole. However a subset of 
economies may experience reduced growth depending on countries’ initial factor endowments and 
levels of technological development (see e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2006). And 
as emphasized by Grossman and Helpman (1991), the general answer to the question whether trade 
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particular, DeJong and Ripoll (2006) find significant differential effects of tariffs and 
economic growth relationship between high and low income economies. 
Although the asymmetric role of international trade on growth across nations is 
increasingly viewed as a stylized fact in growth and development economics, the 
explanations of the source of this evidence are mixed. In contrast to the literature on 
the dynamics of comparative advantage, there is an alternative literature focusing on 
the interaction between population growth and comparative advantage as a potential 
trigger that causes “Great Divergence” in income per capita between less developed 
and developed countries (Deardorff, 1994; Galor and Weil, 1999, 2000); and 
generates differential impact of trade on economic development.
3
 In particular, 
recent contributions by Galor and Mountford (2006, 2008) suggest that in developed 
countries the gains from trade have been directed towards investment in education 
and growth in income per capita by concentrating in the production of industrial, 
skilled intensive goods; whereas a significant portion of gains from trade for less 
developed economies have been channelled towards population growth, namely 
fertility decisions, and utilized primarily for a further increase in the size of the 
population, rather than the income of the existing population, since the absence of 
significant demand for human capital provides limited incentives to invest in the 
quality of the population (see also Doces, 2011).
4
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
encourage innovation in a small open economy is it depends. In particular, it depends on whether the 
comparative advantage forces the economy’s resources in the direction of activities that induce long-
run growth or divert them from such activities.  
3
 The origin of “Great Divergence” in living standards across countries has been discussed by many 
scholars. Selected contributions include the following works. On institutional factors, refer to Easterly 
and Levine (2003), Rodrik et al. (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2005), Ashraf and Galor (2007). With 
respect to geographical factors, refer to Krugman and Venables (1995), Diamond (1997), Gallup et al. 
(1999), Baldwin et al. (2001) among others. Considering the role of human capital formation, refer to 
Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2002), McDermott (2002), Doepke (2004), Glaeser (2004), 
Galor (2005), Galor et al. (2006) and others. 
4
 Specifically, Galor and Mountford (2008) show that trade asymmetrically affects a country’s 
population development by reducing fertility and increasing education for developed countries; 
whereas the reverse is the case for the less developed countries. Stratifying a country’s export share 
into manufacturing and primary sectors, Gries and Grundmann (2012) demonstrate that 
manufacturing exports lower fertility levels, while primary exports have either a positive impact or 
none at all. Among other theoretical contributions that link trade and fertility, see also Lehmijoki and 
Palokangas (2009) which focuses on wage and income effects induced by international trade; and 
Saure and Zoaby (2011) that concentrates on female labour force participation in connection with 
international trade.  
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Previous research on the effect of income on health outcomes and contrasting trends 
in cross-sectional health inequality that have occurred during the last half of the 
twentieth century, namely convergence in life expectancy averages and divergence 
in infant mortality rates suggest that the impact of economic growth does not tend to 
be uniform across all measures of well-being or samples. For example, Pritchett and 
Summers (1996) show that poor countries had been outperforming rich countries in 
improving life expectancy, but lagging behind in their reduction of infant mortality; 
suggesting that the link between economic development and life expectancy may be 
stronger among poorer nations, whereas this link with infant mortality may be 
stronger among wealthier nations.
5
  
Focussing on the impact of international trade on health outcomes, Owen and Wu 
(2007) find that increased openness lowers the rate of infant mortality and increases 
life expectancy, especially in developing countries, suggesting that some of the 
positive correlation between trade and health can be attributed to knowledge 
spillovers. Considering the influence of geographical factors, Jamison et al. (2001) 
suggest that more open countries have a faster rate of technical progress that 
improves infant mortality outcomes.
6
  
The importance of infrastructure for international trade is widely documented in the 
literature.
7
 Looking for the answer to the question why less developed countries 
                                                          
5
 Investigating the relationship between economic activity and health status, Pritchett and Summers 
(1996) show that wealthier economies have lower infant mortality rates and higher life expectancy. 
Their results also show that the wealthiest two quartiles of countries increased their life expectancy by 
lower rates, but reduced their infant mortality by higher rates, than the poorest two quartiles during 
the sample period. In addition, using the sample of less developed countries, Brady et al. (2007) 
demonstrate a positive income effect on life expectancy, whereas this link is not significantly different 
from zero for infant or child survival. This might affect the relationship between health outcomes and 
income shocks generated by tariff rates. 
6
 Rodrik et al. (2004), in an effort to sort out the geographical, institutional, and trade related 
determinants of development, suggest that trade and institutional features of the economy may evolve 
endogenously, with trade having positive effect on the quality of institutions; which themselves may 
create a policy environment that is conducive to improved health (see also Bhagwati, 1998). 
Investigating the partial effects of trade and institutions on growth in the long run, Dollar and Kraay 
(2002) find that both trade and institutions are important joint determinants, but trade has a relatively 
stronger role in the short run (see also Alcala and Ciccone, 2004).  For the investigation of the 
relationship between economic growth and health, see also Bhargava et al. (2001) who demonstrate 
that countries with better health outcomes grow faster.    
7
 Depending on geography and endowments of a country, Bougheas et al. (1999) estimate the 
augmented gravity model of bilateral trade flows of countries for which investment in infrastructure is 
optimal; and find a positive relationship between infrastructure and volume of trade. Limao and 
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trade less relative to other countries, Francois and Manchin (2013) highlight the role 
of infrastructure demonstrating that for trade the dependence on institutional quality 
and access to well developed infrastructure is far more important than variations in 
trade policy limitations. This implies that policy emphasis on developing country 
market access, instead of support for trade facilitation, may be misplaced.       
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the data and 
methodology used during the analysis. Section 2.3 presents the estimation results and 
Section 2.4 concludes. 
2.2.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The analysis is based on a balanced panel data set that consists of 70 countries over 
the 1975-2000 period.
8
 The dependent variable for the tariffs and economic growth 
analysis is logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP collected from the Penn World 
Table (PWT 6.3). The log of initial income per capita is used as regressor (e.g., 
logged income per capita measured in 1975 serves as an explanatory variable when 
log of income per capita measured in 1980 is the dependent variable).  
As a trade-barrier indicator, the analysis employs ad-valorem tariffs, measured using 
import duties as a percentage of imports since it provides superior ranking for 
countries according to their levels of openness (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001). 
Human capital proxies used in the analysis as explanatory variables are the average 
years of secondary schooling for males and females over 15 years of age from the 
Barro and Lee dataset. Additionally, for the investigation of the tariffs and education 
relationship, the analysis employs current gross primary school-enrolment ratios by 
gender (the number of children enrolled at each level divided by the population of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Venables (2001) estimate that a deterioration of infrastructure from the median to the 75
th
 percentile 
raises transport costs by 12% and reduces trade volumes by 28%. For the role that quality of 
infrastructure has on a country’s trade performance, see also Nordas and Piermartini (2009), Wilson et 
al. (2005).   
8
 A sample of 70 countries is selected for which data on tariffs are available. The sample size 
decreases to 68 countries when the tariffs and education relationship is investigated. To be able to 
compare the estimation results with the DeJong and Ripoll (2006) results, a sample of 60 countries is 
used to explore the effect of tariffs on economic growth. In addition, the investigation of the link 
between tariffs and infrastructure is based on a 44 countries data set that cover 1990-2000 period 
since the paved road data, a proxy for infrastructure, is available only after the 1990s. See Appendix 
Tables 2-B and 2-C for the list of countries and descriptive statistics. 
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persons of the designated school age) from the World Bank as the dependent 
variables, and the average years of secondary schooling for males and females over 
25 years of age as explanatory variables following Barro and Lee (1994).
9
 As 
indicators of long-run development, the investigation also utilises the log of fertility, 
log of life expectancy and log of infant mortality, as reported by the United Nations, 
where all are measured as averages over the half-decade.  
Real private investment and real government expenditures, each measured as a share 
of real GDP, are also included in the models, where the data are taken from the Penn 
World Table (PWT 6.3). As a proxy to infrastructure, the analysis employs the 
World Bank data on paved roads, measured as a percentage of total roads, widely 
used in the literature (see e.g., Nordas and Piermartini, 2009; Francois and Manchin, 
2013).   
To capture potential contingencies in the relationship between tariffs and income, the 
specifications include additional interaction terms constructed in two ways: first, the 
product of logged initial income and tariffs; second, the product of tariffs and 1975 
income rankings (which takes values 1 for the poorest income countries to 4 for the 
richest countries). Income rankings are constructed as in DeJong and Ripoll (2006) 
using the classification of the World Development Indicators by the World Bank 
where four income groups are defined as high-income (rank 4) countries; upper-
middle-income (rank 3) countries; lower-middle-income (rank 2) countries; and low-
income (rank 1) countries.
10
  
Table 2-1 and 2-2 provide descriptive statistics for average tariff rates, economic 
growth, development indicators and infrastructure over different income groups. 
Three aspects of these statistics are of particular interest in the analysis. The first is 
                                                          
9
 The enrolment ratios reported by the World Bank can exceed 100% because of repeaters and other 
attendees whose age falls outside of the designated range for the schooling. Therefore, the analysis 
truncates all values that were reported above 100% to 100%. The school-attainment variables of 
average years of secondary schooling by gender over 25 years of age can be interpreted in terms of 
the impact of parental schooling on children’s choices of schooling.  
10
 The cut-off levels of income rankings are taken as in DeJong and Ripoll (2006), where country 
classifications are obtained by mapping classification thresholds as defined by the World Bank’s 
income measures into the corresponding Penn World income measures. The resulting definitions are 
as follows: high-income level countries are those with real per capita GDP above $11,500; upper-
middle income level countries those between $5,500 and $11,499; lower-middle income level 
countries are between $2,650 and $5,499; and low-income level countries those with less than $2,650. 
All classifications are based on 1975 income rankings. 
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the tendency that relatively richer countries enjoy relatively rapid growth. Average 
growth rates increase when moving from the lower to higher income classifications: 
from 1.07% (s.d. 2.89) for low-income countries to 1.87% (s.d. 0.76) for high-
income countries. The second aspect of these statistics is that relatively poor 
countries tend to impose relatively high tariff barriers. The average tariff rates tend 
to decrease monotonically between high and low income classifications: from 
16.99% (s.d. 6.59) to 2.91% (s.d. 3.33). The third feature is that development 
indicators and the infrastructure measure of paved roads respond to the movements 
across income classifications monotonically according to their correlations with 
income.
11
 In particular, average fertility and infant mortality rates tend to decrease, 
while life expectancy, education, and infrastructure tend to increase monotonically 
when moving from the lower to higher income classifications.  
2.2.2. Empirical Methodology 
As is now standard in the literature, a panel data set is constructed by transforming 
the time series data into non-overlapping half decades. This ﬁlters out business cycle 
ﬂuctuations, so that the analysis can focus on the long-run effects rather than the 
short-run gains (Aghion et al., 2009). Firstly, discussion concentrates on the method 
that is used to explore potential contingencies in how tariff rates affect economic 
growth. Then discussion turns into the influence of tariffs on the main determinants 
of economic growth such as fertility, life expectancy, infant mortality and education 
through income. The main interest behind the estimated model is to see whether 
tariff rates affect long-run determinants of economic growth, or whether they provide 
a short-run gain, that can benefit a country when it is targeted to balance economic 
situation just for a short time period such as a budget deficit. As an estimation 
approach, the analysis employs the System GMM dynamic panel estimator by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which builds on the 
GMM Difference estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
12
 This 
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 For correlations between the variables of interest, see Appendix Table 2-D. 
12
 Because of the limited scope in paved road data, OLS estimation results for tariffs and 
infrastructure relationship are also reported as a comparison with GMM results. Moreover, stratifying 
the sample into income ranks for tariffs and growth relationship severely reduces number of 
observations during the estimation process. Thus, the analysis also reports OLS estimation results for 
comparison purposes.    
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approach addresses the issues of joint endogeneity of all explanatory variables in a 
dynamic formulation and of potential biases induced by country-speciﬁc effects.13 
During the estimation process, the non-linear effect of tariffs is captured using two 
approaches. Under the first, the analysis includes a quadratic in tariffs and all 
explanatory variables into the estimation model following Barro and Lee (1994). The 
second approach employs interaction term of tariff rates with real per capita income 
level or ranking where the analysis follows DeJong and Ripoll (2006). 
Letting the subscripts i and t represent country and time period respectively, the 
estimated model that is introduced with interaction term can be written as 
       yit =  λ GDPi(t−1) + θ1TARi(t-1) + θ2TARi(t-1)* INC i(t-1) + β'Zi(t−1) + μt + ξi + εit   (2i) 
where yit is either the log of real GDP per capita income level, the gross school-
enrolment ratio, paved road ratio; the log of fertility, the log of life expectancy or the 
log of infant mortality, GDPi(t−1) is a log of initial real per capita income, TARi(t-1) is 
initial realization of ad-valorem tariffs, INC is either logged initial real per capita 
income or 1975 income rankings, Zi(t−1) is a vector of control variables, μt is a period-
specific constant, ξi is an unobserved country-specific effect, and εit is an error 
term.
14
 
The hypothesis for the relationship between tariffs and economic growth is that θ1>0 
and θ2<0 implying that the impact of tariffs, θ1+ θ2* INCi(t−1), is more negative at 
high levels of income. Moreover, when θ1 and θ2 have opposite signs, a threshold 
effect arises.
15
   
                                                          
13
 For detailed information regarding the assumptions employed when using GMM estimators, see 
Appendix 2-A. 
14
 For the estimation of potential contingencies between tariffs and growth, the baseline approach (2i) 
takes the form:  
       GDPit - GDPi(t-1)= α GDPi(t−1) + θ1TARi(t-1) + θ2TARi(t-1)* INCi(t−1)+ β'Zi(t−1)+ μt+ ξi + εit 
where GDP is log of real income per capita level. Equation above then can be written as: 
       GDPit = (1+α) GDPi(t−1) + θ1TARi(t-1) + θ2TARi(t-1)* INCi(t−1) + β'Zi(t−1) + μt + ξi + εit 
Therefore the coefficient of log of initial income per capita has to be interpreted as λ=1+α. 
15
 Letting γ1 and γ2 be, respectively, the coefficients for tariffs and its square term as specified under 
the first approach, the threshold level for tariffs can be calculated by taking the first derivative with 
respect to tariffs. A threshold effect arises when γ1 and γ2 have opposite signs: 
      
           
 = γ1 +2 γ2* TARi(t−1)>0    
      
        TARi(t−1)>      := - 
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 = θ1+ θ2* INCi(t−1)>0    
      
         INCi(t−1)>      := - 
   
  
 
The standard errors of the respective threshold levels for both approaches are 
computed using the delta method. However, it is of note that in small samples, the 
delta method is known to result in excessively large standard errors. 
For the relationship between tariffs and indicators of long-run development, the 
hypothesis is that the signs of θ1 and θ2 are determined by the correlation between 
real per capita income and development indicators such that tariffs can have impact 
through income.  
Selection of long-run development indicators and explanatory variables for all 
specifications considered follows Barro and Lee (1994). The analysis also stratifies 
countries into different income groups, based on initial income levels, and estimates 
separate specifications of (2i) that are linear in tariffs. 
As an additional sensitivity check, outliers are singled out using a strategy advocated 
by Belsley et al. (1980) that involves the application of the DFITS statistic to find 
out the countries associated with high combinations of residual and leverage 
statistics. Moreover, to ensure that the estimated effect is not driven by the number 
of instruments, the investigation employs the “1 lag restriction” technique following 
Roodman (2009) that uses only certain lags instead of all available lags as 
instruments. The treatment of each regressor according to their exogeneity levels is 
based on upper and lower bound conditions (Roodman, 2006).
16
 
Along with coefficient estimates obtained using the System GMM estimator, tables 
also report three tests of the validity of identifying assumptions: Hansen’s (1982) test 
of over-identifying restrictions for the joint validity of moment conditions;
17
 
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) AR(1) and AR(2) tests in first differences. The AR(1) 
test is of the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation, which can be rejected 
under the identifying assumption that εit is not serially correlated; and the AR(2) test 
is of the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, which should not be 
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 For detailed information regarding upper and lower bound conditions, see Appendix 2-A. 
17
 It is of note that some of the Hansen test statistics during the analysis (especially when the 
investigation stratifies the data set into separate subsamples) yield high p-values (e.g., in excess of 
0.90). This can be a warning signal that too many moment conditions are in use; and therefore, the 
results from these specifications must be read with caution. 
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rejected. In addition, to control for heteroskedasticity, the Windmeijer (2005) small-
sample correction is applied. 
2.3. Estimation Results 
Table 2-3 reports the estimation results obtained from the tariffs and economic 
growth analysis. Part 1 investigates this relationship first non-linearly employing the 
interaction terms, and then linearly by stratifying countries into low-half and high-
half income subsamples. Part 2 examines the linear association of this relationship 
for each income rank.  
The investigation of how the effect induced by tariffs on economic growth is 
transfered onto long-run growth determinants is presented in Tables 2-4 – 2-7. Table 
2-4 estimates the non-linear relationship between tariffs and fertility rates first using 
the quadratic and then interaction term specification. This link is also examined for 
low-half and high-half income subsamples where fertility is linearly related with 
tariffs. The same approach is applied for the analysis of tariff rates with life 
expectancy, infant mortality and education where the results are reported, 
respectively, in Tables 2-5, 2-6 and 2-7. 
Table 2-8 explores the effects of tariff rates on infrastructure as a potential channel 
through which tariffs can affect growth and development for low income economies. 
2.3.1. Tariffs and Growth 
Figure 2-1 presents a simple illustration how the relationships between tariffs and 
economic growth depend on the level of income. The upper graphs consider the 
relationship between growth and two tariffs-initial income interaction terms (logged 
initial income and the World Bank’s income ranking indicator), while the lower 
graphs explore this link for different subsamples where growth and tariffs are related 
linearly. In each case, the residuals of a growth regression on a set of variables are 
compared with the residuals of tariffs (either interacted or linear) regression on the 
same variables.
18
 This produces adjusted measures of tariffs which are purged from 
                                                          
18
 Partial regression estimates are obtained in two stages. First, both the dependent variable and the 
isolated independent variable are projected onto the additional set of regressors under consideration. 
Next, the residuals of the dependent variable are regressed against the residuals of the independent 
variable. The figures are produced using OLS regressions. 
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any collinearity with the standard growth determinants. The upper graphs illustrate 
clearly a negative significant relationship between growth and tariffs for 
economically developed countries. This fact is supported by the lower graphs where 
this relationship is negative for the high-income subsample and positive for the low-
income group. 
The estimation results for the growth and tariffs analysis are illustrated in Table 2-3. 
Part 1 examines this relationship with introduction of both tariffs/income level and 
tariffs/income ranking interaction terms. Tariffs and interaction terms enter 
significantly taking the expected signs. Combining these two terms enables the 
identification of a threshold of initial income per capita level above (below) which a 
higher level of protectionism dampens (increases) economic growth. The point 
estimates of threshold levels are close to the cut-off level used to stratify the 
countries into high and low income groups. Stratifying countries into low-half and 
high-half income subsamples illustrates, respectively, positive and negative 
significant impact of tariffs on economic growth.
19
 Regarding quantitative 
significance, the impact on growth of a 10-percentage-point increase in tariffs is 
estimated as 1.2 percentage points among the low-half income countries, and −1.8 
percentage points among high-half income countries.
20
  
Part 2 of Table 2-3 runs the same exercise for the four income ranks. In all cases, 
tariffs enter positively for the poorest and lower-middle income countries, while this 
effect is negative for higher-middle and the richest income group. For all income 
groups, except for income rank 2 countries, tariffs generally illustrate a significant 
impact on growth, implying that the estimated effect of tariffs for the low-half 
income subsample is mainly driven by the poorest countries. Application of 
additional sensitivity restrictions mostly does not alter the significance of the 
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 All estimates reported in Part 1 of Table 2-3 are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique 
following Roodman (2009). When all available lags are employed, the coefficient estimates of tariffs 
are 0.004 for low-half subsample, and -0.007 for high-half subsample. These estimates are, 
respectively, 0.005 and -0.011 when outliers are eliminated from these subsamples. Note that DeJong 
and Ripoll’s (2006) estimates obtained excluding outlier countries are, respectively, 0.004 and -0.011; 
which are almost the same with the estimates here when the same specifications are used.   
20
 These measures are obtained by multiplying the coefficient estimate by the percentage-point change 
of 10, dividing by the time span between income observations (5 years), and then multiplying by 100 
to convert to a percentage-point measurement. 
26 
 
estimates.
21
 Regarding quantitative significance, using the estimates produced by the 
OLS (GMM) estimator, the impact on growth of a 10-percentage-point increase in 
tariffs is estimated as 1.2 (1.4) percentage points among the poorest countries, and    
-1.8 (-2.4) percentage points among the richest countries. 
2.3.2. Tariffs and Long-Run Development  
The hypothesis regarding the determinants of long-run growth is that the signs of θ1 
and θ2 in the baseline specification (2i) is determined by the correlation between real 
per capita income and the variables under interest, such that tariffs can have impact 
through income. For instance, since the marginal impact of tariff rates on economic 
growth is declining in initial income, then taking into account negative correlation 
between fertility and income, tariff rates are expected to increase fertility when the 
income level of an economy is increasing. Alternatively, the impact of tariffs on 
fertility should be negative for low-half subsample, and positive for high-half 
subsample. The same intuition is applied for interaction term specifications of tariffs 
contingency on life expectancy, infant mortality, and education.  
The signs of linear and non-linear terms of tariffs when employing the quadratic 
term specification are expected to be the reverse of that of the interaction term 
specification. A simple explanation is that the square term for tariff rates captures the 
impact of high trade limitations, where interaction term explains the effect of 
limitations to trade while the income level of an economy is increasing. The reverse 
signs are expected, due to the fact that countries tend to apply relatively lower tariff 
rates as an economy becomes richer (see Table 2-1). For instance, the linear tariffs 
term captures the effect of the appication of relatively lower trade limitations tend to 
be applied by relatively richer economies. Since tariffs decrease income for higher 
income level countries, the impact of the linear tariffs term on fertility is expected to 
be positive. The quadratic tariffs term in turn captures the effect of the application of 
relatively higher barriers to trade tend to be implemented by relatively poorer 
economies. As the application of tariffs increases income for lower income level 
economies, the quadratic term should decrease fertility. For both linear and quadratic 
cases, the negative correlation between fertility and income is considered. Therefore, 
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 The significance of tariffs estimates for upper-middle income subsample exhibits sensitivity across 
specifications. However, it is of note that the magnitude of estimates is lying within one standard 
deviation with the high-half income group estimates. 
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the signs of the linear and square tariff terms are expected to be the identical with the 
fertility case for infant mortality; and opposite for life expectancy and education 
since these indicators are positively correlated with income. Also note that for linear 
and quadratic terms of income, the signs are expected to be reverse of that of tariff 
terms.  
2.3.2.1. Tariffs and Fertility 
A simple illustration of how the impact of income on fertility rates changes with the 
income level of a country is presented in Figure 2-2. The plots illustrate a significant 
negative income effect on fertility when income rank 4 countries are excluded from 
the sample, while this effect is positive and not significantly different from zero for 
the richest economies.
22
 The implication of this relationship can be explained with 
the increased value of time of parents, a substitution of quality of children for 
quantity as income increases, where for the highest income level countries the effect 
of income on fertility is nil. 
The estimation results for the fertility and tariffs analysis are reported in Table 2-4.
23
 
Linear income terms enter negatively, while square terms demonstrate positive 
association with fertility, supporting the findings from Figure 2-2. In all cases, the 
estimates of the impact of both linear and non-linear tariff rates on fertility take the 
expected signs. The estimated non-linear impact of tariffs is always significant. The 
linear tariffs term loses its significance when it is interacted with the World Bank’s 
income ranking index, while shows strong quantitative impact when the interaction 
term with logged initial income and its quadratic term are employed.  
The coefficient estimates of the tariffs and interaction terms take, respectively, 
negative and positive signs implying that the more developed an economy is, the 
higher is the point estimate of the impact of tariffs on fertility. The point estimates of 
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 While not reported separately, partial estimation results for low-half subsample demonstrate a 
significant negative impact of income on fertility, while for high-half subsample the negative impact 
of income is mainly driven by income rank 3 countries. 
23
 The investigation under “Barro-Lee specification” in Table 2-4 allows fertility to respond non-
linearly to the values of the real investment ratio and the ratio of government expenditure to GDP. 
However, the original Barro and Lee (1994) specification does not include these variables, while 
along with initial income, schooling and life expectancy, allows fertility to react with respect to infant 
mortality. It is of note that alternative treatments of these specifications do not alter the key results for 
tariff rates.  
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threshold of initial income per capita levels are close to the cut-off level between 
income rank 1 and rank 2 countries classification. This is also supported by the point 
estimates of threshold of initial income rank analysis where a country’s income level 
is required to be higher than rank 1 in order to have total positive effect of tariffs on 
fertility. The threshold level for tariff rates circles around 25%, implying that fertility 
initially rises with tariffs, and then declines when tariff rates exceed the cut-off 
level.
24
  
Splitting countries into low-half and high-half income groups illustrates, 
respectively, negative (insignificant) and positive impact of tariffs on fertility. 
Regarding quantitative significance, the impact on fertility of a 10-percentage-point 
increase in tariffs is estimated as -0.6% among the low-half income countries, and 
3.8% among high-half income countries.  
2.3.2.2. Tariffs and Life Expectancy 
The estimation results for the life expectancy and tariffs analysis are reported in 
Table 2-5, where linear and quadratic income terms are, respectively, positive and 
negative illustrating a highly significant impact on life expectancy. This tendency 
can be explained by the long-term convergence in life expectancy where the most of 
the improvements occur in early stages of economic development, and as the 
percentage of agricultural segment of the population starts to decline when countries 
become richer, further increases in economic development begin to yield to 
diminished returns for life expectancy since the broader population enjoys elevated 
living standards (see Clark, 2011). The estimated effects of tariff rates also 
demonstrate strong quantitative impact where both the linear and quadratic terms 
take correct signs. The threshold levels of tariff rates ranges from 17.04% to 24.19%. 
Investigation of a non-linear impact of tariffs using interaction terms allows life 
expectancy to respond to the values of real investment and government expenditure 
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 The threshold levels of tariff rates across different specifications during the analysis vary between 
17% and 31%, which is informative for further investigations; and can be helpful for construction of 
proxies for trade openness where most researchers employed 40% as a breakpoint level for economy’s 
closeness. For example, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) criticized Sachs and Warner’s (1995) index of 
openness emphasizing that very little of the dummy’s statistical power would be lost if the index was 
constructed without using the most direct measures of trade - tariff and nontariff barriers where 
authors applied 40% as a threshold. 
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ratios, in addition to the original Barro and Lee (1994) specification. Both tariffs and 
its interaction demonstrate significant differential impacts on life expectancy taking, 
respectively, negative and positive signs, when an interaction with logged initial 
income is considered. However, this effect disappears when tariffs are interacted 
with the World Bank’s income ranking index. The point estimates of threshold levels 
for initial income are lower than the cut-off level of income rank 1 classification.  
Note that the signs of estimation results for tariffs and its interaction with initial 
income contradict expectations of a positive effect for tariffs and a negative effect 
for the interaction term. Figure 2-3 attempts to find an explanation why it would be 
the case. The plots illustrate significant positive income effect on life expectancy for 
the sample when the poorest countries are excluded, while this effect is not 
significantly different from zero for the lowest income level sample.
25
 According to 
the estimation results, marginal impact of tariff rates becomes to be positive after the 
breakpoint level of $1543 which matches with the middle of income rank 1 sample. 
However, it is of note here that the investigation in Section 2.3.1 illustrates a positive 
significant effect of tariffs on income which starts to marginally decrease after the 
cut-off level of $5609. Therefore, one might expect tariff rates to marginally increase 
life expectancy from the level of $1543 up to the threshold level of $5609 and then 
to observe a negative association between the variables of interest. This is indeed 
supported by estimation results when the sample is stratified into low-half and high-
half income groups. It seems that the positive sign of the interaction term is driven 
by the fact that the effect of tariffs on life expectancy tends to have larger weight 
among low-half income countries than among high-half income countries.
26
 Taking 
into consideration all the evidence – (i) differential effect of tariffs on life 
expectancy occurs after the threshold level of $1543, (ii) income does not affect life 
expectancy significantly for the lowest income distribution, and (iii) the dominated 
tariffs effect on life expectancy in low-half subsample – one might expect tariffs and 
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 Partial impact of income on life expectancy for income rank 1 subsample is estimated as 0.150. 
While not reported separately, this effect increases in magnitude for income rank 2 subsample and 
reaches its peak illustrating the estimated impact of 0.334; and then starts to decay demonstrating the 
estimated impact of 0.033 for income rank 3, and 0.026 for income rank 4 subsample. This is 
consistent with the idea that the link between income and life expectancy is stronger among poorer 
nations. 
26
 Notice that the magnitude of the point estimates of tariffs on life expectancy for low-half subsample 
dominates the point estimates for high-half subsample. 
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its interaction term to be, respectively, positively insignificant and positively 
significant which turns out to be true for linear tariffs term when interaction with the 
World Bank’s income ranking index is employed. However, the interaction term 
itself, demonstrates insignificant impact, probably reflecting a contradictory effect, 
perhaps because of the reason that positive and negative tariffs effects on life 
expectancy, respectively, for low-half and high-half subsamples cancels each other 
out. 
Regarding quantitative significance, the impact on life expectancy of a 10- 
percentage-point increase in tariffs is estimated as 0.8% among the low-half income 
countries, and -0.6% among high-half income countries. 
2.3.2.3. Tariffs and Infant Mortality 
Table 2-6 applies the same analysis for infant mortality. Income shows sensitivity 
when quadratic term specification is introduced, however demonstrates a highly 
significant negative impact on mortality when interaction term specification is 
employed.
27
 The intuition here is that higher income could possibly lead to improved 
nutrition, sanitation, and health care, and would thereby tend to reduce infant 
mortality.  
The estimates of the impact of linear and non-linear tariff rates on mortality take the 
expected signs under both approaches. The linear and square terms of tariffs 
demonstrate a strong qualitative impact for both sets of control variables which is 
also the case when the analysis employs tariff rates interaction with logged initial 
income. However, the estimates exhibit sensitivity to the introduction of “1 lag 
restriction” which reduces the precision, while changing the point estimates very 
little.  
When the World Bank’s income rank index is used as an interaction term, the linear 
tariffs measures do not show a significant impact on mortality. The interaction term 
instead enters significantly illustrating some sensitivity across specifications. 
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 Although the results for income under the first approach are too sensitive, when the analysis 
employs all available lags instead of “1 lag” instruments, the quadratic term of income illustrate 
significant negative impact on infant mortality where this association is not significantly different 
from zero for the linear income term; supporting the idea that the link between income and infant 
mortality is stronger among wealthier nations, but not among poorer nations (see Brady et al., 2007).   
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Threshold analysis displays that country’s income level is required to be higher than 
rank 1 in order to have positive effect of tariffs on infant mortality. The breakpoint 
level for tariff rates ranges between 25% and 31%. 
Stratifying countries into low-half (high-half) income groups illustrates a negative 
(positive) impact of tariffs on infant mortality which is in line with the expectations. 
Tariffs demonstrate a significant impact only for high-half income subsample. 
Regarding quantitative significance, the impact on infant mortality of a 10-
percentage-point increase in tariffs is estimated as -1.6% among the low-half income 
countries, and 6.6% among high-half income countries. 
2.3.2.4. Tariffs and Education 
Table 2-7 reports the estimation results for the relationship between tariffs and 
school-enrolment ratios at primary level. Estimated specifications examine the 
dependence of the current school enrolment ratios by gender on income and levels of 
educational attainment in the presence of tariff rates.
28
 The estimation results 
illustrate no effect of tariff rates on male primary school-enrolment ratio. Application 
of the tariff interaction with logged initial income demonstrates significant impact of 
both linear and non-linear terms for female primary school-enrolment ratio, taking, 
respectively, negative and positive signs; however the significant effect from the 
linear tariffs term disappears when the World Bank’s income rank index is used. The 
point estimates of threshold levels are lower than the cut-off level of income rank 1 
classification. 
An analogous situation to the life expectancy and tariffs relationship arises here, 
where the tariffs and its interaction term were expected to demonstrate, respectively, 
positive and negative impacts. Figure 2-4 illustrates significant positive income 
effect on female primary school-enrolment ratio for the lowest income countries, 
while this effect is nil for the sample when the poorest countries are excluded. The 
estimation results show that the differential effect of tariff rates appears after the 
breakpoint level of $1754. Therefore, tariff rates are expected to increase marginally 
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 The estimation results using quadratic terms are not reported since the analysis does not find any 
significant impact of tariffs. Furthermore, following Barro and Lee (1994) the effect of tariffs on 
secondary-school enrolment ratio by gender are also investigated, but not reported since the 
investigation of this relationship did not show any robust evidence between the variables of interest. 
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the female primary-school enrolment ratio from the level of $1754 up to the 
threshold level of $5609 and then observe negative association between the variables 
of interest.
29
 It is indeed supported by estimation results when the sample is stratified 
into low-half and high-half income groups. For both subsamples, the impact of 
tariffs on female primary schooling is not significantly different from zero.
30
  
Overall, the results suggest that the detrimental and generally significant association 
between tariffs and long-run development indicators is only apparent among rich 
countries, while this effect is mostly not substantial among poor countries. It seems 
that for lower income economies, the gains from the implementation of a higher 
tariff policy have a positive effect on economic growth for a short time period only 
and mostly are not reflected in development indicators. This is consistent with 
Bourguignon (2011), who argues that an increase in economic growth does not 
necessarily mean an increase in development, and GDP of a country can grow 
without health, education and poverty situations evolving positively. 
2.3.3. Tariffs and Infrastructure 
The exploration now turns to relationships between tariffs and infrastructure as a 
potential channel that might drive the effect of tariff rates for low income economies. 
Part 1 of Table 2-8 reports the results from the non-linear relationship between tariffs 
and infrastructure proxied by the percentage of paved roads.
31
 The linear and non-
linear terms of tariffs take, respectively, positive and negative signs across all 
specifications, implying that the point estimate of the impact of tariffs on paved 
                                                          
29
 Income significantly increases female primary schooling up to the cut-off level between income 
rank 1 and rank 2 country classifications. Therefore, tariffs theoretically can significantly affect 
female primary schooling up to the level of $2650, and then insignificant impact from tariffs is 
expected to be observed with the sign depending on which effect (negative or positive) dominates. 
The estimation results show that point estimates of tariffs on female primary schooling for low-half 
subsample dominate the point estimates for high-half subsample. Consequently, one might expect 
tariffs and its interaction term to demonstrate, respectively, positive insignificant and positive 
significant impact. In order to check whether the significance of tariffs for low-half subsample are 
affected because of pooling the income rank 1 and rank 2 countries, the investigation runs the same 
exercise separately for income rank 1 subsample which demonstrates no effect of tariffs on female 
primary school enrolment ratio. 
30
 Following the argument by Galor and Mountford (2008) that in developed countries the gains from 
trade have been directed towards investment in education, the effect of tariffs on average years of 
primary, secondary and total schooling over 15 years of age by gender are also investigated. However, 
the analysis of these relationships did not show any robust evidence between the variables of interest.  
31
 These results must be read with caution since their scope is limited only after the 1990s period and 
to fewer observations than the benchmark exercises. 
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roads is decreasing with the income level of the economy. OLS estimation results of 
both tariffs term generally demonstrate significant impact, where turning points 
ranges between income rank 1 and 2. 
System GMM estimation results demonstrate a significant impact of tariffs and its 
interaction with logged initial income only when potential outliers are eliminated. 
Using the product of tariffs and the World Bank income rank index exhibits a 
significant negative impact only for interaction term. The point estimates of the 
threshold analysis show that country’s income level is required to be higher than 
rank 1 in order to have a differential impact of tariffs. 
Part 2 estimates the linear impact of tariffs on infrastructure for different subsamples. 
Splitting countries into low-half and high-half income groups illustrates, 
respectively, negative and positive impact of tariffs on paved roads, which is 
supportive with the predictions. This effect is only significant for high-half income 
group when the OLS estimator is employed.
32
 Regarding quantitative significance, 
using the estimates produced by the OLS (GMM) estimator, the impact on paved 
roads of a 10-percentage-point increase in tariffs is estimated as -8.96 (-9.77) 
percentage points among the high-half income countries, and 0.15 (1.70) percentage 
points among low-half income countries. 
OLS estimation of tariffs effects on infrastructure for each income rank illustrates a 
significant impact for income ranks 1, 3 and 4 when outlier countries are removed. 
For each income rank, tariffs mostly take the correct sign illustrating a positive 
impact for the poorest and lower-middle income countries, and negative impact for 
higher-middle and the richest income group. The GMM estimation results are 
essentially consistent with those achieved by OLS. It is of note that significant 
impact of tariffs on infrastructure appears only for those income ranks where tariffs 
significantly affect economic growth as described in Part 2 of Table 2-3. Regarding 
quantitative significance, using the estimates produced by the OLS (GMM) 
estimator, the impact on growth of a 10-percentage-point increase in tariffs is 
estimated as 1.6 (1.6) percentage points among the poorest countries, and -11.8        
(-15.7) percentage points among the richest countries. 
                                                          
32
 Although imprecise, it is of note that the point estimates of tariffs for high-half income group, 
produced by the GMM estimator, lies within one standard deviation of that achieved via OLS.  
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These results are consistent with Francois and Manchin’s (2013) argument that 
within developing countries, the reason why the least developed countries 
underperform in international trade compared with other less developed countries 
can be explained by the role of physical infrastructure. Alternatively, given that 
everything else is constant, the gains from trade barriers can increase the quality of 
infrastructure facilitating a country’s competitiveness in trade which might lead to 
economic growth and development. 
2.4. Conclusion  
The empirical analysis has confirmed that tariff rates have a differential impact on 
economic growth with results suggesting that application of limitations to trade is 
detrimental for economically developed countries, but has a potential to improve 
growth prospects of developing economies. In addition, the analysis contributes to a 
trade literature showing that the implementation of high tariff rates in developed 
economies is harmful not only for economic growth, but also for long-run 
development indicators. Specifically, the findings demonstrate that all negative 
associations for growth from tariffs, namely increased fertility and mortality, reduced 
life expectancy and education are only apparent among the world’s rich countries. 
This effect is robust accross different specifications, and is consitent with predictions 
of standard neoclassical theory regarding the detrimental effect of trade barriers on a 
country’s economy. However, how the positive significant effect of tariffs on growth 
is transfered onto the determinants of long-run growth is less clear for lower income 
economies. Indeed, the significant effect from tariffs appears only for the life 
expectancy relationship, showing qualitatively weak results for the rest of the 
development indicators. The exploration of channels through which tariff rates can 
generate positive growth and development effects for less developed economies 
reveals that infrastructure might be a potential trigger which mainly drives this effect 
for the world’s poorest countries. 
The empirical research was constrained by the limited availability of data on the 
variables of interest, inducing the analysis to concentrate on relatively small samples 
(especially when the data set is stratified into separate subsamples) and a short time 
span (in particular, for the tariffs and infrastructure analysis). Therefore, these results 
must be read with caution before drawing reliable conclusions and should be taken 
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as a suggestive of the deeper structure linking trade restrictions and development 
indicators. Short of having the luxury of better and longer data, there is also no 
obvious way to deal with the robustness constraints imposed by the limitations of the 
sample. 
The analysis also suggests a number of paths for future research concerning the 
triggers of positive effects on economic growth from trade barriers for developing 
economies. Various channels by which economic growth can be affected have been 
discussed in the literature, such as investment, government expenditure, 
consumption, the trade-off between exports and imports. Although not reported, the 
analysis attempted to link these relationships with tariffs, but unfortunately, the 
estimation results did not reveal any robust evidence. However deeper investigation 
with better data on this is needed.  
In addition, a particularly promising avenue of future research would be to analyse 
whether the paucity of evidence from tariffs on indicators of long-run development 
in lower income economies is driven by the lack of infrastructure in these countries, 
that is whether the effect of tariffs on development indicators is contingent on 
infrastructure levels. The analysis of whether trade limitations generate any 
externalities through different channels such as countries’ level of industrialisation 
and various good sectors is another interesting avenue to investigate. 
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Figure 2-1: Partial Regression Plots for Tariffs and Economic Growth 
 
 
Note: The set of regressors includes log of initial income and life expectancy, schooling (male and female), investment and 
government expenditure ratios, and time fixed effects. Partial regression plots for interaction terms also include tariffs (linear) 
into the specification. The figures are produced using OLS regressions. 
 
Figure 2-2: Partial Regression Plots for Fertility and Income 
 
 
Note: The set of regressors includes tariffs (linear), log of life expectancy and infant mortality, schooling (male and female), 
and time fixed effects following the specification as defined in Barro and Lee (1994). The figures are produced using OLS 
regressions.
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Figure 2-3: Partial Regression Plots for Life expectancy and Income 
 
 
 
Note: The set of regressors includes tariffs (linear), schooling (male and female), and time fixed effects following the 
specification as defined in Barro and Lee (1994). The figures are produced using OLS regressions. 
 
Figure 2-4: Partial Regression Plots for  
Female Primary School-Enrolment Ratio and Income 
 
 
 
Note: The set of regressors includes tariffs (linear), schooling (male and female), and time fixed effects following the 
specification as defined in Barro and Lee (1994). The figures are produced using OLS regressions. 
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Table 2-1: Descriptive Statistics for Growth and Tariff Rates 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
Sample split Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Full sample Tariffs 70 10.09 7.85 0.01 31.54 
 Growth 70 1.45 2.06 -6.49 6.09 
High income Tariffs 21 2.91 3.33 0.01 11.44 
 
Growth 21 1.87 0.76 -0.89 2.79 
Upper-middle Tariffs 13 8.22 5.89 0.60 22.95 
 Growth 13 1.53 1.76 -0.88 5.26 
Lower-middle Tariffs 18 12.90 6.63 2.64 30.33 
 
Growth 18 1.27 2.34 -3.35 6.09 
Low income Tariffs 18 16.99 6.59 3.68 31.54 
 Growth 18 1.07 2.89 -6.49 4.49 
High/Upper-Mid. Tariffs 34 4.94 5.12 0.01 22.95 
 
Growth 34 1.74 1.23 -0.89 5.26 
Lower-Mid./Low Tariffs 36 14.95 6.84 2.64 31.54 
 Growth 36 1.17 2.59 -6.49 6.09 
Note: All descriptive statistics are based on cross country averages for 70 countries sample. Growth rates are computed as the 
first differences of logged income per capita. 
 
 
Table 2-2: Descriptive Statistics for Development Indicators and Infrastructure 
 
 Full 
sample 
High 
income 
Upper-
middle 
Lower-
middle 
Low 
income 
High/ 
Upper-Mid. 
Lower-
Mid./Low 
Fertility 3.77 
(1.79) 
1.97 
(0.56) 
3.23 
(1.09) 
4.44 
(1.39) 
5.58 
(1.34) 
2.45 
(1.01) 
5.01 
(1.46) 
Life Expectancy 65.66 
(9.47) 
75.19 
(1.71) 
68.25 
(5.03) 
62.88 
(7.68) 
55.43 
(6.88) 
72.54 
(4.76) 
59.16 
(8.12) 
Infant Mortality 48.71 
(40.03) 
10.99 
(5.49) 
37.61 
(23.53) 
61.51 
(40.03) 
87.94 
(28.68) 
21.17 
(19.79) 
74.72 
(36.84) 
Female Prim. Sch. Enr. 90.29 
(15.99) 
98.95 
(1.94) 
98.86 
(2.68) 
89.75 
(17.78) 
75.49 
(17.65) 
98.92 
(2.18) 
82.62 
(18.89) 
Male Prim. Sch. Enr.  95.23 
(9.04) 
98.87 
(2.07) 
99.67 
(0.73) 
94.87 
(9.39) 
88.65 
(12.39) 
99.15 
(1.75) 
91.76 
(11.28) 
Paved Roads 56.74 
(33.66) 
76.80 
(26.87) 
43.02 
(33.58) 
50.55 
(33.78) 
43.84 
(32.74) 
64.13 
(33.33) 
47.87 
(32.67) 
Note: The descriptive statistics of fertility, life expectancy and infant mortality are based on cross country averages of 70 
countries. Summary of primary enrolment ratio measures by gender is restricted to 68 countries sample. The respective 
statistics of paved roads are summarized for 44 countries data set. Standard deviations are presented in the parentheses. 
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Table 2-3: Part 1 
Tariffs and Growth Relationship 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  TARIFF/INCOME   
LEVEL INTERACTION 
TARIFF/INCOME  
RANK INTERACTION 
SPLITTING into  
INCOME GROUPS 
OUTLIERS 
REMOVED 
  Main Model Outliers Removed Main Model Outliers Removed Low-half High-half Low-half High-half 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 0.933*** 
(0.039) 
0.951*** 
(0.039) 
0.949*** 
(0.035) 
0.953*** 
(0.038) 
0.860*** 
(0.065) 
0.842*** 
(0.053) 
0.869*** 
(0.056) 
0.856*** 
(0.036) 
Tariffs (ad-valorem) 0.033** 
(0.013) 
0.041*** 
(0.011) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.005** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
Tariffs*GDP -0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Tariffs*RANK 
  
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Life expectancy (log) 0.559** 
(0.237) 
0.644** 
(0.272) 
0.466* 
(0.251) 
0.557** 
(0.267) 
1.032** 
(0.413) 
0.621* 
(0.356) 
0.895** 
(0.388) 
0.696 
(0.437) 
Secondary schooling (female) 0.033 
(0.082) 
0.048 
(0.094) 
0.007 
(0.082) 
0.073 
(0.090) 
0.003 
(0.142) 
-0.089 
(0.084) 
0.010 
(0.114) 
0.027 
(0.088) 
Secondary schooling (male) -0.035 
(0.083) 
-0.080 
(0.097) 
-0.006 
(0.086) 
-0.092 
(0.092) 
0.006 
(0.125) 
0.108 
(0.089) 
0.015 
(0.106) 
-0.006 
(0.087) 
I/Y (Investment/GDP) 0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.0037 
(0.002) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
G/Y (Government burden/GDP) -0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Countries/Observations 60/267 56/249 60/267 55/245 28/118 32/149 25/105 28/130 
Threshold analysis 
Initial GDP p.c. 5609 
(3182) 
3159 
(1417) 
      
Income Rank    2.45 
(0.617) 
1.82 
(0.377) 
    
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.342 0.632 0.445 0.570 0.428 0.483 0.647 0.463 
(b) Serial Correlation:         
           First-Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.007 0.019 0.002 
           Second-Order 0.922 0.880 0.920 0.806 0.242 0.392 0.665 0.769 
Note: All estimated results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). The excluded countries for tariff/income level interaction specification are Iran, Korea Rep., Papua New Guinea and Sierra 
Leone. In addition, Iceland is also excluded for tariff/income rank interaction specification. Eliminated countries from low-half income group are Korea Rep., Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone, while Ireland, Iran, Iceland and 
South Africa are excluded for high-half income subsample. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. All specifications also control for time fixed effects. Following the upper and lower bound restrictions offered by 
Roodman (2006), the analysis treats tariff rates (and its interactions), investment ratio and the ratio of government expenditure to GDP as endogenous, while other variables employed in the specification as predetermined. The time 
span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1975-2000 period (T=5). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. 
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Table 2-3: Part 2 
Tariffs and Growth Relationship 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real GDP 
Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and GMM System 
   OLS GMM System 
   Full 
Subsamples  
Outliers 
Removed 
Full 
Subsamples 
Outliers 
Removed 
   impact std.error p value impact std.error p value impact std.error p value impact std.error p value 
Income Rank 1 0.004 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.081 0.007 0.003 0.046 
Income Rank 2 0.001 0.003 0.860 0.002 0.003 0.307 0.002 0.004 0.598 0.003 0.004 0.539 
Income Rank 3 -0.007 0.005 0.176 -0.010 0.007 0.146 -0.007 0.003 0.041 -0.010 0.007 0.212 
Income Rank 4 -0.007 0.002 0.007 -0.009 0.002 0.000 -0.006 0.003 0.021 -0.012 0.002 0.000 
Note: All specifications control for log of initial income and life expectancy, schooling (male and female), investment and government expenditure ratios and time fixed effects. For the GMM 
system estimator under the specification when outliers removed, the estimated results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). The excluded countries 
from income rank 1 sample are Botswana and Papua New Guinea; from income rank 2 are Korea Rep. and Sierra Leone; from income rank 3 are Ireland, Iran and South Africa; and from 
income rank 4 are Austria, Iceland and Venezuela. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. The number of countries/observations for each subsample (the number of 
countries/observations from removing outliers is presented in parentheses) is as following: income rank 1- 15/63 (13/54); income rank 2 – 13/55 (11/47); income rank 3- 11/51 (8/36); income 
rank 4 – 21/98 (18/85). Following the upper and lower bound restrictions offered by Roodman (2006), the analysis treats tariff rates (and its interactions), investment ratio and the ratio of 
government expenditure to GDP as endogenous, while other variables employed in the specification as predetermined. The time span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1975-
2000 period (T=5). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. 
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Table 2-4 
Tariffs and Fertility Relationship 
Dependent Variable: Logged fertility (woman’s prospective number of live births) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  
Basic 
Relationship 
Barro-Lee 
Specification 
with Tariffs 
TARIFF/INCOME 
LEVEL INTERACTION 
TARIFF/INCOME 
RANK INTERACTION 
SPLITTING into  
INCOME GROUPS 
OUTLIERS 
REMOVED 
 Main Model Outliers Removed Main Model Outliers Removed Low-half High-half Low-half High-half 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -2.737*** 
(0.987) 
-0.623 
(0.628) 
-0.283*** 
(0.094) 
-0.282*** 
(0.102) 
-0.306*** 
(0.091) 
-0.283*** 
(0.095) 
-0.182 
(0.125) 
-0.194* 
(0.105) 
-0.111 
(0.137) 
-0.175* 
(0.096) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) squared 0.134** 
(0.057) 
0.025 
(0.034) 
        
Tariffs (ad-valorem) 0.033** 
(0.014) 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.073** 
(0.034) 
-0.087* 
(0.046) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
0.018*** 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
Tariff squared -0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
        
Tariffs*GDP   0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.011** 
(0.006) 
      
Tariffs*RANK     0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
    
Life expectancy (log)  4.525 
(11.859) 
-2.261*** 
(0.606) 
-2.170*** 
(0.689) 
-1.974*** 
(0.529) 
-1.800*** 
(0.584) 
-0.788 
(0.778) 
-2.909*** 
(0.616) 
-0.930 
(0.766) 
-2.974*** 
(0.638) 
Life expectancy (log) squared  -0.729 
(1.493) 
        
Secondary schooling (male)  0.245 
(0.233) 
-0.017 
(0.096) 
-0.119 
(0.105) 
-0.011 
(0.104) 
-0.081 
(0.109) 
0.068 
(0.136) 
-0.131 
(0.155) 
-0.013 
(0.145) 
-0.141 
(0.139) 
Secondary schooling (male) squared  -0.032* 
(0.019) 
        
Secondary schooling (female)  -0.174 
(0.185) 
0.035 
(0.099) 
0.115 
(0.111) 
0.024 
(0.103) 
0.068 
(0.111) 
-0.099 
(0.132) 
0.146 
(0.149) 
-0.037 
(0.140) 
0.153 
(0.132) 
Secondary schooling (female) squared  0.027* 
(0.016) 
        
I/Y (Investment/GDP)  0.017 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
I/Y (Investment/GDP) squared  -0.0003 
(0.0002) 
        
G/Y (Gov. exp./GDP)  -0.018 
(0.016) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
G/Y (Gov. exp./GDP) squared  0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
        
Countries/Observations 70/303 70/303 70/303 67/292 70/303 66/289 36/147 34/156 34/142 33/152 
Threshold analysis 
Tariff Rate (%) 23.58 
(4.54) 
24.18 
(3.63) 
        
Initial GDP p.c.   2014 
(1180) 
2083 
(1038) 
      
Income Rank     1.27 
(0.715) 
1.15 
(0.706) 
    
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.183 0.827 0.846 0.219 0.920 0.133 0.971 0.989 0.936 0.971 
(b) Serial Correlation:           
                First-Order 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.042 0.015 0.052 
                Second-Order 0.237 0.233 0.281 0.183 0.697 0.372 0.184 0.583 0.203 0.837 
Note: All results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009), except the estimates for the “Main model” specifications. The excluded countries for tariff/income level interaction specification are Iceland, Israel and Togo. In addition, Paraguay is also excluded for tariff/income rank 
interaction specification. Eliminated countries from low-half income group are Ghana and Togo; and from high-half income group is Iceland. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. All specifications also control for time fixed effects. Following the upper and lower bound restrictions offered by Roodman 
(2006), the analysis treats tariff rates (and its interactions), income and schooling as endogenous, while other variables employed in the specification as predetermined. The time span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1975-2000 period (T=5). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, 
respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. 
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Table 2-5 
Tariffs and Life Expectancy Relationship 
Dependent Variable: Logged life expectancy (at birth, total years) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  
Basic 
Relationship 
Barro-Lee 
Specification 
with Tariffs 
TARIFF/INCOME 
LEVEL INTERACTION 
TARIFF/INCOME 
RANK INTERACTION 
SPLITTING into 
INCOME GROUPS 
OUTLIERS 
REMOVED 
  Low-half High-half Low-half High-half 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 0.901*** 
(0.212) 
0.527** 
(0.201) 
0.048* 
(0.027) 
0.068*** 
(0.021) 
0.061** 
(0.026) 
0.075*** 
(0.022) 
0.146** 
(0.057) 
0.043*** 
(0.014) 
0.161*** 
(0.043) 
0.049*** 
(0.017) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) squared -0.046*** 
(0.012) 
-0.026** 
(0.011) 
        
Tariffs (ad-valorem) -0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.027** 
(0.013) 
-0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
Tariffs squared 0.00013** 
(0.00005) 
0.00013** 
(0.00005) 
        
Tariffs*GDP   0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
      
Tariffs*RANK     0.0002 
(0.0013) 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
    
Sec. sch. (male)  -0.029 
(0.058) 
-0.002 
(0.033) 
-0.004 
(0.027) 
-0.004 
(0.037) 
-0.025 
(0.031) 
0.065* 
(0.032) 
0.019 
(0.019) 
0.039 
(0.035) 
0.031 
(0.021) 
Sec. sch. (male) squared  0.004 
(0.006) 
        
Sec. sch. (female)  0.077 
(0.051) 
0.025 
(0.033) 
0.022 
(0.026) 
0.033 
(0.039) 
0.043 
(0.032) 
-0.039 
(0.031) 
-0.013 
(0.018) 
-0.018 
(0.034) 
-0.021 
(0.021) 
Sec. sch. (female) squared  -0.007 
(0.005) 
        
I/Y (Investment/GDP)    0.002* 
(0.001) 
 0.003* 
(0.0016) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
G/Y (Government exp./GDP)    0.003 
(0.002) 
 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Countries/Observations 70/303 70/303 70/303 70/303 70/303 70/303 36/147 34/156 34/138 33/151 
Threshold analysis 
Tariff Rate (%) 24.19 
(5.60) 
17.04 
(4.22) 
        
Initial GDP p.c.   1543 
(937) 
1418 
(905) 
      
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.697 0.217 0.884 0.212 0.326 0.182 0.827 0.934 0.833 0.876 
(b) Serial Correlation:           
            First-Order 0.009 0.054 0.038 0.033 0.002 0.019 0.636 0.033 0.979 0.033 
            Second-Order 0.247 0.531 0.211 0.347 0.043 0.102 0.268 0.698 0.259 0.662 
Note: The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” following Roodman (2009). Excluded countries from low-half income group are Nicaragua and Syria; and from high-half income group is Costa Rica. For the interaction terms 
specifications, the results excluding outliers are not reported since elimination of potential outliers does not alter the results. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. All specifications also control for time fixed effects. Following the 
upper and lower bound restrictions offered by Roodman (2006), the analysis treats tariff rates (and its interactions), income and investment ratio as endogenous, while other variables employed in the specification as predetermined. The time span for 
the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1975-2000 period (T=5). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. 
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Table 2-6 
Tariffs and Infant Mortality Relationship 
Dependent Variable: Logged infant mortality (rate under-five, per 1000) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
   
Basic 
Relationship 
Barro-Lee 
Specification 
with Tariffs 
TARIFF/INCOME 
LEVEL INTERACTION 
TARIFF/INCOME 
RANK INTERACTION 
SPLITTING into 
INCOME GROUPS 
   a b a b a b a b Low-half High-half 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 0.906 
(1.495) 
1.746 
(1.439) 
-0.981*** 
(0.097) 
-1.002*** 
(0.098) 
-0.877*** 
(0.162) 
-0.854*** 
(0.148) 
-0.961*** 
(0.098) 
-0.953*** 
(0.094) 
-0.964*** 
(0.179) 
-0.878*** 
(0.162) 
-0.513** 
(0.215) 
-0.946*** 
(0.229) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) squared -0.097 
(0.087) 
-0.133 
(0.083) 
          
Tariffs (ad-valorem) 0.049** 
(0.019) 
0.052*** 
(0.017) 
-0.145* 
(0.073) 
-0.149 
(0.106) 
-0.127** 
(0.054) 
-0.112 
(0.066) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
-0.015 
(0.019) 
-0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.016 
(0.016) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
0.033** 
(0.015) 
Tariffs squared -0.0008** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
          
Tariffs*GDP   0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
      
Tariffs*RANK       0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
  
Sec. sch. (male)  0.489 
(0.336) 
  0.182 
(0.169) 
0.075 
(0.163) 
  0.214 
(0.184) 
0.093 
(0.166) 
-0.170 
(0.152) 
-0.112 
(0.272) 
Sec. sch. (male) squared  -0.046 
(0.031) 
          
Sec. sch. (female)  -0.601** 
(0.273) 
  -0.272* 
(0.159) 
-0.171 
(0.162) 
  -0.244 
(0.179) 
-0.155 
(0.166) 
-0.004 
(0.128) 
0.046 
(0.274) 
Sec. sch. (female) squared  0.052* 
(0.027) 
          
Countries/Observations 70/303 70/303 70/303 70/303 70/303 70/303 70/303 70/303 70/303 70/303 35/144 31/141 
Threshold analysis 
Tariff Rate (%) 31.13 
(4.12) 
24.85 
(2.07) 
          
Initial GDP p.c.   2302 
(1112) 
2467 
(1293) 
3863 
(1655) 
3783 
(2263) 
      
Income Rank       1.31 
(0.842) 
1.27 
(0.919) 
1.67 
(1.12) 
1.56 
(0.864) 
  
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.356 0.393 0.680 0.497 0.277 0.621 0.664 0.488 0.325 0.610 0.774 0.416 
(b) Serial Correlation:             
First-Order 0.039 0.170 0.981 0.974 0.938 0.904 0.044 0.045 0.057 0.077 0.101 0.365 
    Second-Order 0.944 0.556 0.546 0.545 0.275 0.266 0.214 0.207 0.107 0.120 0.037 0.252 
Note: Columns “a” apply all possible lags as instruments, while the rest of the estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). Excluded countries from high-half income group are Iran, South Africa 
and USA; and from low-half income group is Ghana. For the interaction term specifications, the results excluding outliers are not reported since elimination of potential outliers does not alter the results. The outliers are singled out OLS regressions. 
All specifications also control for time fixed effects. Following the upper and lower bound restrictions offered by Roodman (2006), the analysis treats tariff rates (and its interactions) and income as endogenous, while other variables employed in the 
specification as predetermined. The time span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1975-2000 period (T=5). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the 
parentheses. 
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Table 2-7 
Tariffs and Education Relationship 
Dependent Variable: Primary-school enrollment ratio (male and female) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  
TARIFF/INCOME 
LEVEL INTERACTION 
TARIFF/INCOME 
RANK INTERACTION 
SPLITTING into 
INCOME GROUPS 
 Low-half High-half 
 male 
primary 
female 
primary 
male 
primary 
female 
primary 
male 
primary 
female 
primary 
male 
primary 
female 
primary 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 4.027 
(3.254) 
1.287 
(5.901) 
3.984 
(3.023) 
2.396 
(5.583) 
4.779 
(4.704) 
4.666 
(9.629) 
0.067 
(0.831) 
-0.511 
(0.731) 
Tariffs (ad-valorem) -2.156 
(1.533) 
-5.869*** 
(2.004) 
0.065 
(0.283) 
-0.226 
(0.433) 
0.256 
(0.237) 
0.162 
(0.336) 
-0.100 
(0.111) 
-0.132 
(0.086) 
Tariffs*GDP 0.304 
(0.188) 
0.786*** 
(0.246) 
      
Tariffs*RANK   0.102 
(0.119) 
0.333* 
(0.187) 
    
Sec. sch. (male) 0.514 
(3.037) 
-2.414 
(4.765) 
1.875 
(3.071) 
0.609 
(4.480) 
6.727 
(5.902) 
2.890 
(7.124) 
-0.887 
(1.093) 
-0.445 
(1.111) 
Sec. sch.(female) -0.354 
(2.763) 
5.012 
(4.483) 
-1.536 
(2.771) 
2.074 
(3.839) 
-3.847 
(5.016) 
4.186 
(6.745) 
0.214 
(1.125) 
0.133 
(1.081) 
Countries/Observations 68/261 68/261 68/261 68/261 36/127 36/127 32/134 32/134 
Threshold analysis 
Initial GDP p.c. 1207 
(1142) 
1754 
(786) 
      
Income Rank    0.68 
(1.04) 
    
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.427 0.755 0.299 0.413 0.602 0.421 0.898 0.493 
(b) Serial Correlation:         
First-Order 0.114 0.794 0.123 0.413 0.167 0.071 0.344 0.523 
   Second-Order 0.425 0.855 0.387 0.985 0.491 0.960 0.207 0.746 
Note: All estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). The results excluding outliers are not reported since elimination of potential outliers does not alter the 
results. All specifications also control for time fixed effects. Following the upper and lower bound restrictions offered by Roodman (2006), the analysis treats tariff rates (and its interactions) and income as endogenous, 
while other variables employed in the specification as predetermined. The time span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1975-2000 period (T=5). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, 
respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. 
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Table 2-8: Part 1 
Tariffs and Infrastructure Relationship 
Dependent Variable: Roads, paved (% of total roads) 
Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and GMM System 
  OLS GMM System 
  TARIFF/INCOME 
LEVEL INTERACTION 
TARIFF/INCOME 
RANK INTERACTION 
TARIFF/INCOME 
LEVEL INTERACTION 
TARIFF/INCOME 
RANK INTERACTION 
  Main Model Outliers Removed Main Model Outliers Removed Main Model Outliers Removed Main Model Outliers Removed 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 31.465*** 
(7.446) 
30.051*** 
(5.415) 
33.835*** 
(6.325) 
28.366*** 
(6.001) 
72.828*** 
(23.957) 
59.384*** 
(17.149) 
44.607** 
(21.993) 
36.989 
(25.595) 
Tariffs (ad-valorem) 6.166 
(3.812) 
14.467*** 
(2.776) 
2.444*** 
(0.631) 
2.779*** 
(0.581) 
6.437 
(20.497) 
23.986** 
(10.315) 
3.405 
(2.040) 
4.817 
(2.938) 
Tariffs*GDP -0.729 
(0.495) 
-1.803*** 
(0.369) 
  -0.759 
(2.746) 
-3.004** 
(1.407) 
  
Tariffs*RANK   -1.233*** 
(0.269) 
-1.336*** 
(0.212) 
  -2.619* 
(1.426) 
-3.148** 
(1.493) 
Life expectancy (log) 39.183 
(35.459) 
70.326** 
(35.201) 
43.314 
(40.242) 
132.441** 
(58.335) 
3.795 
(245.563) 
-7.149 
(178.599) 
-11.714 
(199.835) 
0.457 
(345.601) 
Secondary schooling (female) -77.875*** 
(21.711) 
-57.683*** 
(16.023) 
-64.187*** 
(19.246) 
-59.319*** 
(16.955) 
-137.028 
(128.017) 
-69.721 
(65.508) 
-65.019 
(129.847) 
23.443 
(87.638) 
Secondary schooling (male) 73.583*** 
(22.057) 
53.362*** 
(16.023) 
59.587*** 
(19.406) 
54.695*** 
(16.174) 
91.899 
(143.423) 
53.127 
(75.484) 
42.461 
(131.302) 
-32.654 
(92.833) 
I/Y (Investment/GDP) 0.835 
(0.543) 
0.388 
(0.315) 
0.698 
(0.437) 
0.362 
(0.325) 
0.763 
(2.108) 
-0.364 
(1.230) 
0.912 
(1.302) 
0.306 
(1.205) 
G/Y (Government exp./GDP) 0.406 
(0.599) 
-0.261 
(0.357) 
0.506 
(0.563) 
-0.317 
(0.346) 
-0.555 
(1.743) 
0.186 
(0.908) 
0.179 
(1.489) 
1.025 
(1.239) 
Countries/Observations 44/75 40/68 44/75 40/69 44/75 40/68 44/75 40/69 
R-squared 0.62 0.78 0.68 0.77     
Hansen Test     0.573 0.326 0.569 0.788 
Threshold analysis 
Initial GDP p.c. 4703 
(4162) 
3059 
(786) 
  4782 
(22494) 
2932 
(1650) 
  
Income Rank   1.98 
(0.408) 
2.08 
(0.388) 
  1.29 
(0.769) 
1.53 
(0.641) 
Note: The excluded countries for tariff/income level interaction specification are Egypt, Jordan, Mauritius and Thailand. The excluded countries for tariff/income rank interaction specification are the same set of 
countries where Mauritius is replaced with Sierra Leone. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. All specifications also control for time fixed effects. Following the upper and lower bound restrictions 
offered by Roodman (2006), the analysis treats tariff rates (and its interactions), income, investment ratio and the ratio of government expenditure to GDP as endogenous, while other variables employed in the 
specification as predetermined. The time span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1975-2000 period (T=5). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. 
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Table 2-8: Part 2 
Tariffs and Infrastructure Relationship 
Dependent Variable: Roads, paved (% of total roads) 
Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and GMM System 
   OLS GMM System 
   Full 
Subsamples  
Outliers 
Removed 
Full 
Subsamples 
Outliers 
Removed 
   impact std.error p value impact std.error p value impact std.error p value impact std.error p value 
High-half  -4.834 1.357 0.001 -4.480 1.063 0.000 -5.427 6.873 0.438 -4.883 5.712 0.402 
Low-half 0.085 0.667 0.899 0.076 0.688 0.913 1.111 1.151 0.346 0.852 1.719 0.627 
Income Rank 1 0.772 0.382 0.100 0.793 0.176 0.011 0.605 0.373 0.149 0.793 0.165 0.003 
Income Rank 2 0.843 1.233 0.508 1.144 1.819 0.553 0.957 1.995 0.641 -0.004 3.588 0.999 
Income Rank 3 -1.065 0.609 0.124 -2.203 0.599 0.014 -1.727 0.796 0.062 -2.236 0.631 0.009 
Income Rank 4 -6.766 0.964 0.000 -5.891 1.298 0.001 -8.206 8.872 0.371 -7.845 4.507 0.107 
Note: All specifications employ log of initial income and life expectancy, average years of secondary schooling by gender, investment and government expenditure ratios, and time fixed effects 
as an additional control set. Eliminated countries from high-half income group are Hungary and Israel; from low-half income group are Egypt, Jordan and Thailand; from income rank 1 is 
Egypt; from income rank 2 are Jordan, Nicaragua and Sierra Leone; from income rank 3 is Hungary; and from income rank 4 are Austria and Israel. The outliers are singled out using OLS 
regressions. The number of countries/observations for each subsample (the number of countries/observations from removing outliers is presented in parentheses) is as following: high-half 
income group- 24/41 (22/37); low-half income group- 20/34 (17/29); income rank 1- 8/14 (7/13); income rank 2 – 12/20 (9/15); income rank 3- 9/16 (8/14); income rank 4 – 15/25 (13/22). 
Following the upper and lower bound restrictions offered by Roodman (2006), the analysis treats tariff rates (and its interactions), income, investment ratio and the ratio of government 
expenditure to GDP as endogenous, while other variables employed in the specification as predetermined. The time span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1990-2000 period 
(T=2). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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3. Military Spending and Growth: An Empirical Exploration of 
Contingent Relationships 
3.1. Introduction 
The economic effects of military spending continue to be the subject of considerable 
debate, with a lack of consensus in the literature. How does military expenditure 
affect a country’s economic growth? And how do these effects vary across 
economies? These are important questions, as the effects of military spending, on 
one hand, may just represent a budgetary burden which is necessitated by a country’s 
need for some level of security; on the other hand, it may also serve for growth by 
delivering significant “peace dividends” and attract additional revenues into a 
country’s budget through the defence industry (e.g., arms trading, technology 
transfers).      
This investigation makes a contribution to the debate on the economic effects of 
military spending, in light of the ambiguous outcomes found in the military spending 
and economic growth literature, by reassessing the relationship contingent on the 
level of initial income per capita. Although growth falls with higher levels of 
military spending, the results reveal that conditional on the values of other 
independent variables, the marginal impact of military spending is increasing in 
initial income levels. In particular, this relationship is negative and significant 
amongst poor countries, while typically not significantly different from zero amongst 
richer countries. In contrast to previous research, this contingency pattern continues 
to hold under an alternative modelling strategy in which the data set is stratified into 
different income categories and types of economies, as well as its robustness along 
several dimensions; and is monotonic in direction, converging towards zero for 
sufficiently high income level countries, which explains the ambiguity in previous 
findings. 
The debate regarding the economic effects of military spending is founded in the 
contribution of Benoit (1973, 1978) which ignited a subsequent tranche of research 
employing a variety of econometric models, reflecting different theoretical 
perspectives. Keynesian, neoclassical and structuralist models were applied using a 
variety of specifications, econometric estimators and types of sample in cross-
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sectional, time-series or panel datasets. The diversity of results led to arguments for 
case studies of individual countries and relatively homogeneous groups of countries. 
However, the literature has not reached a consensus. For instance, Dunne and Uye 
(2009) in a survey of 102 studies on the economic effects of military spending, 
report that almost 39% of the cross-country studies and 35% of the case studies find 
a negative effect of military spending on growth, with around 20% finding positive 
impacts for both types of studies.
33
 
The explanation behind the heterogeneous outcomes for the relationship between 
growth and military spending can be broadly grouped by demand, supply and 
security effects of military sector on economic performance, where the following 
discussions of these effects heavily draws on those developed in Dunne et al. (2005). 
Demand effects for the relationship between economic growth and military spending 
are driven by decisions on allocating state expenditure or diversification of state 
resources into military complex as an alternative to different sectors of domestic use, 
and can have both short-run and long-run components, which might act in opposite 
directions generating both positive and negative impact on economic growth. For 
instance, a rise in military spending, on one hand, may increase aggregate domestic 
demand in the short run, thereby exerting a Keynesian multiplier effect on economic 
growth rate by generating a rise in capacity utilisation that will increase current 
output, and hence leading to increased profits, investment and economic growth. On 
the other hand, sustained increases in military expenditure might undermine a 
country’s growth performance since these short-run effects do not necessarily always 
lead to higher levels of capital formation. Alternatively, increases in military 
spending are likely to induce a negative impact on output growth in the long run by 
generating industrial inefficiencies that can reduce the efficiency of resource 
                                                          
33
 Previous surveys of the military spending and growth literature also include Chan (1987), who 
found a lack of consistency in the results; Ram (2003) who reviewed 29 studies, concluding that there 
is little evidence of a positive effect of defence outlays on growth, but that it was also difficult to say 
that the evidence supported a negative effect. Dunne (1996, chap. 23) covering 54 studies concluded 
that military spending had at best no effect on growth and was likely to have a negative effect; and 
Smith (2000) concluded that the large literature did not indicate any robust empirical regularity, 
positive or negative, though he suggested there is a small negative effect in the long run. Smaldone 
(2006) in his review of Africa, considers military spending relationship to be heterogeneous, but feels 
that variations can be explained by intervening variables. The effects can be both positive and 
negative but are usually not pronounced, although the negative effects tend to be wider and deeper in 
Africa and most severe in countries experiencing legitimacy/security crisis and economic/budgetary 
constraints. 
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allocation, thereby lowering total factor productivity. For instance, as discussed in 
Knigh et al. (1996), increases in military spending are expected to decrease the total 
stock of resources that is available for alternative domestic uses such as investment 
in (public and private) productive capital, education, health and technological 
innovation, generating crowding-out effects. The size and direction of crowding-out 
effects will also determine a country’s growth prospects depending on how the 
increase in military spending is financed, which according to government budget 
constraints can be realized either by cutting other public expenditure, raising current 
taxes and increasing borrowing (future taxes) or expansion in the money supply.  All 
these approaches will have further effects which will also reflect in different sectors 
of an economy, and hence a country’s growth performance. For example, raising 
current taxes or borrowing will lower the expected after-tax return on productive 
capital, while simultaneously reducing the flow of (domestic plus foreign) savings 
that is available to finance productive capital formation in the domestic economy 
which will be accommodated by a fall in public sector investment and private 
consumption.    
Supply effects of military sector are reflected in an economy’s growth prospects 
through the availability of factors of output production such as labour, physical and 
human capital, natural resources, as well as technology, which can also have both 
negative and positive effects. For instance, military sector, on one hand, may attract 
scarce labour and valuable resources away from the civilian industrial sector at the 
expense of education and training expenditures restricting an economy’s potential 
growth prospects. However, on the other hand, the training in the armed forces may 
also provide workers valuable technical, organisational and administrative skills 
making them more productive when they return to civilian life. Furthermore, military 
R&D is also more likely to have commercial spin-offs depending on the degree of a 
country’s development level and the existence of an advanced sector with trained 
and educated workforce. 
Security effects can be generated by the demand of a state to protect its sovereignty 
from domestic and foreign threats in order to provide an environment for the 
economy to successfully operate where military sector acts as a premium guard for 
the security of persons and property, and gives incentives to invest and innovate. 
Although long-lasting conflicts are major obstacles to achieve sustainable 
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development in many poor countries and having strong military sector can generate 
positive externalities for growth by providing stability, increases in military 
expenditures may also be driven by rent seeking actions by military industrial 
complex instead of by security needs. In such cases, increases in military spending 
may aggravate arms races or damaging wars offsetting positive security effects 
generated by military sector.  
As mentioned above, many of these effects are contingent, depending on 
employment level of available resources, on how increases in military spending is 
financed, the sources of potential externalities from military sector and the 
effectiveness of military complex in responding to the domestic and foreign threats. 
Clearly all these factors – military spending, conflict and economic capacity 
(education, governance, institutions and resource endowments), all interact to 
influence growth. And all the interactions of these channels and their influence on 
economic growth will vary on the countries under examination and depend on their 
economic/budgetary constraints. For example, a relatively advanced developing 
country, such as one of the “Asian Tigers” by investing into military sector will have 
interests over the industrial impact of its involvement in arms production, the 
technology and the foreign direct investment benefits vs. the opportunity costs, while 
a poorer African economy may be more concerned with the conflict trap it finds 
itself in, i.e. directing budgetary sources into military sector instead of welfare-
improving projects is likely to be more detrimental in poorer countries.  
A simple illustration of how the impact of military spending on economic growth 
can vary conditional on countries’ income level, presented in Figure 3-1, indeed 
provides support for this view, while also casting some doubt on the desirability of 
pooling all the nations together in the econometric analysis without taking into 
account the possibility that the effect of military spending is contingent on income.
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The plots illustrate a significant negative impact of military expenditure on growth 
for the low income subsample, while this effect becomes less and less negative going 
                                                          
34
 Scatter plots and fitted relationships between the variables of interest for four income groups are 
achieved using partial regressions which are obtained in two stages. First, both the dependent variable 
and the isolated independent variable are projected onto the additional set of regressors under 
consideration. Next, the residuals of the dependent variable are regressed against the residuals of the 
independent variable. The figures are produced using OLS panel regressions where growth and 
military expenditure is related linearly. 
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towards zero for relatively richer countries, perhaps reflecting a contradictory effect 
induced by positive income effects gained as peace dividends which cancel the 
detrimental effects out.
35
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The methodology and data 
employed are described in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents the estimation results 
using a more formal analysis which confirm the presence of the contingency that 
plots above illustrate, as well as its robustness along several dimensions; and Section 
3.4 concludes. 
3.2.1. Empirical Methodology 
Many different estimators have been used to examine the relationship between 
growth and military spending, with associated advantages and disadvantages to each 
method. This section begins with a brief discussion of these estimators in order to 
motivate the approach to estimation analysis. Then the discussion turns to the 
method used to explore the potential contingencies in the relationship between 
military expenditure and growth. 
Letting the subscripts i and t represent country and time period respectively, the 
estimated growth model with introduction of military expenditure can be written as  
                         yit – yi(t-1) =  α yi(t−1) + θ1milit +  β'Zit + μt + ξi + εit                         (3i) 
where y is log of real per capita income, milit is military spending, Zit is a vector of 
additional control variables, μt is a period-specific constant, ξi is an unobserved 
country-specific effect, and εit is an error term.
36
  
                                                          
35
 Dunne and Tian (2013) also demonstrates that the impact of military expenditure on growth is 
heterogeneous when countries are stratified into different income groups. In particular, the results 
illustrate negative and significant association for poorer countries, showing non-monotonic change in 
behaviour for higher income level economies (see also Dunne, 2012). 
36
 The analysis employs a standard growth model with the introduction of military expenditure which 
is similar to the benchmark specification used by Aizenman and Glick (2006). As discussed in Dunne 
et al. (2005), taking into account the theoretical weaknesses generated by the Feder-Ram or Solow 
model, the extended Barro model used by Aizenman and Glick (2006) has comparative advantage to 
explain both military expenditure and growth. Here, the analysis does not purport to test these 
theoretical models; rather working in the tradition of cross-country growth literature, the investigation 
presents empirical evidence of the existence of a contingent relationship between growth and military 
expenditure. 
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As discussed in Caselli et al. (1996), the consistency of OLS estimators depends on 
the assumption that the country-specific effect ξi is orthogonal to other right-hand 
side variables. This assumption in growth regressions is clearly violated due to the 
presence of lagged income as an explanatory variable: i.e. E[yi(t-1)ξi] ≠ 0. Thus, a first 
step to achieve consistent estimates starts by eliminating the country-specific term. 
One approach to eliminate ξi is using a fixed effects estimator that involves the 
implementation of a country-specific constant term. Another approach instead 
introduces the implementation of a country-specific random variable that is 
uncorrelated with the included regressors and may be realized using seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) (see Greene, 2003, for details regarding this estimator). 
These strategies deal successfully with estimation inconsistencies generated by non-
orthogonality between explanatory variables and country-specific effects but, as 
Caselli et al. (1996) note, inconsistencies will continue to be problematic if the 
explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous. 
To deal with inconsistency and likely endogeneity issues, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
proposed the GMM Difference estimator that is derived by taking first differences of 
all variables, and uses lagged levels of the explanatory variables as instruments. 
However, as discussed in Easterly and Levine (2001), the difference estimator has 
the statistical shortcoming that if regressors are persistent, then lagged levels of 
explanatory variables are weak instruments. Further, taking differences of the 
original level equation reduces the time dimension of the sample and leaves 
information about the level relationship between explanatory variables and growth 
unused. An additional complication associated with the estimation in differences 
involves potential measurement errors associated with the explanatory variables.
37
 
To overcome these issues, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
developed the System GMM estimator that combines the differenced model with the 
levels model. However, it should be noted that the move from the difference to the 
                                                          
37
 Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) have studied the impact of measurement error on the performance of the 
estimators discussed, explicitly in the context of the growth regressions. They conclude the following: 
In the presence of measurement error, fixed-effects and difference estimators tend to underestimate 
the coefficient of lagged income and parameter values associated with the additional explanatory 
variables. In contrast, the cross-sectional OLS estimator and the panel SUR estimator both tend to 
provide relatively accurate estimates of lagged income, while overestimating the magnitude of 
parameters associated with the additional explanatory variables.  
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systems estimator also involves a cost: the adoption of additional assumptions 
regarding orthogonality between the country-specific effect and the regressors, 
which are difficult to justify a priori. 
Lacking clear guidance regarding the choice of estimators, the analysis follows 
Easterly and Levine (2001) (see also DeJong and Ripoll, 2006) and reports results 
obtained from several alternative estimators: cross-section OLS, SUR, Fixed effects, 
Difference and System GMM.
38
 For the additional sensitivity analysis System GMM 
is the preferred estimator. 
The treatment of each regressor according to their exogeneity levels under the GMM 
estimators is based on upper and lower bound conditions (Roodman, 2006).
39
 To 
ensure that the estimated effect is not driven by the number of instruments, the 
analysis also employs the “1 lag restriction” technique followed by Roodman (2009) 
that uses only certain lags instead of all available lags as instruments. 
Along with coefficient estimates obtained using GMM estimators, tables also report 
three tests of the validity of identifying assumptions they entail: Hansen’s (1982) test 
of over-identifying restrictions for the joint validity of moment conditions;
40
 and 
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) AR(1) and AR(2) tests in first differences. AR (1) test is 
of the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation, which can be rejected under 
the identifying assumption that εit is not serially correlated; and AR (2) test is of the 
null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, which should not be rejected. 
In addition, to deal with heteroskedasticity, the Windmeijer (2005) small-sample 
correction is applied. 
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 In addition to these estimates, between-effects and random effects estimates were calculated but are 
not reported, because the between-effects estimator is closely related to the OLS estimator and the 
random-effects estimator is closely related to the SUR estimator, and therefore the results obtained 
using these additional estimators are quantitatively similar to those reported here. Moreover, the 
fixed-effects estimator and the difference GMM estimator leads to quantitatively similar results as 
well, however both estimators are reported since a large body of research analyses in the defence 
literature is based on these estimators. 
39
 Following the upper and lower bound restrictions offered by Roodman (2006), the analysis treats 
military expenditure (and its interactions), and investment ratio as endogenous, while other variables 
employed in the specification as predetermined. For detailed information regarding upper and lower 
bound conditions, see also Appendix 2-A. 
40
 It is of note that some of the Hansen test statistics during the analysis (especially when the 
investigation stratifies the data set into separate subsamples) yield high p-values (e.g., in excess of 
0.90). This can be a warning signal that too many moment conditions are in use; and therefore, the 
results from these specifications must be read with caution. 
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As an additional robustness check, to identify potential outlier countries that might 
affect the estimation results, the analysis employs a strategy advocated by Belsley et 
al. (1980). It involves the application of the DFITS statistic to flag the countries 
associated with high combinations of residual and leverage statistics.   
Turning to the method used to capture potential contingencies in the relationship 
between growth and military expenditure, two approaches are employed. Under the 
first, the baseline approach involves including in (3i) additional explanatory variable 
constructed as the product of military expenditure and log of initial income. The 
hypothesis is that the direct impact of military spending is negative, while marginal 
impact is increasing in income levels implying that the effect of military expenditure 
becomes less negative at higher levels of income. The second approach involves 
stratifying the data set into different subsamples; and separate specifications of (3i) 
are estimated, where growth linearly responds to the changes in military expenditure. 
Therefore four income groups are defined: high income (rank 4) countries; upper-
middle income (rank 3) countries; lower-middle income (rank 2) countries; and low-
income (rank 1) countries.
41
 Analysis of these relationships demonstrates that 
evidence of a significant interaction term effect arises by monotonic changes in the 
impact of military expenditure on growth across different subsamples.   
3.2.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The analysis is based on a balanced dynamic panel dataset that consists of 89 
countries over the 1970-2010 period.
42
 The panel dataset is constructed by 
transforming time series data into non-overlapping five year averages. This 
procedure smoothes out short-run cyclical fluctuations thereby helping the analysis 
to concentrate on long-run growth effects (Knight et al., 1996). The dependent 
variable is logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth constructed using data 
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 The cut-off levels of income rankings are taken as in DeJong and Ripoll (2006), where country 
classifications are obtained by mapping classification thresholds as defined by the World Bank’s 
income measures into the corresponding Penn World income measures. The resulting definitions are 
as follows: high-income level countries are those with real per capita GDP above $11,500; upper-
middle income level countries those between $5,500 and $11,499; lower-middle income level 
countries are between $2,650 and $5,499; and low-income level countries those with less than $2,650. 
Note that the classifications during the analysis are based on 1970 income rankings. 
42
 See Appendix Tables 3-A and 3-B for the list of countries and descriptive statistics. 
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from the Penn World Table (PWT 7.1). The log of initial income per capita is used 
as regressor. 
Military spending is measured as the average ratio of military expenditures to GDP, 
using data collected from the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute) Yearbooks. As online data tables relate only to the period from 1988 
onwards, military expenditure shares for the previous periods are collected and 
inputted directly from the SIPRI Yearbooks in order to extend the time horizon.
43
  
Along with numerous advantages of having a longer time horizon, the access to 
military data before 1990 period allows an investigation of whether the ambiguous 
findings in the literature are driven by the changes in the nature of conflicts after the 
post-Cold War era. As discussed in Kaldor (1999), the end of proxy-wars and 
superpower involvement in local wars did not reduce the number of conflicts, but did 
reduce the intensity of military battles. There are fewer real military battles than in 
the past, but attacks on civilians increased showing a dominance of civil or intra-
state conflict. 
The investigation also uses a standard set of control variables typically employed in 
the empirical growth literature (e.g., Barro and Lee, 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995, Ch. 12). It includes two proxies for human capital: the log of average years of 
schooling attained by males aged 15 and over, obtained from the Barro and Lee data 
set, and the log of life expectancy, as reported by the United Nations; and also the 
population growth rate,
44
 real private investment as a percentage of real GDP and 
degree of economic openness, all as reported in the Penn World Table (PWT 7.1). 
Table 3-1 provides summary statistics for military expenditure share and growth 
over different income groups. Two aspects of these statistics are of particular interest 
in the analysis. The first is the tendency that relatively richer countries tend to enjoy 
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 Data on military spending were initially collected starting from the period of 1959 as the PWT data 
on real GDP per capita are not available for most countries before this date. However, given the trade 
off between having longer time series dimension and losing cross-country sample observations for 
which data on all variables are available, the analysis was constrained to the period of 1970 and 
onwards, yielding the balanced sample of 89 countries. 
44
 Growth rate of population employed in the analysis is computed as log of n + g + δ, where n is 
average population growth rate; g is the rate of technical progress and δ is the rate of depreciation of 
the stock of physical capital investment and g + δ is assumed to be equal to 0.05, following Mankiw 
et al. (1992). 
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relatively rapid growth. Average growth rates increase monotonically when moving 
from the lower to higher income classifications: from 1.473% (s.d. 2.136) for low-
income countries to 2.095% (s.d. 0.442) for high-income countries. The second 
aspect of these statistics is that relatively rich countries tend to spend relatively more 
on the military sector. The average military expenditure share tends to increase when 
moving from the low to high income classifications (with the exception of the upper-
middle income group): from 2.637% (s.d. 1.782) to 3.297% (s.d. 3.128).  
3.3. Empirical Results 
Figure 3-2 illustrates how the relationship between military spending and economic 
growth is contingent on the level of income. A positive relationship between growth 
and the interaction term indicates that the marginal impact of military expenditure on 
growth is increasing in initial income. In turn, military expenditure significantly 
decreases growth in the low- and lower-middle income subsample, while this effect 
is positive, albeit insignificant, in the upper-middle and high-income subsample. 
Taking the evidence from Figure 3-2 (see also Figure 3-1) as preliminary, it is of 
interest to confirm the presence of the contingency that these figures illustrate using 
more formal analysis.  
Estimation results for the impact of military expenditure contingent on initial per 
capita income are presented in Tables 3-2 – 3-9. Table 3-2 reports the coefficient 
estimates from a non-linear estimation. Table 3-3 displays the estimation results 
using the alternative specification, where the relationship is estimated linearly using 
low-half and high-half income subsamples of the data. Table 3-4 runs the same 
exercise using the four income rankings, while Table 3-5 examines the linear 
relationship between growth and military spending for a relatively homogeneous 
group of countries. Table 3-6 and 3-7 examine the sensitivity of the estimates of the 
variables of interest to the presence in the data of several alternative subsets of 
countries, singled out for certain unusual aspects of their growth rate experiences and 
military expenditure shares. Table 3-8 exercises the contingency relationship for 
different time windows. Finally, Table 3-9 uses alternative measures for income and 
military spending as additional robustness check.   
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3.3.1. Military Spending and Growth Contingencies  
While not reported in the tables, a discussion of the global relationship observed 
between military spending and growth excluding the military expenditure and initial 
income interaction term from the baseline specification is pertinent. Using the full 
sample, a moderate negative relationship is estimated, and the estimated impact on 
growth of a one percentage point increase in military expenditure is approximately      
-0.04 percentage points (the significance of the coefficient estimates exhibits 
sensitivity to the particular estimator being employed).  
Inclusion of contingencies into the model, as reported in Table 3-2, demonstrates that 
the negative relationship is evident only among relatively poor countries, and a 
positive sign for the interaction term is obtained in all cases. In contrast to the cross-
sectional OLS, panel estimators demonstrate significant impacts of both linear and 
non-linear terms in all cases when the outliers are removed.
45
 
Splitting the data set into subsamples as reported in Table 3-3, one including low- 
and lower-middle income countries, the other including upper-middle and high-
income countries, and estimating separate linear specifications for each yields results 
which are, in general, consistent with the findings from Table 3-2. For the low and 
lower-middle subsample, the military expenditure coefficients are all estimated as 
negative and in most cases significant. For the upper-middle and high-income 
subsample, a mixed picture emerges: the estimates oscillate between positive and 
negative values and rarely differ significantly from zero (in 8 cases out of 10).
46
 
Regarding quantitative significance, using the estimates produced by the System 
GMM estimator, the impact on growth of a one percentage point increase in military 
expenditure is estimated as -0.133 percentage points among low- and lower-middle 
income countries, and -0.002 percentage points among upper-middle and high-
income countries.
47
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 Note that the joint validity test of the moment conditions is not satisfied for GMM difference 
(column b).  
46
 Note that the second-order serial correlation condition for upper-middle and high-income 
subsample is not satisfied under the GMM Difference (column b) specification. Therefore, the model 
that delivers a valid estimate of a significant impact of military expenditure for the high-half 
subsample is only the fixed effects specification.  
47
 These measures are obtained by dividing the coefficient estimates by the time span between income 
observations (5 years). 
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A similar picture emerges when the four income rankings are considered. There is a 
notable difference across the estimates when investigation moves from the poorest 
countries to the richest.
48
 For the poorest countries, those with index values of 1, all 
fourteen sets of quantitative-significance estimates are negative, showing high 
significance in most cases. Regarding quantitative significance, using the estimates 
produced by the System GMM estimator (Panel B, column b in Table 3-4), the 
impact on growth of a one percentage point increase in military expenditure is 
estimated as -0.130 percentage points among the income rank 1 countries. This 
finding reveals that the significant impact from military spending for the low-half 
income distribution is mainly driven by the poorest economies. For the relatively 
richer countries, the impact of military expenditure becomes less and less negative, 
converging towards zero.
49
 
In a further effort to investigate whether this heterogeneity for military spending 
effects is somehow different across infra-marginal changes throughout subsamples, 
Figure 3-3 plots the estimated coefficients of military expenditure along with their 
relative confidence bands (at 95% level) while income level is marginally increasing 
both within and across income subsamples throughout the entire income distribution. 
In order to do so, all observations are divided into different intervals depending on 
the value of logged income per capita, where each interval is selected so to maintain 
the similar distance between the lower and upper bounds for each interval. The 
resulting intervals are for the logged income per capita values [4.8, 5.8], [5, 6],    
[5.2, 6.2],…, [9.8, 10.8]. The results are supportive with the evidence above 
confirming monotonic increase in military spending effects when moving from lower 
to higher income level economies.   
The results from splitting the countries into more homogeneous groups according to 
their economic and geographical characteristics, and estimating separate linear 
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 The test of the equality of the military expenditure estimates for the poorest and the richest 
countries produced by the System GMM estimator (Panel B, column b in Table 3-4) rejects the null 
that the impact is the same. 
49
 For the richest countries in the world, the significance of military expenditure under GMM 
Difference is not robust when using the “1 lag restriction” technique. Therefore, the only estimator 
that demonstrates a significant impact of military expenditure is the fixed effects model out of the five 
estimators (see Panel B in Table 3-4). Note that this was also the case for high-half subsample in 
Table 3-3. This might suggest that some caution should be taken when employing the fixed effects or 
GMM Difference estimators in the military spending and growth analysis.     
59 
 
specifications for each group reveal essentially the same story. The negative effect of 
military spending is estimated to be wider, deeper and robustly significant for Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries (see also 
e.g., Smaldone, 2006; Hamid, 2012). Interestingly, it turns out that the elimination of 
Iran, Israel and Jordan from the MENA subsample alters the significance of the 
military expenditure estimates. This result can be explained by the high demand for 
security in these countries, and the non-linear impact of military spending when a 
country is faced with high threat (see Aizenman and Glick, 2006). Another 
interesting feature worth mentioning here is that a significant positive effect from 
military spending for East Asia and the Pacific region countries is driven by major 
arms producers like China and “Asian Tigers” countries, and becomes insignificant 
when these countries are removed from the subsample. Overall, these results 
demonstrate that the negative and significant impact from military expenditure 
across countries is mainly the case for the SSA and MENA regions where for the rest 
of the subgroups the results are mixed, with the estimates varying in sign and rarely 
demonstrating a robust significant impact.
50
  
Thus, the results from Tables 3-3 – 3-5 imply that the contingency pattern from 
modelling military spending and growth as shown in Table 3-2 is robust and 
continues to hold under alternative sample splitting methodologies. All in all, these 
findings suggest that a negative and significant relationship is only apparent among 
poor economies, and illustrates a typically insignificant impact among relatively 
richer economies. Moreover, the behaviour of this pattern is monotonic in direction, 
converging towards zero for sufficiently high income level countries, which 
therefore explains the ambiguity in findings from previous research.      
Coefficient estimates of additional explanatory variables enter mostly with the 
expected signs. Estimated coefficients on lagged income and the investment ratio 
are, respectively, negative and positive, statistically significant, and typically 
indicate strong quantitative effects. Life expectancy also exhibits a strong 
relationship with growth. The negative impact of trade openness is mainly driven by 
low-half income distribution countries, where a positive sign is apparent only among 
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 The estimated impact of military expenditure does not differ significantly from zero in 11 cases out 
of 14 for Advanced Economies and East Asia and Pacific; and in 12 cases for Latin America and 
Caribbean subsample. 
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upper-middle and high-income countries (see also DeJong and Ripoll, 2006). 
Surprisingly, schooling exhibits a negative relationship with growth when an 
interaction term is employed; but this effect disappears when alternative sample 
splitting strategies are considered. Finally, the estimated effect of population growth 
is mostly negative and typically insignificant. 
3.3.2. Robustness Checks  
Beyond the robustness checks as described above, special attention is paid to the 
potential influence on the results of several subsets of countries. The first collection 
of subsets features countries singled out on the basis of certain unusual aspects of 
their growth rate experiences during the time period spanned by the sample. Results 
of this exercise are reported in Table 3-6 for three subsets of countries. For each 
subset, Table 3-6 reports the list of countries, their 1970 and 2005 income rankings, 
their average military expenditure shares and growth rates measured over the entire 
sample period, and the coefficient estimates obtained for military spending and its 
interaction with initial income given their removal from the sample in addition to 
outlier countries. Only estimates obtained using System GMM are reported, but the 
general flavour of the exercise is consistent across estimators. For ease of 
comparison, the estimates obtained given the exclusion of the four outlier countries, 
as in Table 3-2 (column b), are also reported. The additional subsets of countries 
singled out on the basis of unusual aspects of their growth rate experiences include 
the twelve escapees from the low-income group, the sixteen escapees from the low 
and lower-middle income group, and the Asian Tigers.
51
  
Strikingly, the coefficient estimates change very little given the removal of any one 
of the subsets under consideration; and in all cases, enter significantly at 
conventional levels. For both the linear and non-linear terms of military expenditure, 
the estimates obtained given the removal of each subsample lie within one standard 
deviation of the full-sample estimate.     
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 It is of note that exclusion of countries on the basis of their realized growth experiences might be 
problematic for the estimation analysis since the composition of the sample then becomes dependent 
on realizations of the error term. Although this concern is acknowledged, the purpose of this exercise 
here is, by working in the tradition of cross-country growth literature, to present empirical evidence 
that the existence of a contingent relationship between growth and military expenditure is not driven 
by a small number of exceptional countries. 
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The second collection of subsets includes countries singled out due to the 
maintenance of high shares of military expenditure in addition to outlier countries. 
Three subsets are considered: the two low-income and the two high-income 
countries with the highest military expenditure shares specified as those with 
military spending levels above the top decile; and the union of these two subsets. 
The impact of removing these subsets of countries is reported in Table 3-7. Once 
again, point estimates change very little. What does change somewhat is statistical 
significance in the case when the second and third subsets are excluded. However, 
the general pattern of results reported in Table 3-2 remains apparent given the 
exclusion of these countries from the sample. 
Collectively, the results from Tables 3-6 and 3-7 suggest that the contingent 
relationship between growth and military expenditure does not seem attributable to 
the influence of a small number of exceptional countries.  
Using time effects in all regressions controls for any common factor that could affect 
all countries in any five-year interval. However, it is of interest to check if the results 
hold when different time windows are used for the estimation. A sensitive issue is 
that the post-Cold War era led to important changes in the nature of conflicts by 
reducing the intensity of real military battles than in the past, and whether these 
changes from the period after the end of Cold-War alter the results (Kaldor, 1999). 
The baseline time span in the analysis is 1970-2010. Table 3-8 considers more 
restrictive information available for three successive periods of minimum 20 years: 
1970-1995; 1980-2010; 1990-2010. The result holds significantly in the first and 
third periods but not in the second (significant only at 18% level), suggesting that the 
findings of a contingent relationship between military expenditure and growth are 
also robust when the analysis is restricted to the post-Cold War era. Overall, the 
general pattern of results reported in Table 3-2 remains apparent under alternative 
restrictions of the dataset to different time windows. 
Table 3-9 presents the robustness test using alternative income and military 
expenditure measures. As discussed in Johnson et al. (2013), using PWT income 
data can be problematic and affect cross-country growth estimates because of 
variability across different versions of the PWT. Although using low-frequency data 
is robust to these inconsistencies in data revisions, as a check on results, column 1 
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employs GDP per capita from the World Development Indicators (WDI) as an 
alternative income measure. Column 2 instead uses an alternative approach to 
capture potential contingencies in the relationship between growth and military 
spending by replacing the product of lagged income and military expenditure with an 
alternative one: the product of military expenditure and 1970 income rankings which 
takes values 1 (for the poorest income countries) to 4 (for the richest countries). 
Column 3 employs the World Bank data as an alternative source for military 
expenditure share instead of SIPRI.
52
 In all three cases, the main results hold.
53
  
Overall, the sensitivity results provide supportive evidence of a contingent 
relationship between growth and military expenditure conditional on initial income 
levels.  
3.4. Conclusion 
The empirical analysis shed light on the rationale behind ambiguous outcomes from 
previous research by reassessing the relationship between growth and military 
spending contingent on a country’s economic development level. The findings have 
revealed the presence of a significant interaction effect under which the marginal 
impact of military expenditure on growth is increasing in initial income. In 
particular, investigation finds that while growth falls with higher levels of military 
spending among the world’s poor countries, the impact of military expenditure on 
growth becomes less and less negative as a country becomes richer, and this 
contingency pattern is monotonic in direction, going towards zero for less budgetary 
constrained countries. 
The analysis suggests a number of paths for future research concerning the effect of 
military activity on economic growth through income. A particularly promising 
avenue of future research would be to analyze the role of the existence of a defence 
industry in a country. Specifically, it is of interest to see whether the difference in the 
impact of military expenditure across income groups is driven by trade in arms, 
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 Note that employing the World Bank measure of military expenditure share restricts the data set to 
1990-2010 period. 
53
 A separate linear relationship of military expenditure and growth is also estimated using WDI 
income data for low-half and high-half income subsamples and four income rankings. The results are 
qualitatively similar to that presented here.   
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including exports of military production, which might offset the detrimental impact 
of military expenditure by attracting export revenues. 
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Figure 3-1: Partial Regression Plots for Military Expenditure and Growth 
 
 
 
Note: The set of regressors includes log of initial income, log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log 
of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects. The figures are produced using OLS panel regressions, excluding outliers as 
defined in Table 3-4. 
 
Figure 3-2: Partial Regression Plots for Military Expenditure and Growth 
 
 
Note: The set of regressors includes log of initial income, growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, 
log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects. Partial regression plot for interaction term also includes military 
expenditure into specification. The figures are produced using OLS panel regressions, excluding outliers as defined in Tables  
3-2 and 3-3. 
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Figure 3-3: Military Expenditure Effects by Infra-Marginal Changes in Income Levels 
 
 
Note: The graph plots the estimated impact of military spending on growth conditional on infra-marginal changes in income 
levels. The infra-marginal intervals are selected so to maintain the same distance between the lower and upper bounds for each 
interval. The set of regressors also includes log of initial income, growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment 
ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects. Black spikes represent 95% confidence bands; the vertical line 
corresponds to the threshold line between low and high-half income level countries. Red line represents local polynomial 
smoothed trend for the impact of military spending on growth when moving from lower to higher income categories. The 
method of estimation is the panel least squares with robust standard errors. 
 
Table 3-1: Descriptive Statistics for Growth and Military Expenditure  
 
Summary Statistics 
 
Sample split Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Full sample Mil. exp. 89 2.789 2.189 0.281 14.964 
 Growth 89 1.730 1.709 -5.338 6.900 
Low income Mil. exp. 44 2.637 1.782 0.281 9.049 
 
Growth 44 1.473 2.136 -5.338 6.900 
Lower-middle Mil. exp. 16 3.026 2.385 0.933 11.247 
 Growth 16 1.787 1.427 -0.678 5.467 
Upper-middle Mil. exp. 11 2.219 1.526 0.364 4.693 
 
Growth 11 2.078 1.425 0.502 5.272 
High income Mil. exp. 18 3.297 3.128 1.067 14.964 
 Growth 18 2.095 0.442 1.086 2.798 
Lower Mid./Low Mil. exp. 60 2.740 1.947 0.281 11.247 
 
Growth 60 1.557 1.965 -5.338 6.900 
High/Upper-Mid. Mil. exp. 29 2.888 2.656 0.364 14.964 
 Growth 29 2.089 0.918 0.502 5.272 
Note: All descriptive statistics are based on cross country averages for the 1970-2010 period. 
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Table 3-2 
Non-linear Specifications of Military Expenditure 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
 OLS SUR Fixed effects Difference GMM System GMM 
 a b a b a b a b a b 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.029*** 
(0.004) 
-0.029*** 
(0.005) 
-0.044** 
(0.018) 
-0.051 
(0.037) 
-0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.354 
(0.572) 
-0.505 
(0.430) 
-1.396*** 
(0.269) 
-1.816*** 
(0.294) 
-2.199*** 
(0.376) 
-2.649*** 
(0.398) 
-1.282 
(0.788) 
[0.107] 
-1.782* 
(0.895) 
-2.094 
(1.446) 
[0.151] 
-3.021** 
(1.444) 
Mil*GDP 0.038 
(0.060) 
0.053 
(0.045) 
0.149*** 
(0.032) 
0.191*** 
(0.034) 
0.243*** 
(0.049) 
0.286*** 
(0.050) 
0.135 
(0.090) 
[0.138] 
0.177* 
(0.099) 
0.225 
(0.161) 
[0.164] 
0.322** 
(0.157) 
Pop. growth (log) -0.016 
(0.015) 
-0.021* 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.022) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
-0.032*** 
(0.012) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.069** 
(0.027) 
0.073*** 
(0.019) 
0.093*** 
(0.012) 
0.093*** 
(0.013) 
0.055*** 
(0.019) 
0.052** 
(0.021) 
0.090 
(0.072) 
0.042 
(0.106) 
0.130*** 
(0.040) 
0.166*** 
(0.058) 
Investment/GDP 0.082*** 
(0.029) 
0.052*** 
(0.019) 
0.106*** 
(0.013) 
0.094*** 
(0.013) 
0.161*** 
(0.019) 
0.162*** 
(0.019) 
0.152*** 
(0.039) 
0.132** 
(0.051) 
0.248*** 
(0.047) 
0.251*** 
(0.056) 
Openness (log) -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.014* 
(0.007) 
-0.023** 
(0.009) 
Schooling (log) -0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.039* 
(0.021) 
-0.036 
(0.025) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.020* 
(0.011) 
Countries/Observations 89/89 85/85 89/695 85/665 89/695 85/665 89/601 85/575 89/695 85/665 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test:       0.772 0.025 0.897 0.986 
(b) Serial Correlation:           
     First-order       0.008 0.075 0.000 0.001 
     Second-order       0.247 0.191 0.492 0.387 
Note: Columns “a” estimate military expenditure and economic growth relationship for the full sample, while columns “b” estimate the same specification removing outliers. All estimated results for GMM estimators 
are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). The excluded countries are Botswana, China, Egypt and Singapore. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. The time span 
for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1970-2010 period (T=8). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses; the 
estimates in square brackets are p-values. 
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Table 3-3 
Low-half and High-half Income Sample Splits 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
 OLS SUR Fixed effects Difference GMM System GMM 
 a b a b a b a b a b 
 Panel A: Upper-middle and High Income Sample 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.039*** 
(0.009) 
-0.049*** 
(0.009) 
-0.032 
(0.028) 
-0.064** 
(0.023) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
Military exp/GDP -0.001 
(0.046) 
0.047 
(0.033) 
-0.006 
(0.043) 
0.019 
(0.030) 
-0.088 
(0.090) 
-0.101* 
(0.057) 
-0.161 
(0.104) 
-0.106** 
(0.044) 
-0.011 
(0.036) 
-0.012 
(0.050) 
Pop. growth (log) -0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.029** 
(0.011) 
-0.022** 
(0.009) 
-0.034*** 
(0.008) 
0.0002 
(0.021) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
0.035 
(0.036) 
0.008 
(0.038) 
-0.031** 
(0.015) 
-0.066** 
(0.025) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.053*** 
(0.018) 
0.088 
(0.059) 
0.116*** 
(0.029) 
0.121*** 
(0.043) 
0.149*** 
(0.056) 
-0.052 
(0.078) 
0.067 
(0.152) 
-0.339 
(0.332) 
0.121*** 
(0.026) 
0.279** 
(0.123) 
Investment/GDP 0.107*** 
(0.034) 
0.032 
(0.039) 
0.111*** 
(0.025) 
0.107*** 
(0.022) 
0.048 
(0.040) 
0.188*** 
(0.031) 
0.028 
(0.026) 
0.195*** 
(0.065) 
0.161** 
(0.066) 
0.320*** 
(0.051) 
Openness (log) 0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.028 
(0.026) 
0.011 
(0.015) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
Schooling (log) 0.003 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.015 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.039) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
Countries/Observations 29/29 23/23 29/232 23/184 29/232 23/184 29/203 23/161 29/232 23/184 
(a) Hansen Test:       0.980 1.000 0.995 0.720 
(b) Serial Correlation:  First-order      0.002 0.156 0.086 0.059 
       Second order      0.153 0.011 0.446 0.069 
 Panel B: Lower-middle and Low Income Sample 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.050** 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.036) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.018** 
(0.007) 
Military exp/GDP -0.054 
(0.112) 
-0.099 
(0.104) 
-0.262*** 
(0.056) 
-0.385*** 
(0.074) 
-0.414*** 
(0.074) 
-0.606*** 
(0.104) 
-0.386** 
(0.180) 
-0.698** 
(0.300) 
-0.324 
(0.209) 
[0.126] 
-0.665* 
(0.341) 
Pop. growth (log) -0.035 
(0.024) 
-0.041 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.039***  
(0.013) 
0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.059*** 
(0.017) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.038) 
0.004 
(0.018) 
0.029 
(0.044) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.065** 
(0.029) 
0.092*** 
(0.032) 
0.089*** 
(0.015) 
0.133*** 
(0.017) 
0.034 
(0.024) 
0.065** 
(0.027) 
0.005 
(0.075) 
0.021 
(0.101) 
0.105*** 
(0.030) 
0.236*** 
(0.054) 
Investment/GDP 0.069** 
(0.030) 
0.069*** 
(0.024) 
0.111*** 
(0.015) 
0.113*** 
(0.016) 
0.169*** 
(0.024) 
0.161*** 
(0.025) 
0.168*** 
(0.047) 
0.193*** 
(0.055) 
0.142*** 
(0.035) 
0.196*** 
(0.051) 
Openness (log) -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.029 
(0.017) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
Schooling (log) -0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.029 
(0.024) 
0.009 
(0.028) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
Countries/Observations 60/60 52/52 60/463 52/401 60/463 52/401 60/398 52/344 60/463 52/401 
(a) Hansen Test:       0.995 0.270 0.994 0.996 
(b) Serial Correlation:  First-order      0.001 0.005 0.001 0.003 
       Second order      0.740 0.419 0.520 0.669 
Note: Columns “a” and “b” estimate military expenditure and economic growth relationship, respectively, with and without outliers. The estimated results for GMM estimators are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009).  Eliminated 
countries from high-half income group are Argentina, Cyprus, Ireland, Iran, Mexico and Singapore, while for low-half income sub-sample are Botswana, Egypt, Guyana, Jordan, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia. The outliers are singled out using OLS 
regressions. The time span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1970-2010 period (T=8). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses; the estimates in square 
brackets are p-values. 
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Table 3-4 
Sample Splits for Income Rankings 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Panel A: Measures of Quantitative Significance 
Income 
Group 
OLS SUR 
Fixed 
effects 
Difference GMM System GMM 
a b a b 
Rank 1 -0.013 
(0.116) 
-0.249*** 
(0.069) 
-0.484*** 
(0.088) 
-0.426* 
(0.236) 
-0.326** 
(0.152) 
-0.237 
(0.242) 
-0.187 
(0.332) 
Rank 2 -0.069 
(0.061) 
-0.186** 
(0.092) 
0.026 
(0.136) 
0.024 
(0.177) 
-0.194 
(0.164) 
-0.169 
(0.100) 
-0.157 
(0.096) 
Rank 3 0.065 
(0.424) 
-0.181 
(0.215) 
-0.266 
(0.349) 
-0.209 
(0.282) 
0.337 
(0.416) 
-0.181 
(0.234) 
-0.181 
(0.234) 
Rank 4 0.006 
(0.037) 
-0.035 
(0.028) 
-0.073 
(0.046) 
-0.084* 
(0.044) 
-0.038 
(0.081) 
-0.033 
(0.032) 
-0.027 
(0.032) 
Panel B: Measures of Quantitative Significance, Outliers Removed 
Income 
Group 
OLS SUR 
Fixed 
effects 
Difference GMM System GMM 
a b a b 
Rank 1 -0.117 
(0.131) 
-0.448*** 
(0.082) 
-0.697*** 
(0.123) 
-0.670 
(0.410) 
[0.111] 
-0.799* 
(0.428) 
-0.473* 
(0.277) 
-0.651* 
(0.323) 
Rank 2 0.185 
(0.196) 
-0.171 
(0.168) 
-0.048 
(0.214) 
-0.048 
(0.247) 
-0.117 
(0.481) 
-0.171 
(0.119) 
-0.171 
(0.118) 
Rank 3 0.569 
(0.231) 
0.017 
(0.218) 
-0.071 
(0.354) 
-0.071 
(0.178) 
0.208 
(0.249) 
0.017 
(0.232) 
0.017 
(0.232) 
Rank 4 0.117 
(0.083) 
0.046 
(0.074) 
-0.399** 
(0.170) 
-0.356* 
(0.181) 
-0.194 
(0.239) 
0.052 
(0.102) 
0.065 
(0.104) 
Note: Columns “a” under the GMM specifications estimate military expenditure and economic growth relationship using all 
possible lags, while the results in columns “b” are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). 
All specifications employ log of initial income, growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of 
openness and schooling, and time fixed effects as an additional control set. The excluded countries from income rank 1 sample 
are Egypt, Guyana, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia; from income rank 2 are Brazil, Jordan, Korea Rep, 
Nicaragua and Panama; from income rank 3 are Cyprus, Iran and Mexico; from income rank 4 are Israel and Norway. The 
outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. The number of countries/observations in Panel A are 44/44 for OLS, 44/335 for 
SUR, FE and GMM System and 44/286 for GMM Difference in income rank 1 sample; 16/16, 16/128 and 16/112 in income 
rank 2 sample; 11/11, 11/88 and 11/77 in income rank 3 sample; 18/18, 18/144 and 18/126 in income rank 4 sample. The 
respective figures for Panel B are 38/38, 38/288 and 38/245 in income rank 1; 11/11, 11/88 and 11/77 in income rank 2; 8/8, 
8/64 and 8/56 in income rank 3; 16/16, 16/128 and 16/112 in income rank 4. The time span for the analysis is based on 
balanced dataset for the 1970-2010 period (T=8). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses; the estimates in square brackets are p-values.  
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Table 3-5 
Sample Splits for Different Types of Economies 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Panel A 
Estimates of Military Expenditure 
 for Different Types of Economies 
Type of 
Economy OLS SUR 
Fixed 
effects 
Difference GMM System GMM 
a b a b 
Advanced 
Economies 
0.122 
(0.106) 
0.076 
(0.080) 
-0.155 
(0.172) 
-0.145 
(0.161) 
-0.206 
(0.239) 
0.088 
(0.097) 
0.099 
(0.119) 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
0.009 
(0.250) 
-0.312** 
(0.154) 
-0.265 
(0.214) 
-0.226 
(0.453) 
-0.337 
(0.443) 
-0.287 
(0.202) 
-0.474* 
(0.227) 
Sub-Saharan  
Africa 
0.108 
(0.263) 
-0.712*** 
(0.131) 
-1.059*** 
(0.151) 
-1.083** 
(0.379) 
-0.854* 
(0.458) 
-0.728 
(0.427) 
[0.101] 
-0.959** 
(0.458) 
East Asia and 
the Pacific 
-1.181 
(1.795) 
0.501*** 
(0.192) 
0.447 
(0.294) 
0.447 
(0.283) 
0.208 
(0.294) 
0.501** 
(0.200) 
0.501** 
(0.200) 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
0.168** 
(0.003) 
-0.078 
(0.076) 
-0.171 
(0.123) 
-0.171 
(0.124) 
-0.149 
(0.133) 
-0.078 
(0.056) 
-0.078 
(0.056) 
Panel B 
Estimates of Military Expenditure 
for Different Types of Economies, Outliers Removed 
Type of 
Economy OLS SUR 
Fixed 
effects 
Difference GMM System GMM 
a b a b 
Advanced 
Economies 
0.132 
(0.094) 
0.081 
(0.076) 
-0.394** 
(0.172) 
-0.371** 
(0.139) 
-0.627* 
(0.305) 
0.089 
(0.114) 
0.097 
(0.129) 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
0.053 
(0.268) 
-0.147 
(0.129) 
-0.256 
(0.187) 
-0.253 
(0.171) 
-0.116 
(0.372) 
-0.148 
(0.153) 
-0.148 
(0.154) 
Sub-Saharan  
Africa 
-0.069 
(0.395) 
-1.193*** 
(0.158) 
-1.420*** 
(0.177) 
-1.538*** 
(0.188) 
-1.768*** 
(0.230) 
-1.202*** 
(0.277) 
-1.331*** 
(0.228) 
East Asia and 
the Pacific 
1.881 
(0.375) 
0.279 
(0.179) 
0.249 
(0.346) 
0.249 
(0.352) 
0.249 
(0.352) 
0.279 
(0.235) 
0.279 
(0.235) 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
0.063 
(0.146) 
-0.218** 
(0.090) 
-0.213* 
(0.107) 
-0.213*** 
(0.047) 
-0.213*** 
(0.047) 
-0.218*** 
(0.053) 
-0.218*** 
(0.053) 
Note: Columns “a” under the GMM specifications estimate military expenditure and economic growth relationship using all 
possible lags, while the results in columns “b” are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). 
All specifications employ log of initial income, growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of 
openness and schooling, and time fixed effects as an additional control set.  The excluded countries from Advanced Economies 
sample are Spain, Ireland and Portugal; from Latin America and the Caribbean sample - Brazil, Guyana, Nicaragua, Panama 
and Paraguay; from Sub-Saharan Africa sample - Botswana, Mozambique, Mauritania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia; 
from East Asia and the Pacific sample - China, Indonesia, Korea Rep and Papua New Guinea; from Middle East and North 
Africa sample - Iran, Israel and Jordan. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. The number of 
countries/observations in Panel A are 20/20 for OLS, 20/160 for SUR, FE and GMM System and 20/140 for GMM Difference 
in Advanced Economies sample; 19/19, 19/151 and 19/131 in Latin America and Caribbean sample; 26/26, 26/195 and 26/165 
in Sub-Saharan Africa sample; 9/9, 9/69 and 9/60 in East Asia and the Pacific sample; 9/9, 9/69 and 9/63 in Middle East and 
North Africa sample. The respective figures for Panel B are 17/17, 17/136 and 17/119 in Advanced Economies sample; 14/14, 
14/111 and 14/96 in Latin America and Caribbean sample; 20/20, 20/149 and 20/125 in Sub-Saharan Africa sample; 8/8, 8/40 
and 8/35 in East Asia and the Pacific sample; 7/7, 7/48 and 7/42 in Middle East and North Africa sample. The time span for the 
analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1970-2010 period (T=8). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, 
respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses; the estimates in square brackets are p-
values. 
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Table 3-6 
Upward Movers and Asian Tigers 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country Income 
Rank, 
1970 
Income 
Rank, 
2005 
Average 
Mil. Exp. 
Share 
Average 
Growth 
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Outliers 
Botswana 1 3 3.32 5.75 Mil.exp/GDP 
China 1 2 1.73 6.90 -3.021 1.444 0.039 
Egypt 1 2 8.66 3.03 Mil*GDP 
Singapore 3 4 4.61 5.27 0.322 0.157 0.044 
Remove Escapees from Low Income Group 
Fiji 1 2 1.25 1.99    
Guyana 1 2 2.76 2.54    
Honduras 1 2 1.50 1.04    
Indonesia 1 2 2.34 4.19    
Malaysia 1 3 3.73 4.01 Mil.exp/GDP 
Mauritius 1 3 0.28 2.87 -3.101 1.457 0.037 
Morocco 1 2 4.10 2.38 Mil*GDP 
Paraguay 1 2 1.35 1.44 0.331 0.157 0.039 
Sri Lanka 1 2 2.52 3.70    
Syria 1 2 9.05 1.48    
Thailand 1 3 2.88 4.46    
Tunisia 1 2 2.10 2.60    
Remove Escapees from Low and Lower-Middle Income Group 
Algeria 2 3 2.57 1.28    
Brazil 2 3 1.52 2.29    
Chile 2 3 4.16 2.29    
Colombia 2 3 2.31 2.39    
Ecuador 2 3 2.19 1.77    
El Salvador 2 3 1.79 0.99    
Guatemala 2 3 1.13 1.51 Mil.exp/GDP 
Korea Rep. 2 4 3.85 5.47 -2.708 1.524 0.080 
Malaysia 1 3 3.73 4.01 Mil*GDP 
Mauritius 1 3 0.28 2.87 0.287 0.164 0.085 
Panama 2 3 0.93 3.47    
Peru 2 3 3.05 1.28    
South Africa 2 3 2.63 1.38    
Thailand 1 3 2.88 4.46    
Turkey 2 3 4.01 2.51    
Uruguay 2 3 2.11 2.20    
Remove Asian Tigers 
Indonesia 1 2 2.34 4.19 Mil.exp/GDP 
Korea Rep. 2 4 3.85 5.47 -2.955 1.544 0.059 
Malaysia 1 3 3.73 4.01 Mil*GDP 
Thailand 1 3 2.88 4.46 0.318 0.169 0.063 
Note: The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). All specifications 
employ log of initial income, growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, 
and time fixed effects as an additional control set. The number of countries/observations for each panel is, respectively, 85/665, 
73/570, 69/537 and 81/633. The time span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1970-2010 period (T=8).   
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Table 3-7 
Exclusion of Countries with High Military Expenditure Shares 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country Income 
Rank, 
1970 
Income 
Rank, 
2005 
Average 
Mil. Exp. 
Share 
Average 
Growth 
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Outliers 
Botswana 1 3 3.32 5.75 Mil.exp/GDP 
China 1 2 1.73 6.90 -3.021 1.444 0.039 
Egypt 1 2 8.66 3.03 Mil*GDP 
Singapore 3 4 4.61 5.27 0.321 0.157 0.044 
Remove High Military Exp. Share, Low Income Countries 
Egypt 1 2 8.66 3.03 
Mil.exp/GDP 
-3.027 1.523 0.050 
Syria 1 2 9.05 1.48 
Mil*GDP 
0.321 0.164 0.053 
Remove High Military Exp. Share, High Income Countries 
Israel 4 4 14.96 2.42 
Mil.exp/GDP 
-3.476 1.984 0.083 
United States 4 4 5.37 1.68 
Mil*GDP 
0.401 0.241 0.100 
Remove All Subsets 
Egypt 1 2 8.66 3.03 Mil.exp/GDP 
Syria 1 2 9.05 1.48 -3.369 1.871 0.075 
Israel 4 4 14.96 2.42 Mil*GDP 
United States 4 4 5.37 1.68 0.375 0.225 0.099 
Note: The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). All specifications 
employ log of initial income, growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, 
and time fixed effects as an additional control set. The number of countries/observations for each panel is, respectively, 85/665, 
83/649, 83/649 and 82/641. The time span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1970-2010 period (T=8).    
72 
 
Table 3-8 
Different Time Windows 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 1970-1995 
(1) 
1980-2010 
(2) 
1990-2010 
(3) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
-0.019** 
(0.007) 
Mil. exp/GDP -4.381*** 
(1.637) 
-2.217 
(1.564) 
[0.160] 
-3.216** 
(1.439) 
Mil*GDP 0.486** 
(0.189) 
0.241 
(0.176) 
[0.174] 
0.338** 
(0.156) 
Control Set Yes Yes Yes 
Countries/Observations 89/431 89/614 89/439 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.352 0.926 0.230 
(b) Serial Correlation:    
     First-order 0.031 0.000 0.001 
     Second-order 0.767 0.554 0.874 
Note: The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). Additional control 
set includes growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed 
effects. The time series dimension (T) for columns 1-3 is, respectively, 5, 6 and 4. ***, **, * represent significance of 
estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses; the estimates in square 
brackets are p-values. 
 
 
Table 3-9 
Alternative Data Sources and Measurements 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.043** 
(0.018) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
Mil. exp/GDP -2.725** 
(1.136) 
-0.470** 
(0.183) 
-5.666*** 
(1.409) 
Mil*GDP 0.386** 
(0.168) 
 0.624*** 
(0.182) 
Mil*Rank  0.117** 
(0.052) 
 
Control Set Yes Yes Yes 
Countries/Observations 89/688 89/601 89/342 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.971 0.796 0.142 
(b) Serial Correlation:    
     First-order 0.000 0.015 0.000 
     Second-order 0.695 0.260 0.536 
Note: The estimation results under the columns 1 and 3 are achieved using System GMM; while under the column 2 Difference 
GMM is used. In addition, column 1 and 3 also employs the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). 
Additional control set includes growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and 
schooling, and time fixed effects. The time span for the analysis in columns 1 and 2 is based on balanced dataset for the 1970-
2010 period (T=8), while in column 3 for the 1990-2010 period (T=4). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, 
respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. 
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4.   Externalities in Military Spending and Growth: The Role of Natural 
Resources as a Channel through Conflict 
4.1. Introduction 
The economic effects of military spending continue to be the subject of considerable 
debate in the literature where the impact of military expenditure is frequently found 
either to be non-significant or negative.
54
 How do these effects vary across 
economies? And what factors drive the heterogeneity of military spending effects? 
These questions continue to be an important focus for research as it is an expenditure 
by governments that has influence beyond the resources it takes up, especially when 
countries need some level of security to deal with internal and external threats 
generating positive externalities for the military spending and growth relationship. 
This analysis reproduces many of the results of the existing literature using a large 
panel dataset which employs a large dataset on military spending and variety of 
conflict measures. The investigation shows that the differential impact of military 
expenditure is increasing and significant not only for external threat levels, but also 
internal threat levels. In addition, extending the concept of the resource-conflict link, 
the analysis contributes to the defence literature by showing that the impact of 
military expenditure on growth is less detrimental for countries with large natural 
resource wealth once corruption levels are accounted for. The analysis also addresses 
the concerns from the resource-conflict literature regarding endogenous behaviour of 
resource rents share measurement, with findings that suggest a significant positive 
impact of natural resource wealth on conflict. 
There is a widely held view that political tensions and associated high levels of 
military spending are likely to undermine a country's economic growth prospects. As 
discussed in Knight et al. (1996), while political tensions induced by domestic and 
foreign threats themselves can have detrimental impact on a country’s economic 
performance, there are direct and interrelated avenues by which sustained increases 
in military spending may negatively influence economic growth. For instance, 
increases in military spending may reduce the efficiency of allocation of resources 
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 For surveys of the military spending and growth literature see Chan (1987), Dunne (1996, chap. 
23), Smith (2000), Ram (2003), Smaldone (2006), Dunne and Uye (2009). 
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available for alternative domestic uses such as investment in (public and private) 
productive capital, education, health and market-oriented technological innovation, 
and hence adversely affect an economy’s growth prospects. On the other hand, 
military sector can also yield a “peace dividend” in the form of stability by 
improving efficiency in countering both external and internal security threats, and 
deliver an environment for productive activities which will feed back in the economy 
as higher levels of long-run growth.    
In any event, theoretical literature has allowed the identification of a number of 
channels through which military spending can impact the economy – such as labour, 
capital, technology, external relations, socio-political effects, debt and conflicts (see 
Dunne and Uye, 2009). The relative importance and sign of these effects, as well as 
the overall impact on growth can only be ascertained by empirical analysis. 
An important issue acknowledged in the empirical literature is the identification 
problem that results from the feature that security threats may influence observed 
changes in both military spending and economic growth. Aizenman and Glick (2006) 
explain the presence of these non-linearities showing that, while growth falls with 
higher levels of military spending, its impact is positive in the presence of external 
threats. 
Another feature that has emerged in the conflict literature is the role of natural 
resources.
55
 Collier and Hoeffler (1998) offered a pioneering empirical contribution 
finding that resource wealth has a positive impact on possibility of conflict, with the 
main results robust to employing alternative measures of resource wealth (notably a 
measure of resource rents, see Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). 
Although the resource-conflict link is increasingly viewed as a stylized fact in 
economics and political science (see e.g., Ross 2004a; Ron, 2005), the explanations 
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 The literature has distinguished between no fewer than three different dimensions of the “resource 
curse”: resources are associated with (i) slower economic growth, (ii) violent civil conflict, (iii) 
undemocratic regime types. Selected contributions include the following works: On economic growth, 
refer to Sachs and Warner (1995), Mehlum et al. (2006), Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and etc. 
With respect to conflict, refer to Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), Ross (2004a, b), De Soysa and 
Neumayer (2007), Collier et al. (2009), Lujala (2009). Considering regime type (and institutions more 
broadly), refer to Ross (2001), Leite and Weidmann (2002), Jensen and Wantchekon (2004), Bulte et 
al. (2005) and Caselli and Tesei (2011). Overview articles include Rosser (2006), Dixon (2009) and 
van der Ploeg (2009).  
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of this evidence are mixed. Focussing on the economic roots of conflict, De Soysa 
(2002), Fearon (2005), Ross (2006), De Soysa and Neumayer (2007), and Lujala 
(2009) highlight the role of (legal) oil and mineral resource trading. An increased 
probability of foreign intervention (Rosser, 2006) and the probability of suffering 
from economic shocks (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005) are other explanations as to why 
resources might be linked to conflict. 
Other explanations of the resource-conflict link arise around political (state-strength) 
perspectives of (potential) rebels as key decision-makers (e.g., Auty, 2004; Dunning, 
2005; Humpreys, 2005; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005). According to this view, 
resource-rich economies tend to suffer from a weak state and an unaccountable 
leadership, which is unable or unwilling to diversify the economy in order to deliver 
key public goods. Alternatively, resource riches may encourage oppressive regimes, 
leading to genuine grievances amongst a share of the population.
56
  
Therefore there are many reasons to believe that high levels of resource wealth may 
generate high demand for military protection since the military performs as a 
premium guard against the internal and external risk that a country may face. In 
addition, having natural resources can also reduce the opportunity costs of increasing 
military spending and building up the military–industrial complex to strengthen the 
ability of the military to protect national security and natural resources (Ali et al., 
2013; Dunne and Tian, 2013).  
Considering the various mechanisms mentioned, it is not always straightforward to 
distinguish how resources are related to conflict. On one hand, while the income 
from resource abundance may serve as an incentive for rebellion activity, one may 
also argue that it proxies for the “effectiveness of the state” (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 
2003). Along with these complications, there is a literature that involves resource 
scarcity, rather than abundance, as a driver of violent conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999; 
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 Standard explanations of civil war advanced by economists and political scientists are greed and 
grievance. The rational choice concept regards civil war as a special form of non-cooperative 
behaviour. The greed motive simply reflects a chance for rebels to enrich themselves; grievance, 
however, is explained in a behavioural context, and underlines relative deprivation, social 
discrimination and inequality (e.g., due to ethnic and religious segregations, see Regan, 2003). 
Ballantine (2003) has emphasized that the mix of greed and grievance can be particularly effective 
and relevant as an explanation of the onset of war. Ross (2004b) investigates these motives, along 
with other potential conflict triggers. The theoretical foundation of these perspectives may be traced 
back to Grossman (1991) and Hirshleifer (1995). 
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Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009). Another concern in the literature is that resource 
rents, as in Collier and Hoeffler (2005) and De Soysa and Neumayer (2007), may be 
endogenous with respect to conflict.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The methodology and data 
employed are described in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the estimation results 
and Section 4.4 concludes. 
4.2.1. Empirical Methodology 
The analysis employs the System GMM dynamic panel estimator by Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which builds on the GMM Difference 
estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This approach can be used to 
address the issues of potential biases induced by country specific effects, and of joint 
endogeneity of all explanatory variables in a dynamic formulation which is 
especially important here because of the link between military spending and conflict, 
i.e. if military expenditure is reacting to an increased threat of conflict, then the 
ultimate cause of the reduced growth might be the threat of conflict itself rather than 
the observed military expenditure. Moreover, to ensure that the estimated effect is 
not driven by the number of instruments, the analysis employs the “1 lag restriction” 
technique introduced by Roodman (2009) that uses only certain lags instead of all 
available lags as instruments. The treatment of each regressor according to their 
exogeneity levels is based on upper and lower bound conditions (Roodman, 2006).
57
 
Along with coefficient estimates obtained using System GMM estimator, the tables 
also report three tests of the validity of identifying assumptions they entail: Hansen’s 
(1982) test of over-identifying restrictions for the joint validity of the moment 
conditions;
58
 and Arellano and Bond’s (1991) AR(1) and AR(2) tests in first 
differences. AR (1) test is of the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation, 
which can be rejected under the identifying assumption that error term is not serially 
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 Following the upper and lower bound restrictions offered by Roodman (2006), the analysis treats 
military expenditure, natural resources, conflict, corruption (and all interactions with military 
expenditure), and investment ratio as endogenous, while other variables employed in the specification 
as predetermined. For detailed information regarding upper and lower bound conditions, see also 
Appendix 2-A.  
58
 It is of note that some of the Hansen test statistics during the analysis yield high p-values (e.g., in 
excess of 0.90). This can be a warning signal that too many moment conditions are in use; and 
therefore, the results from these specifications must be read with caution. 
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correlated; and AR (2) test is of the null hypothesis of no second-order serial 
correlation, which should not be rejected. In addition, to deal with heteroskedasticity, 
the Windmeijer (2005) small-sample correction is applied. 
The benchmark analysis follows a similar specification used by Aizenman and Glick 
(2006) which provides evidence of a non-linear growth effect of military 
expenditure, which allows the presence of threats to security.
59
 Starting from this 
benchmark, the analysis confirms the presence of conflict risks and government 
performance as potential sources of positive externalities for the relationship 
between growth and military spending, and then looks at the interaction between 
military expenditure and natural resources as a channel through conflict, also 
accounting for the potential adverse effect that might be generated by poor 
governance, namely by rent-seeking or corruption activities.    
Letting the subscripts i and t represent country and time period respectively, the 
estimated model can be written as  
             yit – yi(t-1) =  α yi(t−1) + θ1milit + θ2milit*Xit + φ'Xit + β'Zit + μt + ξi + εit      (4i)  
where y is log of real per capita income, milit is military spending, Xit is the vector of 
variables interacted with military spending expressed as either threat, corruption or 
natural resource wealth, Zit is a vector of additional control variables, μt is a period-
specific constant, ξi is an unobserved country-specific effect, and εit is an error term. 
The hypothesis is that θ1<0 and θ2>0 implying that the impact of military 
expenditure θ1+θ2*Xit is less negative at high levels of threat, government 
performance and natural resource wealth. Moreover, as θ1 and θ2 have opposite 
signs, a threshold effect arises:   
              
      
 = θ1+ θ2*Xit >0    
      
         Xit >     := - 
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 Dunne et al. (2005) in their critical review paper compare theoretical models mainly employed by 
defence economists. They conclude that the Feder-Ram model should be avoided within the defence 
economics literature, since it is prone to theoretical misinterpretation. The augmented Solow model 
used by Knight et al. (1996) has fewer theoretical weaknesses, but it is too narrow given the range of 
variables that have been found significant determinants of growth. The reformulation of the Barro 
model used by Aizenman and Glick (2006), which allows for security effects on output is more 
promising and has the comparative advantage to explain both military expenditures and output. 
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The standard errors of the respective threshold levels are computed using the delta 
method. However it is of note that in small samples, the delta method is known to 
result in excessively large standard errors. 
As an additional robustness check, outliers are singled out using a strategy advocated 
by Belsley et al. (1980) that involves the application of the DFITS statistic to 
identify the countries associated with high combinations of residual and leverage 
statistics.  
4.2.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The initial analysis is based on a balanced dynamic panel dataset consisting of 89 
countries over the 1970-2010 period.
60
 To construct the panel dataset, non-
overlapping five year intervals are used. This filters out short-run cyclical 
fluctuations, so that the analysis can focus on long-run growth effects (Aghion et al., 
2009). The dependent variable, logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth, is 
constructed using data from the Penn World Table (PWT 7.1). The log of initial 
income per capita is used as regressor. 
Military spending is measured as the average ratio of military expenditures to GDP, 
using data collected from the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute) Yearbooks. As online data tables relate only to the period from 1988 
onwards, military expenditure shares for the previous periods are collected and 
inputted directly from the SIPRI Yearbooks in order to extend the time horizon.
61
 
The degree of threat measure employed is twofold: internal and external. To measure 
the internal threat level, the analysis employs two alternative proxies: internal 
conflict onset and internal conflict incidence. The former is measured as the fitted 
values of civil conflict onset from Fearon and Laitin (2003). The projection of 
probabilities for onset is realized according to the specification of their original 
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 See Appendix Tables 4-B and 4-C for the list of countries and descriptive statistics. 
61
 Data on military spending was initially collected for 173 countries starting from the period of 1959 
as the PWT data on real GDP per capita is not available for most countries before this date. However, 
the time horizon was restricted to the period of 1970 and onwards because the measure of natural 
resources is available only since this date. Moreover, in order to maximise the number of countries for 
which data on military expenditure and real GDP per capita is available for most years, the balanced 
sample was limited to 113 countries. Due to lack of the data for other important control variables, the 
analysis was further constrained to the balanced sample of 89 countries. 
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paper.
62
 The latter is constructed using UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts 2012 Dataset 
of the International Peace Research Institute’s (PRIO) Centre and Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP), and computed by counting the number of internal threat 
incidences during non-overlapping five year intervals for the period of 1970-2010. A 
country’s external threat level is proxied in two ways. First, a war intensity measure 
is computed in a similiar way as in Aizenman and Glick (2006) by counting the 
number of wars a country has been involved in conflict for the last half century. 
Specifically, it is defined as the number of years a country was at war with each of 
its adversaries during the period from 1960 to 2010 and divided by the sample 
period. This variable is constructed based on the data of militarized interstate 
disputes from “Major Episodes of Political Violence, 2008” collected by the 
University of Maryland’s Center for Systematic Peace (CSP). A sensitive issue from 
the estimation of military expenditure and growth relationship conditional on a war 
intensity measure is that the estimated effect might be driven by the future conflict 
that a country has not experienced yet at previous time period. Therefore, the 
analysis also employs an alternative measure of external threat incidence which is 
constructed using UCDP/PRIO data; and computed by counting the number of wars 
a country has been involved in conflict during non-overlapping five year intervals for 
the period of 1970-2010.  
The measure of resource wealth is based on data on resource rents provided by 
Hamilton and Ruta from the World Bank.
63
 It includes two categories of natural 
resources: minerals and energy (oil, gas and coal); and is measured as the product of 
the quantity of resources extracted and the difference between the resource price and 
the unit cost of extraction. 
Corruption is measured by the control of corruption index extracted from ICRG 
(International Country Risk Guide) data set.
64
 The index has values ranging from a 
value of 0 (for very high corruption or very poor performance) to 6 (for very low 
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 More specifically, the predicted values of civil conflict onset from model 2 of Table 1 as in Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) are used. The projection reflects prior war, income, population, mountains and non-
contiguous territory, oil, new states and political instability, polity2, as well as ethnic and religious 
fraction. Note that employing the civil conflict onset measure restricts the data set to 1970-2000 
period.       
63
 See also Collier and Hoeffler (2005), De Soysa and Neumayer (2007). 
64
 Employing corruption data restricts the sample to 82 countries and the time span to the period of 
1985-2010.  
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corruption or excellent performance) and hence may be interpreted as an increasing 
index of government performance.  
To examine the claim of endogenous behaviour of resource rents measurement for 
the resource-conflict analysis, several variables are employed to serve as exogenous 
instruments. Instrumental variables should be exogenous and correlated with the 1
st
 
stage endogenous variables, but not with the error term of the 2
nd
 stage conflict 
regression. The instruments employed include three geographical variables – 
distance to major navigable river,
65
 percentage of fertile soil (soil), and percentage of 
land area in the tropics (tropics).
66
 It is evident that biophysical conditions can affect 
a country’s comparative advantage in exporting primary commodities, and hence its 
resource dependence. Moreover, there is no indication that these instruments invite 
conflict directly and therefore correlate with the 2
nd
 stage error term.
67
  
A further instrument is given by the variable democracy constructed by replacing 
negative values of the variable polity2 in the Polity IV database (Marshall, 2010) 
with zero. Polity2 is widely used in the empirical political-science literature as a 
measure of the position of a country on a continuum of autocracy-democracy 
spectrum (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2008; Persson and Tabellini, 2006, 2009; Besley 
and Kudamatsu, 2008). Although one might question the exogeneity of regime type 
for conflict regressions, the analysis clearly demonstrates that this variable may be 
used as an instrument (see also e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Vreeland, 2008). There 
is also little reason to suspect that democratic system of governance leads to more 
incidents of civil conflict; and more importantly it is questionable whether it has a 
direct effect on conflict potential.
68
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 This variable is employed from G-Econ data set collected by Yale University. Source: 
http://gecon.yale.edu/data-and-documentation-g-econ-project 
66
 The geographical characteristics on soil and tropics are obtained from Nunn and Puga (2012). 
Source: http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/ 
67
 The geophysical characteristics most commonly found to influence conflict is the degree of high 
terrain, which is not directly linked to these geographical instruments.    
68
 Using the polity2 measure that ranges from -10 to 10, Fearon and Laitin (2003) find an insignificant 
impact of political regime type on civil conflict onset. However they suggest that anocracies, as 
defined by the middle of the Polity index (ranging from -5 to 5) of political regime, are more 
susceptible to civil conflict than either pure democracies or pure dictatorships. Unpacking the 
anocracy measure, Vreeland (2008) finds that certain components of the Polity index are defined with 
explicit reference to civil conflict, and when these components are removed from the Polity index, the 
significant relationship between political regime and conflict disappears. To check whether the 
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The analysis also employs a standard set of control variables typically used in the 
empirical growth literature (e.g., Barro and Lee, 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995, Ch. 12), which can be classified as stock and flow variables. Stock variables 
are measured at the beginning of each half decade and consist of two proxies for 
human capital: the log of average years of schooling attained by males aged 15 and 
over, obtained from the Barro and Lee data set; and the log of life expectancy, as 
reported by the United Nations. Flow variables are measured as averages over the 
half-decade. These feature the population growth rate,
69
 real private investment as a 
percentage of real GDP and degree of economic openness, all as reported in the Penn 
World Table (PWT 7.1). 
Table 4-1 provides summary statistics for shares of military expenditure and natural 
resources, and the cumulative incidence of conflict over the different subsamples. 
Three features are of note for the analysis. The first is the tendency that countries 
experience internal threat on average eight times more frequently than external threat 
(8.382 vs. 1.112). This supports the claim that the end of proxy-wars and superpower 
involvement in local wars did not reduce the number of conflicts in general, but did 
reduce the intensity of inter-state military battles (Kaldor, 1999). There are fewer 
real military battles than in the past, but attacks on civilians increased showing a 
dominance of civil or intra-state wars. Furthermore, over 2/3 of the sample never 
experienced any external threat, while this figure is almost the same for those who 
have experienced internal conflict. This might affect the economic impact of military 
expenditure on growth through external and internal conflict. The second facet of 
these statistics is that conflicts occur more frequently in relatively more resource 
abundant countries. The average natural resource shares increases when moving 
from the sample without any conflict experience to the sample with some conflict 
experience: from 2.391% (4.099%) to 5.608% (5.057%) for internal (external) threat. 
The third aspect is the obvious tendency that countries facing either external or 
internal threat tend to spend relatively more on the military sector compared with the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
arguments above alter the results, the analysis also used a dummy for democracy that takes value of 1 
if polity2 is higher than 5 and 0 otherwise as an instrument. The results are qualitatively similar to that 
presented here. 
69
 Growth rate of population employed in the analysis is computed as log of n + g + δ, where n is 
average population growth rate; g is the rate of technical progress and δ is the rate of depreciation of 
the stock of physical capital investment and g + δ is assumed to be equal to 0.05, following Mankiw 
et al. (1992). 
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sample facing no threat. Average military expenditure share increases when moving 
from the sample without any conflict experience to the sample with some conflict 
experience: from 2.479% (2.242%) to 2.980% (4.112%) for internal (external) threat.   
4.3. Empirical Results 
Estimation results for the impact of military expenditure conditional on threat levels 
are presented in Table 4-2. Table 4-3 displays estimation results for the relationship 
between growth and military spending conditional on corruption levels. Tables 4-4 – 
4-11 explore the relationship between growth and military spending concentrating on 
natural resources as a channel through conflict. Table 4-4 addresses the concerns of 
potential endogeneity problems in the resource-conflict relationship. The results 
from the non-linear estimation of the relationship between growth and military 
spending conditional on natural resource wealth are reported in Table 4-5. The 
subsequent tables report a number of sensitivity checks on the results from Table 4-
5. In particular, the analysis explores the robustness of the results to: alternative 
criteria for inclusion of the countries in the sample based on (i) importance of the 
shares from natural resource rents in the economy; (ii) dropping large commodity 
producers and (iii) subsets of countries with relatively intense conflict experiences 
that might potentially be induced by resource abundance; (iv) breaking down the 
resource wealth by commodity type (energy and oil resources); (v) alternative time 
windows; (vi) allowance for other non-linearities.     
4.3.1. Military Expenditure and Growth: Threats  
Figure 4-1 illustrates how the impact of military spending on economic growth 
changes while the level of threat increases. Scatter plots and fitted relationships 
between the variables of interest are achieved using partial regressions.
70
 The plots 
indicate a significant negative impact of military expenditure on growth for the 
sample with no experience of conflict, while this effect is positive, albeit 
insignificant, for the sample with some conflict experience. 
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 Partial-regression estimates are obtained in two stages. First, both the dependent variable and the 
isolated independent variable are projected onto the additional set of regressors under consideration. 
Next, the residuals of the dependent variable are regressed against the residuals of the independent 
variable. The figures are produced using OLS regressions where growth and military expenditure are 
related linearly. 
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Estimation results for the impact of military expenditure conditional on internal 
threat levels are presented in Table 4-2.
71
 The conjecture of this investigation follows 
the idea that the impact of military expenditure on growth is a non-linear function of 
the effective militarized threat posed by internal and external forces. Alternatively, 
threats without expenditure for military security reduce growth, military expenditure 
without threats decreases growth, while impact of military expenditure in the 
presence of sufficiently large threats would be positive. 
The results from the non-linear estimation of these relationships provide support for 
the conjecture, and indicate that military expenditure has a negative direct effect on 
growth. The coefficients on the interaction term are significant and positive in all 
cases, implying a positive marginal impact of military expenditure in the presence of 
threats. The coefficient estimates on threat measures are mostly negative where 
significances show sensitivity across different specifications. The threshold analysis 
for the internal threat measure of civil conflict onset implies that military spending 
has an overall negative (positive) effect on growth for threat levels below (above) the 
probability level of 0.032.  
As a check on the results, the growth equation is re-estimated according to the 
threshold levels where the separate linear specifications are estimated for the 
subsamples below and above the threshold level.
72
 The associated quantitative 
significance of a one standard deviation increase in military expenditure from 
splitting the data set into subsamples is estimated as -0.28 percentage points 
(significant) among low threat level countries, and -0.01 percentage points 
(insignificant) among high threat level countries.
73
 Thus, these piece-wise linear 
specifications imply a relationship similar to that found in the specification that 
includes the interaction term between military expenditure and threat.  
                                                          
71
 An analogous analysis of the relationship between growth and military expenditure conditional on 
external threat levels is reported in Appendix Table 4-A1. Overall the results confirm the findings 
from Aizenman and Glick (2006) and demonstrate that this non-linearity is also apparent in a panel 
setting.   
72
 The threshold value of 0.021 is used for the analysis of low and high internal threat sample. 
However note that any threshold value below 0.021 yields qualitatively similar results to that 
presented in Table 4-2.  
73
 These measures are obtained by multiplying the coefficient estimate by average standard deviation 
of 2.81, dividing by the time span between income observations (5 years), and then multiplying by 
100 to convert to a percentage-point measurement. 
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The last column in Table 4-2 employs alternative measure for internal threat levels 
using UCDP/PRIO data. The results are qualitatively similar and consistent with that 
found above. 
Coefficient estimates of additional explanatory variables enter mostly with the 
expected signs. Initial income exhibits a negative relationship with growth. 
Estimated coefficients on life expectancy and the investment ratio are positive, 
statistically significant, and typically indicate strong quantitative effects. Finally, the 
estimated effects of population growth, trade openness and schooling are typically 
insignificant. 
As an additional robustness check, the analysis also considered the potential 
influence of several subsets of countries singled out due to the maintenance of high 
shares of military expenditure and on the basis of certain unusual aspects of their 
conflict experiences during the time period spanned by the sample.
74
 Results of this 
exercise are reported in Appendix Tables 4-A2 and 4-A3 where the results provide 
supportive evidence for the non-linear relationship conditional on threat levels as 
described above. 
Overall, these findings suggest that the negative and significant relationship between 
military expenditure and growth is only apparent among countries facing low threats, 
while in the presence of sufficiently high threats military expenditure is not 
significantly detrimental for growth, illustrating typically an insignificant impact.  
4.3.2. Military Expenditure and Growth: Corruption 
Previous studies suggest that the relationship between growth and military 
expenditure also depends on corruption and rent seeking behaviour (see e.g., Gupta 
et al., 2001; d’Agostino et al., 2012). In Table 4-3, this association is examined more 
formally, where the hypothesis is that military expenditure in the presence of 
corruption (better government performance) reduces (increases) growth. 
The results from the non-linear estimation of this relationship support this 
hypothesis. Military expenditure and corruption are decreasing economic 
performance directly, while the interaction term enters positively, all illustrating a 
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significant impact on growth. The associated quantitative significance of a one 
standard deviation increase in military expenditure from splitting the data set into 
subsamples according to the threshold level is estimated as -0.67 percentage points 
(significant) among high corruption level countries (those below the corruption level 
of 4.5), and 0.01 percentage points (insignificant) among low corruption level 
countries (those above the level of 4.5).  
As noted by Delavallade (2005), the existence of corruption leads to a reallocation of 
resources from more productive sectors towards less productive ones. As military 
spending generates more rents, projects in this sector are likely to involve larger 
amounts of money and may attract more and larger bribes. Overall, the magnitude of 
these results implies that corruption leads to increases in military spending, 
worsening the negative impact of the larger military sector on the economy’s growth 
rate. 
4.3.3.1. Military Expenditure and Growth: Natural Resources 
The exploration now turns to relationships between growth and military spending 
concentrating on natural resources as a channel through conflict. As mentioned 
previously, a large body of the literature identifies natural resource wealth as a major 
determinant of civil conflict. The dominant causal link is that resources provide 
finance and motive (the “state prize” model). Others see natural resources as causing 
“political Dutch disease” or increasing rent-seeking and corruption activities, which 
in turn weaken state capacity inducing failures in delivering key public goods and 
hence increase the likelihood of conflict. If this is the case, the resource-conflict link 
is expected to impact the military spending and growth relationship. This 
investigation supposes that if resource wealth leads to a higher risk of conflict, then 
the impact of military expenditure on growth is a non-linear function of natural 
resource wealth. In particular, the impact of military expenditure in the presence of a 
sufficiently large resource wealth would be positive, conditioning that natural 
resources are not associated with high corruption activities. 
Estimation results of the analysis of the resource-conflict link are presented in Table 
4-4. The first two columns of the upper panel derives this relationship using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) where civil conflict onset linearly responds to initial income, 
natural resources and the set of control variables as employed in the benchmark 
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analysis. The findings are very similar to those found in the existing literature, where 
all variables of interest take the expected signs. Specifically, resource wealth leads to 
a higher probability of conflict, while a negative correlation is apparent for initial 
income. In both cases, initial income and resource wealth illustrate strong 
quantitative effects on probability of conflict onset. 
In light of the concerns about endogeneity, as argued by Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2009), the next column applies a two-step instrumental variables (IV) model, where 
initial income and natural resources are estimated in the first stage by a simple linear 
regression, and the second stage uses an instrumental variable approach to determine 
the probability of the conflict onset. First-stage regression results, as shown in the 
lower panel, demonstrate that the instruments are strong. The joint endogeneity test 
from the linear estimation provide support for the idea that the variables of interest 
are jointly endogenous, and that instrumenting for these variables is necessary to 
obtain consistent estimates of the causal relationship for the onset of conflict.
75
 The 
test statistics for the instruments, namely the over-identification test and the tests on 
the excluded instruments (all performed in linear regressions), also confirm that the 
instruments are strong and appropriate for the analysis.
76
  
The estimation results from the instrumental variables approach imply a qualitatively 
similar relationship to that found in the OLS specifications. Higher incomes 
attenuate the risk of conflict, while resource wealth is positively and significantly 
associated with civil conflict onset. Therefore, returning back to the relationship of 
growth and military spending conditional on resource wealth, the effect from 
military expenditure and resource interaction is expected to be positive. 
The results from the non-linear estimation of this relationship are reported in Table 
4-5. To deal with problems that might potentially be induced from association of 
corruption with natural resources and military expenditure, the analysis employs two 
approaches (see e.g., Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Aizenman and Glick, 2006; 
d’Agostino et al., 2012). Under the first, as shown in columns (1) and (2), the 
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 Separate endogeneity tests for the variables of interest fail to reject the exogeneity of initial income. 
However, natural resource wealth still enters endogenously. Therefore, the IV equation is also re-
estimated by instrumenting only for natural resources; the results are qualitatively similar to that 
presented in Table 4-4. 
76
 The joint significance test of the instruments fails to reject the null of no explanatory power on 
conflict. 
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specification also includes corruption and its interaction with military expenditure in 
addition to the interaction term between military expenditure and natural resources. 
Under the second (column 3), the growth equation is estimated by interacting 
military expenditure with two separate natural resource variables: one for resource 
wealth for those countries below the corruption level of 4.5 (high corruption), and 
the other for countries above this level (low corruption). 
The estimation results from these alternative approaches provide support for the 
supposition. While military expenditure has a direct significant and negative effect 
on growth, the coefficients on the interaction terms with natural resources are 
positive, implying a positive differential impact of military expenditure. In 
particular, interaction terms under the first approach are significant and robust to the 
elimination of outliers. For the second approach, military expenditure is only 
significant for the case when it is interacted with resource wealth for countries with 
low corruption levels, and illustrates an insignificant impact for high corruption 
levels, confirming the concerns regarding a potential contradictory effect induced by 
corruption. 
In summary, the findings confirm the idea that resource wealth is associated with a 
higher risk of conflict, and show that the impact of military expenditure in the 
presence of sufficiently large resource wealth is positive once corruption levels are 
accounted for. 
4.3.3.2. Robustness Checks 
Table 4-6 examines the robustness of the results estimated for the relationship 
between growth and military spending, conditional on natural resources, to the 
exclusion of countries whose natural resource wealth accounts for only a small share 
of GDP. For these countries it is unlikely that the capacity of resources provides 
finance or motive to induce a potential conflict, so focussing on a smaller sample 
with significant resource rents share is arguably a better test for sensitivity of the 
results. Columns 1 and 2 exclude countries in the first decile of the average share 
distribution (8 countries); columns 3 and 4 exclude countries in the first quartile (18 
countries); and columns 5 and 6 exclude all countries below the median average 
share (39 countries). Results from baseline sample are confirmed and generally 
reinforced as the threshold to be included in the sample progressively increases. In 
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particular, the point estimates for the interaction term (columns 2, 4 and 6) become 
more positive as the analysis focuses on more resource dependent countries.  
The potential influence on the results of several additional subsets of countries is 
also considered. The collection of these subsets reflects countries singled out due to 
their resource dependence and conflict experiences during the time period spanned 
by the sample. The results of this exercise are illustrated in Tables 4-7 and 4-8. For 
each subset, Tables 4-7 and 4-8 report the list of countries, their average shares of 
natural resource rents, military expenditure and growth rates measured over the 
entire sample period, and the coefficient estimates obtained for interaction terms of 
military spending with natural resources as specified above for the first and the 
second approach. 
Table 4-7 addresses the plausible concern that high stakes from resource rents might 
incentivise conflict potential and affect motivation for rebels to enrich themselves. 
The investigation therefore excludes from the sample four subsets of countries: (i) 
those belonging to OPEC; (ii) big oil and natural gas producers; (iii) large minerals 
and coal producers; and (iv) the union of these subsets.
77
 In all cases, the results 
remain robust at least at the 10% significance level with coefficient estimates of the 
variables of interest lying within one standard deviation of the full-sample estimate. 
Table 4-8 checks the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of countries with 
relatively intense conflict experiences that might potentially be induced by resource 
wealth. The results of this exercise are demonstrated for three subsets of countries: 
(i) countries with high internal threat levels and high natural resource shares 
specified as those experienced internal threat above the mean of cumulative internal 
conflict incidence and with natural resource levels above the mean; (ii) countries 
with high external threat levels and high natural resource shares defined as those 
experienced external threat more than approximately one standard deviation from the 
mean of cumulative external conflict incidence and with natural resource levels 
                                                          
77
 The investigation treats Indonesia as an OPEC country, as it belonged to the organisation for more 
than half of the sample period. It also includes Ecuador who joined the OPEC in 2007. Alternative 
treatments of these countries do not alter the results. Big commodity producers reflect countries with 
more than 3% of total world supply, belonging to the list of top 10 biggest producers (according to the 
latest estimates) in the world by commodity. Data for commodities produced in a country are obtained 
from the following sources: minerals from British Geological Survey 2000-2008; Oil, natural gas and 
coal from US Energy Information Administration 1980-2009. 
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above the mean; and (iii) the union of these subsets. The coefficient estimates of the 
interaction terms change very little given the removal of any one of the subsets under 
consideration. However, statistical significance of the interaction term, as specified 
under the first approach, is somewhat altered in the case when the exclusion of the 
second and the third subsets is employed. Overall, the general pattern of results 
reported in Table 4-5 remains apparent given the exclusion of these countries from 
the sample. 
Table 4-9 deals with the issue of commodity typology. An important distinction that 
has been made in the literature is the role of energy and oil trading as a potential 
driver of conflict (Rosser, 2006; De Soysa and Neumayer, 2007 and etc.), which is 
believed to induce higher risk of conflict, as these commodity types are generally 
more valuable and easier to control for the ruling elite. Therefore columns 1-2 and 3-
4 break down the resource wealth into energy and oil resources respectively. The 
results from both cases are consistent with findings from Table 4-5. Furthermore, the 
point estimates of interaction terms provide support to the belief that energy and oil 
resources in particular, are the crucial drivers of the impact of the natural resources 
on the conflict potential as mentioned above.  
Using time effects in all regressions controls for any common factor that could affect 
all countries in any five-year interval. In addition, the non-linear specification 
implicitly allows for time and cross-country variation in the effect of military 
expenditure on economic growth. However, it would be of interest to check if the 
results hold when different time windows are used for the estimation. The baseline 
time span in the analysis for natural resource contingency is 1985-2010. Table 4-10 
considers more restrictive information under the first approach available for four 
successive periods of minimum 15 years: 1985-2000; 1985-2005; 1990-2010; 1995-
2010. The result holds significantly, at least at the 10% significance level, suggesting 
that the findings from non-linear relationship between growth and military 
expenditure are also robust when the analysis is restricted to different time spans. 
A final robustness check explores the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of 
additional non-linearities of military expenditure. Results of this exercise are 
reported in Table 4-11 where columns 1 and 2 add the interactions of military 
expenditure, respectively, with initial logged income and the threat measure of 
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conflict onset into the specification.
78
 In all cases, the results remain robust. 
Moreover, note that all other interactions show a highly significant impact and take 
the correct sign.
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Overall, the findings provide supportive evidence to the general pattern of results 
reported in Table 4-5 showing robust relationship between growth and military 
expenditure conditional on natural resource wealth. 
4.4. Conclusion 
The empirical analysis has confirmed that military expenditure in the presence of 
high external threats increases economic growth, while military expenditure driven 
by rent seeking and corruption reduces growth. In addition, the analysis provides 
evidence that such non-linearity is also apparent when internal threats are 
considered. Extending the concept of the resource-conflict link, the analysis also 
contributes to the defence literature showing that military expenditure is less 
detrimental for countries with large natural resource wealth as long as the resource 
wealth is not associated with high corruption activities. 
The empirical research was constrained by the limited availability of data for some 
countries (e.g., for Arab Gulf countries, former Soviet Union countries), inducing the 
analysis to concentrate on a relatively limited country sample. Therefore there is no 
obvious way to deal with the robustness constraints imposed by the limitations of the 
sample. Hence, the results should be taken as a suggestive of the deeper structure 
linking military expenditure, conflict, natural resource wealth and growth.  
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 The design of initial income interaction with military expenditure is an approach to place countries 
into income categories (see DeJong and Ripoll, 2006). The evidence of a positive significant 
interaction term effect between military expenditure and initial income arises by differences in the 
impact of military expenditure on growth across different income groups.  
79
 An analogous analysis as in column 2 of Table 4-11 has been carried by employing military 
expenditure interaction with external instead of internal threat. The results are qualitatively similar to 
those reported here. Furthermore, in addition to investigating the internal and external threats 
separately as potential sources of positive externalities for the non-linear relationship between military 
spending and growth, the analysis also considered including military spending interactions with both 
type of threats into the model simultaneously. The results reveal a significant interaction effect of 
military spending only with internal threats. This is consistent with Kaldor’s (1999) argument that the 
change in the nature of conflicts after the end of Cold-War era led to important changes in the 
frequency of civil or intra-state wars, illustrating dominance of internal conflicts over external 
conflicts (see Table 4-1). However this is not to argue that the role of external threats as a source of 
positive externality for the military spending and growth relationship should be underestimated. 
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The analysis also suggests a number of paths for future research concerning the 
effect of military activity on economic growth through natural resource wealth. 
Various channels by which natural resources can influence the economy have been 
discussed in the literature. A particularly promising avenue of future research would 
be to analyze the role of political factors, such as degree of political stability, and the 
political orientation of the government. 
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Figure 4-1: Partial Regression Plots for Military Expenditure and Growth 
 
 
Note: The set of regressors includes log of initial income, log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log 
of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects. The figures are produced using OLS panel regressions. 
 
Table 4-1: Descriptive Statistics for Military Expenditure, Natural Resources and Conflict  
 
Summary Statistics 
 
Sample split Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Full sample Mil. exp. 89 2.789 2.189 0.281 14.964 
 Natural res. 89 4.379 6.946 0 38.969 
 Ext. Threat 89 1.112 3.009 0 16 
 Int. Threat 89 8.382 11.888 0 45 
Internal Threat 
No Conflict  Mil. exp. 34 2.479 1.876 0.281 11.247 
 Natural res. 34 2.391 3.897 0 13.827 
Conflict  Mil. exp. 55 2.980 2.357 0.549 14.964 
 Natural res. 55 5.608 8.082 0 38.969 
External Threat 
No Conflict  Mil. exp. 63 2.242 1.132 0.281 4.836 
 Natural res. 63 4.099 7.206 0 38.969 
Conflict  Mil. exp. 26 4.112 3.334 0.933 14.964 
 Natural res. 26 5.057 6.355 0 26.112 
Note: All descriptive statistics are based on cross sectional averages for the 1970-2010 period. Internal and external threat 
measures represent cumulative sum of the conflict incidences over the whole sample constructed using UCDP/PRIO data. 
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Table 4-2 
Military Expenditure and Internal Threat  
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 Internal threat: Onset Internal  
Threat 
Incidence 
 Main 
Model 
Outliers 
Removed 
Level of Threat 
 Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.010*** 
(0.004) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
Mil*Threat 0.130** 
(0.062) 
0.205** 
(0.097) 
  0.0014** 
(0.0006) 
Threat -0.159 
(0.106) 
-0.459 
(0.308) 
0.323 
(0.284) 
-0.333* 
(0.164) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Pop. growth (log) -0.009 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.037) 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.139*** 
(0.045) 
0.148*** 
(0.054) 
0.148** 
(0.062) 
0.184*** 
(0.038) 
0.123*** 
(0.042) 
Investment/GDP 0.152*** 
(0.034) 
0.145*** 
(0.037) 
0.120*** 
(0.041) 
0.072*** 
(0.017) 
0.219*** 
(0.049) 
Openness (log) -0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
Schooling (log) -0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
Countries/Observations 89/517 82/478 77/419 21/64 85/665 
Threshold Analysis 
Internal Threat 
0.027 
(0.0004) 
0.032 
(0.001) 
  4.39 
(3.35) 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.990 0.994 0.700 0.872 0.798 
(b) Serial Correlation:      
     First-order 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.212 0.000 
     Second-order 0.916 0.745 0.779 0.247 0.190 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 estimate military expenditure and economic growth relationship conditional on the probability of 
internal conflict onset, respectively, with and without outliers. Columns 3 and 4 apply the alternative approach to estimate the 
impact of military expenditure for countries with high and low internal threat levels. Column 5 employs UCDP/PRIO data to 
measure for internal threat incidence instead of conflict onset. All specifications control for time fixed effects. The excluded 
countries in column 2 are Botswana, China, Egypt, Israel, Mali, Korea Rep. and Singapore; in column 3 are Botswana, Israel, 
Korea Rep., Mali and Singapore; in column 4 are China and Uganda; and in column 5 are Botswana, China, Egypt and 
Singapore. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. The time span for the analysis in columns 1-4 is based on 
balanced dataset for the 1970-2000 period (T=6), while in column 5 for the 1970-2010 period (T=8). ***, **, * represent 
significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4-3 
Military Expenditure and Corruption 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 
Main 
Model 
Outliers 
Removed 
Level of Corruption 
Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.002) 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Mil*Corr 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
  
Corruption -0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
Pop. growth (log) -0.008 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
-0.046** 
(0.022) 
0.023 
(0.028) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.105*** 
(0.033) 
0.099** 
(0.044) 
0.187* 
(0.092) 
0.143*** 
(0.047) 
Investment/GDP 0.260*** 
(0.042) 
0.247*** 
(0.048) 
0.175*** 
(0.046) 
0.355*** 
(0.062) 
Openness (log) -0.024*** 
(0.008) 
-0.026*** 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.043** 
(0.011) 
Schooling (log) -0.003 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.042** 
(0.018) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
Countries/Observations 82/404 78/384 24/72 72/307 
Threshold Analysis 
Corruption (0-6) 
4.3 
(1.89) 
4.5 
(2.25) 
  
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.654 0.634 0.792 0.824 
(b) Serial Correlation:     
     First-order 0.001 0.003 0.032 0.004 
     Second-order 0.546 0.622 0.389 0.741 
Note: The excluded countries in column 2 are Botswana, China, Mozambique and Uganda. Eliminated countries from low 
corruption level sample are Australia and Finland, while from high corruption level sample are China, Mozambique and 
Uganda. The estimates reported in columns 3 and 4 are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman 
(2009). All specifications control for time fixed effects. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. The time span for 
the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1985-2010 period (T=5). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, 
respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4-4 
Natural Resources and Civil Conflict Onset 
Dependent Variable: Probability of Civil Conflict Onset 
 OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Natural Res. 0.061** 
(0.027) 
0.014* 
(0.007) 
0.063** 
(0.028) 
Control Set Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 517 506 494 
R-squared 0.243 0.343  
Joint exogeneity p   0.044 
Instrument overid p   0.892 
Exc. inst. F- Initial GDP p.c.   31.07 
Exc. inst. F- Nat. Res.   12.53 
First Stage Results for Instruments 
 
(1) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 
(2) 
Natural Res. 
 
Dist. to major river 
-0.049*** 
(0.018) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
 
Soil 
-0.621*** 
(0.142) 
-0.100*** 
(0.016) 
 
Tropical 
-0.428*** 
(0.074) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
 
Democracy, lagged 
0.046*** 
(0.008) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 estimates economic growth specification, respectively, with and without outliers. Column 3 applies 
instrumental variables approach using the specification as in column 2. In addition to variables of interest reported in the upper 
panel, all specifications control for military expenditure ratio, log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment 
ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects. The excluded countries are China and Israel. The outliers are 
singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
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Table 4-5 
Military Expenditure and Natural Resources 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 Main  
Model 
Outliers  
Removed 
Alternative 
 Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
Natural Res. -0.017 
(0.031) 
-0.019 
(0.034) 
 
Mil*Nat 0.025** 
(0.012) 
0.027** 
(0.013) 
 
Natural Reshighcorr   0.014 
(0.066) 
Natural Reslowcorr   -0.531** 
(0.222) 
Mil*Nathighcorr   0.016 
(0.031) 
Mil*Natlowcorr   0.269** 
(0.133) 
Corruption -0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
 
Mil*Corr 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
Pop. growth (log) -0.015 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.017) 
0.028 
(0.027) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.112*** 
(0.030) 
0.112** 
(0.042) 
0.159*** 
(0.053) 
Investment/GDP 0.233*** 
(0.042) 
0.225*** 
(0.047) 
0.316*** 
(0.062) 
Openness (log) -0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.023*** 
(0.008) 
-0.031*** 
(0.009) 
Schooling (log) -0.004 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
0.015 
(0.014) 
Countries/Observations 82/404 78/384 79/389 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.978 0.986 0.820 
(b) Serial Correlation:    
     First-order 0.001 0.004 0.002 
     Second-order 0.361 0.461 0.985 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 report the estimation results, respectively, with and without outliers under the first estimation approach. 
Column 3 employs the second estimation approach using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009) and 
removing outliers. All specifications control for time fixed effects. Eliminated countries in column 2 are Botswana, China, 
Mozambique and Uganda; in column 3 are China, Mozambique and Uganda. The outliers are singled out using OLS 
regressions. The time span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1985-2010 period (T=5). ***, **, * represent 
significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4-6 
Excluding Low Natural Resource Share Countries  
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  Above 1st Decile Share Above 1st Quartile 
Share 
Above Median Share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
[0.102] 
-0.021*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
Natural Res. -0.019 
(0.040) 
 -0.050 
(0.032) 
 -0.027 
(0.027) 
 
Mil*Nat 0.029* 
(0.016) 
 0.031** 
(0.012) 
 0.018 
(0.011) 
[0.112] 
 
Natural Reshighcorr  0.028 
(0.065) 
 0.026 
(0.064) 
 -0.032 
(0.068) 
Natural Reslowcorr  -0.501** 
(0.208) 
 -0.561** 
(0.222) 
 -0.777** 
(0.292) 
Mil*Nathighcorr  0.004 
(0.033) 
 0.001 
(0.033) 
 0.021 
(0.029) 
Mil*Natlowcorr  0.295** 
(0.132) 
 0.319** 
(0.140) 
 0.409** 
(0.167) 
Corruption -0.003 
(0.003) 
 -0.006* 
(0.003) 
 -0.005 
(0.004) 
 
Mil*Corr 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 
Control Set Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries/Observations 74/364 74/364 64/314 64/314 43/210 43/210 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.846 0.903 0.880 0.984 0.944 0.398 
(b) Serial Correlation:       
     First-order 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
     Second-order 0.416 0.630 0.515 0.711 0.938 0.570 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 exclude the countries below the 1st decile of natural resource rents as a share of GDP (8 countries); 
columns 3 and 4 exclude countries below the 1st quartile (18 countries); and columns 5 and 6 exclude countries below the 
median (39 countries). All specifications employ log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of 
openness and schooling, and time fixed effects as an additional control set.  The time span for the analysis is based on balanced 
dataset for the 1985-2010 period (T=5). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses; estimates in square brackets are p-values. 
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Table 4-7 
Excluding Big Producers  
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country Average  
Nat. resource 
 Share 
Average  
Mil. Exp. 
 Share 
Average 
Growth  
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove OPEC Countries 
Algeria 19.51 2.57 1.28    
Ecuador 13.83 2.19 1.77 Mil*Nat 
Indonesia 10.31 2.34 4.19 0.026 0.011 0.024 
Iran 26.11 4.69 0.89 Mil*Natlowcorr 
Venezuela 26.15 1.75 0.50 0.230 0.116 0.051 
Remove Big Oil and Gas Producers 
Brazil 2.02 1.52 2.29    
Canada 3.78 1.78 1.88 Mil*Nat 
China 7.34 1.73 6.90 0.022 0.011 0.046 
Iran 26.11 4.69 0.89 Mil*Natlowcorr 
Mexico 6.89 0.55 1.93 0.205 0.103 0.051 
United States 1.64 5.37 1.68    
Venezuela 26.15 1.75 0.50    
Remove Big Minerals and Coal Producers 
Australia 3.87 2.49 2.28    
Bolivia 10.73 2.36 0.44    
Botswana 1.78 3.32 5.75 Mil*Nat 
Chile 9.85 4.16 2.29 0.022 0.012 0.064 
Jamaica 5.58 0.82 0.66 Mil*Natlowcorr 
Jordan 0.67 11.25 -0.02 0.267 0.121 0.030 
Morocco 1.49 4.11 2.38    
Peru 6.41 3.05 1.28    
Zambia 13.51 2.73 -0.27    
Remove All Subsets 
Algeria 19.51 2.57 1.28    
Australia 3.87 2.49 2.28    
Bolivia 10.73 2.36 0.44    
Botswana 1.78 3.32 5.75    
Brazil 2.02 1.52 2.29    
Canada 3.78 1.78 1.88    
Chile 9.85 4.16 2.29    
China 7.34 1.73 6.90 Mil*Nat 
Ecuador 13.83 2.19 1.77 0.021 0.009 0.037 
Indonesia 10.31 2.34 4.19 Mil*Natlowcorr 
Iran 26.11 4.69 0.89 0.193 0.114 0.094 
Jamaica 5.58 0.82 0.66    
Mexico 6.89 0.55 1.93    
Morocco 1.49 4.11 2.38    
Peru 6.41 3.05 1.28    
United States 1.64 5.37 1.68    
Venezuela 26.15 1.75 0.50    
Zambia 13.51 2.73 -0.27    
Note: The estimates are achieved according to specifications under the first and the second estimation approach as in Table 4-5. 
Big commodity producers reflect countries with more than 3% of total world supply which belong to the list of top 10 biggest 
producers in the world by commodity. Data for commodities produced in a country are obtained from the following sources: 
minerals from British Geological Survey 2000-2008; Oil, natural gas and coal from US Energy Information Administration 
1980-2009. The number of countries/observations for each panel is, respectively, 77/379, 75/369, 73/359 and 63/309. The time 
span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1985-2010 period (T=5).    
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Table 4-8 
Exclusion of Countries with Unusual Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country Average  
Nat. resource 
 Share 
Average  
Mil. Exp. 
 Share 
Average 
Growth  
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Countries with High Internal Threat Levels 
and High Natural Resource Shares 
Algeria 19.51 2.57 1.28    
Colombia 4.97 2.31 2.39 Mil*Nat 
Congo Dem. Rep. 7.37 2.24 -3.59 0.026 0.012 0.039 
Indonesia 10.31 2.34 4.19 Mil*Natlowcorr 
Iran 26.11 4.69 0.89 0.218 0.102 0.035 
Peru 6.41 3.05 1.28    
Sudan 4.30 3.00 0.99    
Remove Countries with High External Threat Levels 
and High Natural Resource Shares 
China 7.34 1.73 6.90 Mil*Nat 
    0.022 0.014 0.106 
Egypt 12.64 8.66 3.04 Mil*Natlowcorr 
    0.217 0.107 0.046 
Iran 26.11 4.69 0.89    
Remove All Subsets 
Algeria 19.51 2.57 1.28    
China 7.34 1.73 6.90    
Colombia 4.97 2.31 2.39    
Congo Dem. Rep. 7.37 2.24 -3.59 Mil*Nat 
Egypt 12.64 8.66 3.04 0.022 0.015 0.138 
Indonesia 10.31 2.34 4.19 Mil*Natlowcorr 
Iran 26.11 4.69 0.89 0.217 0.103 0.039 
Peru 6.41 3.05 1.28    
Sudan 4.30 3.00 0.99    
Note: The estimates are achieved according to specifications under the first and the second estimation approach as in Table 4-5. 
Countries with high internal threat levels and high natural resource shares are specified as those experienced internal threat 
above the mean of cumulative internal conflict incidence with natural resource levels above the mean. Countries with high 
external threat levels and high natural resource shares are specified as those experienced external threat more than 1 standard 
deviation from the mean of cumulative external conflict incidence with natural resource levels above the mean. The number of 
countries/observations for each panel is, respectively, 75/370, 79/389 and 73/360. The time span for the analysis is based on 
balanced dataset for the 1985-2010 period (T=5).    
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Table 4-9 
Typologies of Commodities 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 Energy Resources Oil Resources 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.016** 
(0.006) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.020*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Energy res. -0.073 
(0.050) 
   
Oil res.   -0.050 
(0.056) 
 
Mil*Energy 0.051*** 
(0.017) 
   
Mil*Oil   0.041** 
(0.019) 
 
Energyhighcorr  -0.145 
(0.092) 
  
Energylowcorr  -0.714*** 
(0.262) 
  
Oilhighcorr    -0.043 
(0.066) 
Oillowcorr    -0.540** 
(0.225) 
Mil* Energyhighcorr  0.068** 
(0.030) 
  
Mil* Energylowcorr  0.404** 
(0.157) 
  
Mil* Oilhighcorr    0.036 
(0.025) 
Mil* Oillowcorr    0.279** 
(0.121) 
Corruption -0.002 
(0.004) 
 -0.003 
(0.004) 
 
Mil*Corr 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 0.002* 
(0.001) 
 
Control Set Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries/Observations 82/404 82/404 74/365 74/365 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.745 0.699 0.976 0.954 
(b) Serial Correlation:     
     First-order 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
     Second-order 0.530 0.583 0.403 0.456 
Note: All specifications employ log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and 
schooling, and time fixed effects as an additional control set. The estimates are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique 
following Roodman (2009). The time span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1985-2010 period (T=5). ***, 
**, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
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Table 4-10 
Different Time Windows 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 1985-2000 
(1) 
1985-2005 
(2) 
1990-2010 
(3) 
1995-2010 
(4) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.024*** 
(0.003) 
-0.022*** 
(0.003) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
Natural Res. -0.209* 
(0.124) 
-0.102** 
(0.048) 
-0.017 
(0.031) 
-0.013 
(0.034) 
Mil*Nat 0.067** 
(0.030) 
0.047*** 
(0.014) 
0.025** 
(0.012) 
0.025* 
(0.015) 
Corruption -0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Mil*Corr 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Control Set Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries/Observations 82/240 82/322 82/404 82/322 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.181 0.997 0.978 0.967 
(b) Serial Correlation:     
     First-order 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.002 
     Second-order N/A 0.961 0.371 0.400 
Note: All specifications employ log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and 
schooling, and time fixed effects as an additional control set. The time series dimension (T) for columns 1- 4 is, respectively, 3, 
4, 4 and 3. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented 
in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4-11 
Allowance for Other Non-linearities 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 (1) (2) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.037*** 
(0.008) 
-0.052*** 
(0.011) 
Natural Res. -0.015 
(0.035) 
-0.151* 
(0.090) 
Mil*Nat 0.028** 
(0.014) 
0.066*** 
(0.022) 
Corruption -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
Mil*Corr 0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Mil*GDP 0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
Threat  -1.276*** 
(0.399) 
Mil*Threat  0.439*** 
(0.119) 
Control Set Yes Yes 
Countries/Observations 78/384 78/222 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.985 0.587 
(b) Serial Correlation:   
     First-order 0.003 0.005 
     Second-order 0.709 N/A 
Note: Both columns are estimated removing outlier countries. Eliminated countries in column 1 are Botswana, China, 
Mozambique and Uganda; in column 2 are Botswana, China, Mozambique and Sudan. Column 2 employs probability of civil 
war onset as threat measure. All specifications employ log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of 
openness and schooling, and time fixed effects as an additional control set. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. 
The time span for the analysis in column 1 is based on balanced dataset for the 1985-2010 period (T=5), while in column 2 for 
the 1985-2000 period (T=3). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard 
errors are presented in the parentheses. 
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5. Commodity Price Shocks, Conflict and Growth: The Role of 
Institutional Quality and Political Violence 
5.1. Introduction 
The effect of resource abundance on growth prospects is a perennially important 
topic in the growth and development literature. How do resource windfalls affect a 
country’s development level? And how do additional revenues generated by resource 
abundance influence economic growth? These are important questions, as the effects 
of income shocks generated by resource windfalls cannot be referred to as generic 
income changes. Because resource booms typically translate into direct windfalls 
into the hands of political elite, these shocks may have very different political and 
economic consequences than other sources of income shocks (Sachs and Warner, 
2001; Caselli and Tesei, 2011). Considered alternatively, resource windfalls may just 
represent short run gains to an economy which do not feed into future development. 
This analysis empirically investigates the relationships between resource windfalls, 
political regimes, conflict and growth using a distinctive commodity price shock 
measurement. The investigation clarifies the potential mechanism behind the 
ambiguous outcomes of the existing resource literature, particularly showing that 
resource windfalls have significant effects on conflict only in politically unstable 
autocracies, where these effects are heterogeneous in the response, conditional on a 
country’s initial political violence level. Specifically, a positive shock to an 
autocratic country’s flow of resource rents decreases conflict potential if within-
country political violence level is high, while for autocracies with relatively low 
political violence levels the opposite effect occurs. The investigation also contributes 
to the growth literature by showing that resource shocks are positively associated 
with growth in democracies and in politically stable autocracies, while undermining 
a country’s economic performance for politically unstable autocracies.  
In order to motivate the empirical analysis and facilitate the interpretation of the 
results, the paper opens the discussion with a following novel story as developed in 
Caselli and Tesei (2011), Besley and Persson (2011). Assuming that the governing 
elite or ruler has complete control of the flow of income from natural resources, the 
growth prospects of a country will depend on decisions of the government regarding 
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how to diversify this revenue. Countries where the ruler decides to invest into the 
well-managed development activities are likely to enjoy a stable socio-political 
environment and experience higher economic growth from resource windfalls. 
However if the ruler chooses to invest this revenue into rent-seeking activities or to 
direct them into unproductive sectors, this will enhance the likelihood of economic 
and political instability and lead to diminished growth. Investing resource revenues 
into “self-preservation” activities in order to safeguard its political survival as a ruler 
is also likely to further undermine economic performance since these resources could 
have been invested into development activities, and hence can be referred as a 
wasted amount of investment out of productive into unproductive sector.    
Self-preservation activities can range from the mild (e.g., direct and indirect vote-
buying, imprisoning) to the extreme case scenarios (e.g., violent repression, 
execution), which will also shape the decision of opposition groups of whether or not 
to challenge the incumbent government conditional on the threat level faced. For 
instance, in the context of potential conflict scenarios (where both an incumbent 
government and an opposition group can each make an investment into violence), an 
increase in resource windfalls, on one hand, may serve as an incentive for rebellions 
promoting rapacity over these resources, and hence increase violence by raising the 
gains from appropriation if they are successful (“state prize” theories); on the other 
hand, it may also serve for the effectiveness of the state to confront the rebellions 
and decrease the likelihood for insurgents of being successful (“opportunity cost” 
arguments), where investment into self-preservation activities by an incumbent 
government is expected to further decrease the incentives of opposition group to 
resist against the government if the threat level is sufficiently large enough. It is also 
worth mentioning that these outcomes are expected to be the case only for countries 
with an unstable political environment and non-cohesive institutions.  
Considering instead how these effects are reflected in economic growth provides 
another source of ambiguity. For instance, investments in self-preservation activities 
are expected to decrease the possibility of conflict and hence promote growth by 
delivering peace dividends; however, it also refers to the amount of investment that 
could be directed into delivering public goods through well-managed development 
projects, thus leading to reduced growth. Clearly, these determinants – resource 
windfalls, political institutions and violence, all interact to influence each other; and 
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the relative dominance and sign of these effects in cross country analysis, as well as 
how these effects are transferred onto growth, can only be ascertained by empirical 
investigation.  
Moreover, the main determinant for the decision-making processes here is the 
amount of revenue accruing from resource windfalls, which is partly determined by 
the payoff from staying in the office, as political survival as a ruler implies that the 
current elite remains in control of future revenues; and partly explained by budget 
constraints, since at low levels of resource income the incentive to engage in self-
preservation activities (or oppose the incumbent government) is relatively low, as the 
future “pie” to hold on to is small. At higher levels instead the future benefits from 
holding on to power are sufficiently large; and the larger is the “pie”, there is more 
likelihood that the ruler finds it optimal to spend on self-preservation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
long-lasting debate in the literature regarding the impact of resource abundance on 
institutional quality, conflict and growth. The methodology and data employed is 
described in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents the estimation results and Section 5.4 
concludes. 
5.1.1. Related Literature 
Many researchers have noted the resource-led development failures – economic and 
political factors that may have played a role in the disappointing performance of 
resource-intensive economies in the 1970s and 1980s (Gelb, 1988; Auty, 1990), 
although the adverse effects of resource abundance on growth was first confirmed in 
the 1990s by Sachs and Warner (1995), igniting a subsequent tranche of research that 
focuses on the resource curse paradox. The literature has distinguished between no 
fewer than three different dimensions of the resource curse effect, where resources 
are associated with (i) slower economic growth, (ii) undemocratic regime types, and 
(iii) violent civil conflict.  
Among the popular early explanations for the curse effect on growth are rent-seeking 
analyses (e.g., Torvik, 2002) where for grabber friendly countries rent-seeking and 
production are competing activities. By shifting away from productive activities, the 
government allocates more of its revenue to inefficient public sector activities 
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leading aggregate investment levels to fall, while public and private consumption to 
increase. Lowering investment levels may also lead to a lower quality of investment 
projects (e.g., white elephants). Stories based on “Dutch-disease” arguments are 
other explanations for the curse effect where the non-resource sector is the long-run 
engine of growth due to increasing returns at the sector level, but becomes crowded 
out by the resource sector (Sachs and Warner, 1999). Empirical support for these 
views is provided by various authors, including Ross (1999, 2001), Leite and 
Weidmann (2002), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Isham et al. (2005), and 
Bulte et al. (2005). Mehlum et al. (2006) demonstrate that the impact of resource 
abundance is conditional on institutional quality, i.e. while countries with good 
institutions which promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit 
from resource abundance, countries without such institutions may suffer from a 
resource curse (see also Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Robinson et al., 2006). 
Along with these transmission channels, another feature that has emerged in the 
resource curse literature is the link between resources and conflict pioneered by 
empirical contribution in Collier and Hoeffler (1998).
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However the validity of these results has been criticized by Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte (2008, 2009) drawing attention in the literature. The authors disputed the 
arguments that abundant resources lead to bad institutions, higher conflict potential 
or slower growth by emphasizing their concerns regarding the endogeneity of 
resource exports ratio to GDP where the denominator explicitly measures the 
magnitude of other activities in the economy, i.e. the ratio is not independent of 
                                                          
80
 Although the resource-conflict link is increasingly viewed as a stylized fact in economics and 
political science (see e.g., Ross 2004a), the explanations of this evidence are mixed. Focussing on the 
economic roots of conflict, Fearon (2005), Ross (2006), De Soysa and Neumayer (2007), and Lujala 
(2009) highlight the role of (legal) oil and mineral resource trading. The probability of foreign 
intervention (Rosser, 2006) and the probability of suffering from economic shocks (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2005) are other explanations as to why resources might be linked to conflict. Other 
explanations of the resource-conflict link arise around political (state-strength) perspectives of 
(potential) rebels as key decision-makers (e.g., Dunning, 2005; Humpreys, 2005). Ballantine (2003) 
has emphasized that the mix of greed and grievance can be particularly effective and relevant as an 
explanation of the onset of war. These are not to argue that there were no “dissident” views: e.g., 
Homer-Dixon (1999) who suggests resource scarcity, rather than abundance as a driver of violent 
conflict. 
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economic policies and institutions which is to the large extent produced by choices 
of individual governments.
81
    
In the light of endogeneity concerns regarding the resource rent share, measuring 
resource shocks with changes in international commodity prices is more promising 
since they are typically unaffected by the behaviour of individual countries (Deaton 
and Miller, 1995).
82
 Alternatively viewed, since world commodity prices are set in 
international markets, they are less likely to be influenced by the socio-economic and 
political events in a single country. While empirical studies by Deaton and Miller 
(1995) and Raddatz (2007) do find that commodity price shocks raise growth, 
Collier and Goderis (2009) demonstrate that this positive association is only the case 
in the short run; and a positive shock to commodity prices can lead to slower growth 
in the long run conditional on poor governance. 
A recent literature has also investigated the effect of commodity price shocks on 
political regime types as a proxy for institutional quality.
83
 Using commodity price 
changes as instruments for income changes, Burke and Leigh (2010) find 
insignificant effects of commodity-driven income changes on political regimes. 
Bruckner et al. (2012) instead find a positive effect of oil-price shocks interacted 
with the share of net oil exports in GDP for movements towards democracy. A good 
summary of this literature (with associated weaknesses and advantages regarding the 
approaches employed) is provided in Caselli and Tesei (2011) where the findings 
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 Alternative measures of resource abundance have been also used in the literature, casting some 
doubts on the consistency and robustness of the curse. For example, Brunnschweiler (2008) finds no 
curse evidence using World Bank resource data; Alexeev and Conrad (2009) employ several 
measures of resource abundance, including hydrocarbon deposits per capita, and oil and mining 
outputs, and find no negative effects on income. Lederman and Maloney (2007) also demonstrate that 
the resource curse effect disappears when employing system GMM.   
82
 During the analysis, the issue of large producers with potential to influence world prices is 
addressed, with findings that the results are robust and not altered by these economies. 
83
 For the relationship between political regimes and income shocks measured other than commodity 
price changes, see e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Acemoglu et al. (2008) who empirically 
investigated the causal relationship between income and democracy; Haber and Menaldo (2011) who 
concentrated on windfalls from natural resources, finding no effect of oil windfalls on greater 
autocracy. As for the literature studying the effects of resource windfalls on political institutions (and 
institutional quality more broadly) other than democracy/autocracy, see also the theoretical studies of 
Baland and Francois (2000), and Torvik (2002), all whom study theoretically the consequences of 
windfalls for rent seeking, and Leite and Weidman (2002) and Salai-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) 
that present corresponding empirical evidence (where rent-seeking is usually measured through 
proxies of corruption).     
107 
 
demonstrate that while commodity price shocks have no effect on political system in 
democracies, a positive shock to an autocratic country’s flow of resource rents 
significantly exacerbates the autocratic nature of the political system which itself is 
heterogeneous in the response across deeply and moderately entrenched autocratic 
regimes. 
There is also an emerging literature regarding the link between conflict and 
commodity prices, yet the results are ambiguous. While Bruckner and Ciccone 
(2010) and Savun and Cook (2011) demonstrate that negative shocks to export prices 
increase the risk of civil conflict, Besley and Persson (2008) demonstrate that higher 
world market prices of exported, as well as imported, commodities are strong and 
significant predictors of higher within-country incidence of civil conflict.
84
 
Differentiating the effect of labour intensive commodities and natural resources on 
conflict within Colombia, Dube and Vargas (2013) show that a rise in international 
prices of oil, coal and gold increases violence, while this association is negative 
when commodities like coffee, sugar, bananas and tobacco are considered (see also 
Angrist and Kugler, 2008).
85
  
Although it seems that the case studies of individual countries offer relatively clear-
cut evidence, the relationship between resource windfalls and conflict for cross-
country analysis is not clear. Along with these complications, Bazzi and Blattman 
(2011) suggest “absence of evidence” from resource windfalls on conflict. 
5.2.1. Empirical Methodology 
The investigation firstly explores the link between resource windfalls and conflict 
following a similar specification to Bruckner and Ciccone (2010), where the 
indicator for civil conflict onset linearly responds to the changes in commodity price 
index. Starting from this benchmark, the analysis further investigates the impact of 
                                                          
84
 See also Besley and Persson (2010), who demonstrate that resource dependence can increase the 
propensity towards conflict while lowering income and state capacity; and Besley and Persson (2011), 
who show that natural disasters are negatively correlated with income per capita and induce greater 
political violence. 
85
 The theoretical foundation of these perspectives may be traced back to Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2011). 
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changes in commodity prices on conflict possibility, conditional on political 
institutions and a country’s political violence level.86  
The analysis then turns to the exploration of how these relationships between 
resource windfalls, political regimes and violence are reflected in economic growth. 
The baseline investigation for the growth analysis employs similar specification used 
by Collier and Goderis (2009). Letting the subscripts i and t represent country and 
time period respectively, the estimated model can be written as  
   yit – yi(t-1) =  α yi(t−1) + θ1Compricegrowthi(t-1) + φ'Xi(t-1) + β'Zi(t-1) + μt + ξi + εit  (5i) 
where y is log of real per capita income, Compricegrowthi(t-1) is the change in 
commodity price index where the variation across countries is generated by applying 
country-commodity specific weights based on net export baskets of individual 
countries (see the Section 5.2.2), Xi(t-1) is the vector of interaction variables (political 
regimes and political violence) with price index, Zi(t-1) is a vector of additional 
control variables, μt is a period-specific constant, ξi is an unobserved country-specific 
effect, and εit is an error term. 
The hypothesis for these relationships is that the impact of resource windfalls on 
both conflict onset and economic growth is a non-linear function of a country’s 
political institutions and political violence levels, where the marginal impact of price 
shocks is increasing while within-country political violence (stability) level 
decreases (increases). Alternatively, governments in countries with stable socio-
political environments have a greater incentive to spend the resource windfalls 
beneficially, whereas in politically unstable countries with non-cohesive institutions 
the resource windfalls may be spent in unproductive directions. 
The analysis for growth estimation employs the System GMM dynamic panel 
estimator by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which builds 
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 In order to keep the specification straightforward and to concentrate on how the conflict possibility 
responds non-linearly to the changes in commodity price index conditional on political institutions 
and within-country political violence level, the investigation does not include the additional two lags 
of price index into the specification as is done in Bruckner and Ciccone (2010). In addition, it is also 
worth mentioning that both lags demonstrated no impact on conflict onset when are included; thus a 
parsimonious specification without additional lags during the analysis was preferred. 
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on the GMM Difference estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
87
 This 
approach has the advantage of addressing the issues of joint endogeneity of all 
explanatory variables in a dynamic formulation, and of potential biases induced by 
country specific effects.
88
 Moreover, to ensure that the estimated effect is not driven 
by the number of instruments, the analysis employs either collapsing instruments 
approach or the “1 lag restriction” technique introduced by Roodman (2009) that 
uses only certain lags instead of all available lags as instruments. The treatment of 
each regressor according to their exogeneity levels is based on upper and lower 
bound conditions (Roodman, 2006).
89
 
Along with coefficient estimates obtained using System GMM estimator, the tables 
also report three tests of the validity of identifying assumptions they entail: Hansen’s 
(1982) test of over-identifying restrictions for the joint validity of the moment 
conditions; and Arellano and Bond’s (1991) AR(1) and AR(2) tests in first 
differences. AR (1) test is of the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation, 
which can be rejected under the identifying assumption that error term is not serially 
correlated; and AR (2) test is of the null hypothesis of no second-order serial 
correlation, which should not be rejected. In addition, to deal with heteroskedasticity, 
the Windmeijer (2005) small-sample correction is applied. 
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 Since the dependent variable for the investigation of the relationship between resource windfalls 
and conflict onset is dichotomous, the analysis employs largely preferred in the literature the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimator. In addition, the investigation also considered Logit and Probit models, 
which indicated that the results are robust and not altered by the choice of estimator. The results from 
employing these additional estimators are available upon request. 
88
 It is of note that GMM estimators are designed for situations with “small T and large N” panels, 
implying few time periods and many individuals; and employing System GMM with annual data for 
1963-2010 period might raise question whether the System GMM is the appropriate estimating 
approach. Alternatively viewed, using long T dimension can lead to overfitting endogenous variables 
and hence weaken the Hansen test putting the reliability of over-identifying restrictions test under 
question. Indeed, some of the Hansen test statistics during the analysis yield extremely high p-values 
(e.g. in excess of 0.90) and therefore, the results from these specifications should be read with caution 
since this can be a warning signal that too many moment restrictions are in use. However, it is of 
emphasis that the analysis checked whether the estimated results for growth relationship are driven by 
the choice of estimator by running the same exercises employing OLS estimator as a comparison 
which indicated that the results are in line with those achieved using System GMM estimator. These 
results are available upon request. 
89
 For detailed information regarding upper and lower bound conditions, see Appendix 2-A. 
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5.2.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The initial analysis is based on an unbalanced dynamic panel dataset consisting of 
135 countries over the 1963-2010 period.
90
 The dependent variable, logged per 
capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth, is constructed using data from the Penn World 
Table (PWT 7.1). The log of initial income per capita is used as regressor. 
The measure of resource wealth is the commodity export price index which is 
constructed using a similar methodology to Deaton and Miller (1995), Dehn (2000) 
and Collier and Goderis (2009). More specifically, first, data on world commodity 
price indices and commodity export and import values are collected for as many 
commodities as data availability allowed. All commodity price indices are extracted 
from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) dataset, where the list of 54 
commodities used to construct the composite index is listed in Appendix Table 5-D3. 
Export and import data by commodity, country and year are collected from the 
United Nation’s Comtrade data set, which reports dollar values of exports and 
imports according to the SITC1 system, for the period 1963 to 2010. To construct 
the composite commodity export price index, total net export value (exports minus 
imports) of all commodities in 1990 for which the country is a net exporter is first 
calculated for each country. Then the individual 1990 net export values for each 
commodity are divided by this total in order to achieve 1990 country-commodity 
specific weights, wi, which are held fixed over time and applied to the world price 
indices of the same commodities to form the country-specific geometrically 
weighted index of commodity export prices. More specifically, for each year and 
country the geometrically weighted index is constructed as follows: 
P =   
  
  
where wi is 1990 country-commodity specific weight and pi is the international 
commodity price index for the commodity i. The weighting item, wi, can be 
interpreted as a value of commodity i in total value of all commodities, n, for 
constant base year j:  
wi =  
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 See Appendix Tables 5-D1 and 5-D2 for the list of countries and descriptive statistics. 
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Finally, to allow the effect of commodity export prices to be larger for countries with 
higher commodity exports, the log of geometrically weighted index of commodity 
export prices for each country i and year t, Pit, is weighted by the 1990 share of net 
commodity exports in a country’s GDP, denoted si, resulting in the final shape of the 
composite commodity price index,    
  . This contrasts to Collier and Goderis (2009) 
(see also Bazzi and Blattman, 2011), where the final construction is instead realized 
by multiplying the weighted index with export shares which might cause potential 
endogeneity issues as discussed in Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008). The separate 
indices for different type of commodities are constructed in a similar way.
91
   
Although the measurement of commodity price shocks using shares of commodities 
in a given year is far from ideal, it has several advantages. Since the index uses a 
constant base year, it does not cope well with shifts in the structure of trade. In 
particular, the index does not capture resource discoveries and other quantity shocks 
after the base year. Nor does it capture temporary volume shocks other than those 
which happen to occur in the base year itself. However, since the purpose is to 
capture price shocks rather than quantity movements, but at the same time 
differentiate between resource abundant and resource scarce countries, it is desirable 
to hold volumes constant. This also avoids possible endogeneity problems arising in 
the event of a volume response to price changes. Nevertheless, the index will 
understate income effects of a given price change. In addition, as discussed above, 
the geometrical weighting scheme has the comparative advantage in avoiding the 
potential endogeneity issues that can be faced with when using arithmetically 
weighted indices.
92
  
As a proxy for institutional quality outcome, the analysis employs the variable of 
polity2 in the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010), which is widely used 
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 See also Appendix 5-C for more detailed information regarding the sources and the data coverage 
methodology used to construct the price index. 
92
 Caselli and Tesei (2011) suggested a nice strategy of using a country’s principal export commodity 
prices to capture the effect of price shocks. However, the analysis here did not follow this strategy 
since only a few oil producing countries are specialised to the point of exporting only a single 
commodity, so for the majority of countries the full ramifications of being a commodity exporter 
cannot be determined with reference to just a single commodity price series. In addition, given the 
findings from the literature that different type of commodities are likely to behave very differently 
within a given country (see e.g., Dube and Vargas, 2013), conditional on everything else being 
constant, the broad aggregate indices of commodity prices based on export baskets of individual 
country was preferred. 
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in the empirical political-science literature (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2008) to measure 
the position of a country on a continuum of autocracy-democracy spectrum. It 
aggregates information on several building blocks, including political participation 
(existence of institutions through which citizens can express preferences over 
policies and leaders), constraints on the executive, and guarantees of civil liberties 
both in daily life and in political participation, as evaluated by Polity IV coders. 
Polity2 varies continuously from -10 (extreme autocracy) to +10 (perfect 
democracy). The analysis follows the convention in the vast majority of the literature 
that interprets negative values of polity2 as pertaining to autocracies and positive 
ones to democracies (e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2006, 2009). 
Data on civil conflict is obtained from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts 2012 Dataset 
of the International Peace Research Institute’s (PRIO) Centre for the Study of Civil 
War and the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP). The UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Database defines civil conflict as a “contested incompatibility which 
concern government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two 
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle 
deaths”. Civil conflict outbreak is captured by defining civil conflict onset indicator 
that is unity if there is conflict in year t but not in t-1, and zero if there is no civil 
conflict in t and t-1; if there is a conflict in t-1, the year t civil conflict onset indicator 
is not defined. 
To measure the political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on 
governance, the analysis employs the index of internal conflict risk – proxy for 
stability – obtained from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Dataset.93 The 
index ranges from 0 to 12, where the highest rating is given to those countries where 
there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the government does not 
indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its own people. The lowest 
rating is given to a country embroiled in an ongoing civil war. The risk rating 
assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of 4 points 
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 Employing the political violence/stability measure restricts the sample to 119 countries and the time 
span to the period of 1984-2010. Moreover, due to lack of the data for some countries for which data 
on political violence and civil conflict onset is available, the price shocks and conflict analysis was 
constrained to the sample of 77 countries. 
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and a minimum score of 0 points. The subcomponents are civil war/coup threat, 
terrorism/political violence and civil disorder. 
The analysis also includes the additional set of control variables taken from the 
empirical growth literature: trade openness measured as the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services as a share of GDP; inflation computed as the log of 1 
plus the annual consumer price inflation rate, where data for both controls is 
collected from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI); and international 
reserves (from IFS series 1..SZF) over GDP (from PWT 7.1).
94
 
Table 5-1 provides summary statistics for growth rates, political contestability and 
violence/stability levels, and probability of conflict onset over the different 
subsamples according to countries’ income (Panel A) and resource dependence 
levels (Panel B).
95
 Two features of these statistics are of particular interest for the 
analysis. The first aspect is the tendency that higher income level countries tend to 
enjoy relatively rapid growth, better institutional quality and experience relatively 
less (higher) political violence (stability) and conflict. Average statistics of growth 
rates (conflict onset) increase (decrease) when moving from the lower to higher 
income classifications: from 1.698% (0.049) for low-income countries to 1.739% 
(0.035) for high-income countries. Furthermore, the lower (higher) income level 
countries are on average more autocratic (democratic) and likely to suffer from 
unstable political environment: average statistics of polity2 (political stability) 
increases from -0.371 (7.976) to 5.662 (10.07) when moving from the lower to 
higher income classifications. The second facet of these statistics is that relatively 
low resource dependent countries are likely to lie down on the upper-half (more 
democratic) of autocracy-democracy spectrum and enjoy relatively higher political 
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 Following the upper and lower bound restrictions offered by Roodman (2006), the analysis treats 
commodity price index (and all its interactions), polity2, political violence, trade openness and 
international reserves ratios as endogenous, while other variables employed in the specifications as 
predetermined. 
95
 The cut-off levels for low and high-half income groups are taken as in DeJong and Ripoll (2006), 
where country classifications are obtained by mapping classification thresholds as defined by the 
World Bank’s income measures into the corresponding Penn World income measures. The resulting 
definitions are as follows: high-half income countries are those with real per capita GDP above 
$5,500; and low-half income countries are those with real per capita GDP less than $5,499. All 
classifications are based on the beginning sample income rankings. The threshold for the low and high 
resource dependence levels are defined as countries with net export shares below and above the 75
th
 
percentile of the distribution respectively.    
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stability: average statistics of polity2 (political stability) decreases from 2.408 
(8.784) to -1.284 (8.585) when moving from the lower to higher resource dependent 
countries.  
Figure 5-1 plots how average cross-country political violence/stability levels change 
across political regime types. In order to do so, all observations are divided into eight 
bins depending on the value of polity2, where bin sizes are chosen to have as 
uniform as possible a sample size across bins, while at the same time preserving the 
symmetry between “autocratic” and “democratic” bins. The resulting intervals of the 
eight bins are for the average polity2 values [-10,-8], [-8,-5], [-5,-3], [-3, 0],      [0, 3], 
[3, 5], [5, 8] and [8, 10] respectively.
96
 Three features are of note. The first is that for 
deeply entrenched autocracies (interval of [-10,-8]) the average political stability is 
above the mean illustrating low variation in political violence. The second facet of 
these statistics is that average political stability rapidly jumps down below the mean 
when moving from deeply to less entrenched autocracies reaching its minimum 
average value and maximum variation range for the [-5,-3] interval which also 
demonstrates similar behaviour for the [-3, 0] interval. The third aspect is the 
intuitive tendency that the average political stability gradually increases when 
moving from less democratic to highly democratic subsamples.
97
 
5.3. Empirical Results 
Aforementioned, the previous literature suggests that income shocks generated by 
resource windfalls might have a heterogeneous impact on growth conditional on a 
country’s governance level. In particular, Collier and Goderis (2009) adopting a 
panel co-integration methodology show that resource shocks have an unconditional 
positive association with growth in the short run, however an increase in commodity 
price levels may lead to slower growth in the long run conditional on poor 
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 It is of note that none of the countries in the data set lay on bounds of average polity2 level 
intervals. Moreover, since the number of countries with available political violence data is severely 
low for deeply entrenched autocracies, the convention of the overlapping intervals is preferred during 
the analysis in order to be able to achieve as large as possible number of observations for small 
sample sized bins.  
97
 The average political stability across democratic bins drastically decreases showing wide variation 
in political violence only for the [5, 8] interval which is mainly driven by the presence of three 
countries: Colombia, Peru and Sri Lanka. Eliminating these countries from the subsample illustrates a 
monotonic increase (decrease) in average political stability (violence) levels when moving from less 
democratic to highly democratic bins. 
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governance, which itself is heterogeneous across different type of commodities.
98
 A 
simple illustration of how the impact of resource windfalls on economic growth can 
vary across countries with different income levels, presented in Figure 5-2, indeed 
provides support for this view.
99
 The plots illustrate a significant positive impact of 
resource windfalls on growth only for the high-half income subsample, while this 
effect is insignificant on average across the lower income distribution subsample, 
perhaps reflecting a contradictory effect induced by institutional quality and political 
instability, which signifies how economic and political factors may have played a 
role in the disappointing performance across resource-intensive economies.  
The role of political institutions (and institutional quality more broadly) in 
explaining the cross-country differences in income levels and economic 
performances (see e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2005),
100
 as well as how resource 
abundance might affect institutional quality has been largely explored in the 
literature. A particularly interesting study for the analysis in this paper is the recent 
work by Caselli and Tesei (2011) where the authors document how a country’s 
political institutions respond heterogeneously to the changes from natural resource 
windfalls. Specifically, the results reveal that resource windfalls have no political 
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 The replication analysis of these relationships is demonstrated in Appendix Table 5-A1. Although 
the analysis in this paper does not purport to test the short-run and long-run impacts of resource 
windfalls on growth, by replicating Collier and Goderis (2009) results using the preferred 
measurement, the investigation confirms the original findings that the impact of commodity price 
levels on growth can vary in the long-run and across different commodity types. In particular, the 
replication results demonstrate that short-term effects of commodity price shocks are always positive 
and illustrate strong quantitative significance with growth. Decomposing the composite commodity 
export price index levels into point vs. diffuse and energy vs. non-energy source commodities 
illustrates that the negative and statistically significant long-run effects might occur only in point 
source and energy source commodity exporting countries. This effect instead is more likely not to be 
detrimental for diffuse and non-energy source commodity exporting countries. For the more detailed 
analysis regarding using co-integration techniques, its requirements, non-linearity results, please see 
Collier and Goderis (2009). 
99
 Scatter plots and fitted relationships between the variables of interest for low and high-half income 
groups are achieved using partial regressions which are obtained in two stages. First, both the 
dependent variable and the isolated independent variable are projected onto the additional set of 
regressors under consideration. Next, the residuals of the dependent variable are regressed against the 
residuals of the independent variable. The figures are produced using least squares regressions where 
growth and commodity price shocks are related linearly. 
100
 See also Sirimaneetham and Temple (2009) who argue that instability can form a binding 
constraint on economies’ growth rates, where for the more stable countries, the measures of 
institutional quality have more explanatory power on economic performance, i.e. fundamentals for 
growth such as good institutions are not strongly associated with higher economic performance unless 
stability is also in place. 
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consequences when they occur in democracies. However, in autocracies, the changes 
in the flow of resource rents make the political regimes more autocratic. Moreover, 
in autocracies the increase in autocracy following an increase in resource revenues is 
diminishing in the initial level of autocracy, i.e. the less autocratic the form of 
government was initially.
101
 Further analysis by Caselli and Tesei (2011) also reveals 
the fact that in autocracies the negative impact from resource windfalls is mainly 
driven by moderately entrenched autocracies, while in deeply entrenched autocracies 
this effect on politics is virtually nil confirming the importance of within-country 
political violence/stability levels in shaping a country’s political institutions.102 
The analysis of how the impact of resource windfalls on conflict can be dependent 
on these interactions between political institutions and political violence are 
presented in Table 5-2. Table 5-3 instead addresses the issue of how these 
relationships are reflected onto the economic growth. The subsequent Tables 5-4 –  
5-8 report a number of sensitivity checks on the results from Table 5-3. In particular, 
the analysis explores the robustness of the results to: alternative criteria for inclusion 
of countries in the sample based on (i) importance of the shares from natural 
resource rents in the economy; (ii) dropping large commodity producers; (iii) 
dropping subsets of countries for certain aspects of their political contestability 
levels and (iv) their political violence experiences; (v) breaking down the resource 
wealth by commodity type.  
5.3.1. Resource Windfalls and Conflict Onset 
The conjecture of this investigation follows the idea that the impact of resource 
windfalls on conflict outbreak is a non-linear function of a country’s political 
institutions and effective political violence/threat posed by internal forces 
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 The main findings from Table 3 (columns 3 and 4) as in Caselli and Tesei (2011) are replicated in 
Appendix Table 5-B2 (columns 1 and 2). Appendix 5-B provides more detailed information on the 
replication analysis. For more detailed analysis regarding the relationship between natural resource 
windfalls and political system, please refer to the original paper. 
102
 In addition to the replication exercise, the analysis also estimated the non-linear relationship 
between price shocks and political system conditional on initial political violence/stability levels 
(columns 3 and 4 in Appendix Table 5-B2). The results provide supportive evidence for the original 
findings and are consistent with Figure 1, confirming that price shocks significantly exacerbate 
political system only in politically unstable autocracies and have no impact on politics when they 
occur in democracies and in politically stable autocracies. For more detailed information regarding 
this investigation, please see Appendix 5-B. 
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(incumbent government vs. opposition group). Alternatively, in the presence of a 
stable socio-economic and political environment and cohesive institutions, resource 
windfalls have no impact on conflict onset. However, for countries with non-
cohesive institutions and unstable political background, the impact of resource 
windfalls on conflict depends on the threat level that incumbent 
government/opposition group faces. Specifically, if the initial within-country 
violence level is high, an increase in resource windfalls is expected to increase the 
investment into self-preservation activities and hence state capacity, and therefore 
decrease conflict possibility by reducing incentives of potential opposition groups to 
confront the incumbent government. However, if the initial threat/violence level is 
relatively low (or the chance of opposition group to be successful and replace the 
incumbent government is relatively high), an increase in resource windfalls is 
expected to increase the incentives of opposition group by raising the gains from 
appropriation, and therefore increase the conflict possibility. The overall impact from 
the cross-country analysis will also vary on the relative strength of the two effects 
within violence groups. 
Estimation results of the resource-conflict link analysis are presented in Table 5-2. 
The first column derives this relationship linearly where civil conflict onset responds 
to the changes in commodity price index, controlling for country and time fixed 
effects. The results are similar to those found in the existing literature where the risk 
of civil conflict outbreak is higher when the change in price of export commodity 
index drops. The statistically significant effect implies that a one standard deviation 
drop in countries’ commodity price indices is associated with an increase in the 
probability of a civil conflict onset of about 0.67 percentage points.
103
  
The subsequent two columns estimate this relationship non-linearly using the 
following strategy. Firstly, the specification in column 2 adds the initial level of 
political violence/stability both, by itself and interacted with price index change; 
while column 3 runs the same exercise by separating the change in price index into 
two variables according to the initial political contestability level: the first is an 
interaction between the change in the price index and a dummy for democracy and 
the second is an interaction with dummy for autocracy.  
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 These measures are obtained by multiplying the coefficient estimate by average standard deviation 
of 0.011, and then multiplying by 100 to convert to a percentage-point measurement. 
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The results from the non-linear estimation of these relationships provide support for 
the conjecture, and indicate that positive shocks in commodity prices have an even 
larger negative direct impact on conflict outbreak in politically violent countries. The 
coefficients on the interaction terms are significant and positive in all cases, 
implying a positive marginal impact of resource windfalls while within-country 
political threat level decreases. Stratifying this association for countries with 
autocratic/democratic regime types reveals that the significant consequences from 
price shocks are present only in autocratic countries, while resource windfalls have 
no impact on conflict possibility when they occur in democracies. 
As a check on the results, the last column re-estimates the effect of price shocks for 
the subsamples below and above the average political stability level.
104
 In order to do 
so, the change in commodity price index interaction with continuous political 
violence/stability variable is replaced by the price shocks interacted with a dummy 
that takes the value of unity if a country’s initial political stability level is above the 
sample mean, and zero otherwise. Interpretation of the coefficient estimates is as 
follows: if the findings above are true, then the direct impact of changes in price 
index (referring to high violence level countries) should be negative, and the 
coefficient on interaction term (referring to relatively low violence level countries) 
should be positive. Moreover, in order to have a total positive impact on conflict for 
the subsample with a relatively stable political environment, the coefficient of the 
latter should be significantly larger in absolute value than the former, representing 
the deviation of price shock effects from the reference subsample with high violence 
levels.
105
   
The results from this exercise are consistent with the findings above where the risk 
of civil conflict outbreak is significantly higher only for autocracies with a politically 
violent environment when the change in price of export commodity index drops. The 
interaction term is positive illustrating that the effect of price shocks for relatively 
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 Since the investigation does not reveal any differential impact of resource windfalls for democratic 
countries, the specification in column 4 does not break up the democracy specific price index into 
violence level categories.  
105
 It can be easily checked that this is equivalent to including the interactions of price shocks with 
both dummies for high and low violence level subsamples. However, the implementation of the 
specification in column 4 has the advantage of demonstrating whether the price shock effects for 
relatively stable countries significantly differ from the reference group with high violence levels, at 
the same time enabling us to distinguish whether these effects are significantly different from zero.     
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low violence level countries significantly deviates from the effect for the reference 
group with high political threat levels. The associated quantitative significance of 
one standard deviation increase in price shocks from splitting the data set into 
subsamples is estimated as -2.28 percentage points among high threat level 
countries. The magnitude of interaction term implies that this effect is positive, albeit 
on average, is not significantly different from zero for relatively stable autocracies. 
In a further effort to probe whether this heterogeneity for price shock effects is 
somehow different across infra-marginal changes in political regimes, Figure 5-3 
plots the estimated coefficients of high and low violence specific changes in 
commodity price index along with their relative confidence bands (at 95% level) for 
each bin given the exclusion of potential outliers.
106
 For ease of comparison of the 
price change estimates, the conflict equation is re-estimated using two interactions of 
price shocks (always controlling for country and time fixed effects): one with a 
dummy for high violence levels illustrated with red colour; and other with a dummy 
for relatively low violence levels illustrated with blue colour. 
The estimation results of high and low violence specific changes in commodity price 
index for democratic countries are consistent with the findings from Table 5-2 
confirming that, on average, resource shocks do not have significant consequences 
on conflict possibility when they occur in countries with cohesive institutions. 
Considering the impact of these shocks across infra-marginal changes for autocracies 
instead provides further intriguing results. For deeply entrenched autocracies, the 
impact of price shocks on conflict is virtually nil. Moving from deeply to moderately 
entrenched autocracies reveals a positive impact (significant at 10% level) of price 
shocks for relatively low threat level countries in the [-8,-5] interval, which in turn 
demonstrates strong quantitative significance (at 1% level) when the subsample in 
the [-5,-3] interval is considered. For the least entrenched autocracies (interval of     
[-3, 0]) with high political threat levels instead, the positive shock to price changes 
significantly decreases the probability of conflict outbreak.
107
 It is also of emphasis 
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 The potential outlier countries are identified as those associated with the combination of 
experiencing the highest frequency of high and low political violence within each violence group for 
each bin. 
107
 The associated quantitative significance of one standard deviation increase in price shocks for the 
subsample in the [-5,-3] ([-3, 0]) interval is estimated as 3.38 (-6.41) percentage points among 
relatively low (high) threat level countries. 
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that in all cases across the bins, relatively lower initial political threat levels within 
subsamples provides relatively less opportunity cost for conflict possibility 
compared with high initial threat level countries, which supports the hypothesis that 
the marginal impact of price shocks on conflict outbreak is increasing while political 
violence level decreases. These results also suggest that average insignificant price 
shock effect on conflict for relatively low violence level autocracies in Table 5-2 
(column 4) is driven by the fact that two opposing effects cancel each other out. 
Altogether, these findings demonstrate that (i) there is an absence of evidence 
between resource windfalls and conflict outbreak for democracies and for stable 
autocracies (as in e.g., Bazzi and Blattman, 2011); (ii) there is a positive association 
for unstable autocracies if initial political violence level is relatively low (as in e.g., 
Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Besley and Persson, 2008); and a negative association if 
an unstable autocratic country’s political violence level is high (as in e.g., 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Bruckner and Ciccone, 2010). 
5.3.2   Resource Windfalls and Growth 
The analysis now turns to the exploration of the impact of resource shocks on 
economic growth with an emphasis on the importance of political institutions and 
within-country political violence levels to explain this relationship. The supposition 
for the growth analysis is that resource wealth is associated with higher economic 
performance only for countries with stable socio-economic and political 
environment, while significantly undermining growth for unstable countries with 
non-cohesive political institutions. 
The estimation results for this analysis are presented in Table 5-3. The first column 
derives this relationship linearly where growth responds to the changes in 
commodity price index in the presence of additional control set. The results are 
consistent with the existing literature where a positive shock from resource windfalls 
is associated with higher economic growth. The statistically significant effect implies 
that a one standard deviation increase in commodity price index is associated with an 
increase in income per capita growth of about 0.36 percentage points. 
The approach to capture the non-linear relationship between resource windfalls and 
growth conditional on political institutions and within-country political violence 
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levels is twofold. Under the first (column 2), the specification, in addition to 
separating the resource shocks into autocracy/democracy specific price change index 
according to a country’s initial political contestability levels, also includes the initial 
level of polity2 (interacted with an autocracy dummy), both by itself and interacted 
with the autocracy specific price change index, enabling us to estimate how price 
shock effects on growth vary when moving from deeply to moderately entrenched 
autocracies, given the amplification of political violence in this direction.
108
 The 
second approach (column 3) instead applies the same strategy as in column 4 in 
Table 5-2 in presence of an additional control set to estimate how the relationships 
between resource windfalls, political regimes and violence are reflected in economic 
growth. 
The estimation results demonstrate that for democracies resource windfalls are 
positively associated with growth, while in autocracies this association is generally 
negative and diminishing in the initial level of autocracy, i.e. an increase in the price 
change index is more detrimental for growth in relatively unstable autocratic 
regimes. Stratifying this association into high and low violence levels reveals that 
resource windfalls are harmful to economic growth only for autocracies with high 
political violence levels, while this association is positive if within-country political 
threat level is low. Regarding quantitative significance, the impact on growth of a 
one standard deviation increase in the commodity price index change is estimated to 
be 1.09 percentage points among democracies, -0.81 percentage points for high 
within-country threat level (unstable) autocracies, and 0.33 percentage points among 
low within-country threat level (stable) autocracies.
109
  
Coefficient estimates of additional explanatory variables also enter with the expected 
signs. Estimated coefficients on initial levels of income and inflation rate are 
negative, statistically significant, and indicate strong quantitative effects. Trade 
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 The inclusion of an interaction term between democracy specific price change index and the initial 
level of polity2 (interacted with a democracy dummy) again does not reveal significant differential 
impact of resource windfalls on growth, also illustrating insignificant interaction effect when the 
democracy specific price change is stratified into political threat categories (results available upon 
request). Therefore, the specifications during the rest of analysis omit any interactions of democracy 
specific price change index. 
109
 The impact of resource windfalls on growth for low threat level autocracies are calculated by 
summing the autocracy specific price shock estimates (-0.732 + 1.033), multiplying by average 
standard deviation of 0.011, and then multiplying by 100 to convert to a percentage-point 
measurement. 
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openness and international reserves ratios are always positive and typically exhibits a 
strong relationship with growth. 
In summary, the findings show that an increase in commodity price shocks are 
positively associated with economic performance in democracies and in politically 
stable autocracies, while significantly undermining growth for politically unstable 
autocracies. Thus the analysis confirms that, despite the arguments in the literature, 
resource windfalls can lead to slower growth conditional on poor governance of 
resource revenues. 
5.3.2.1. Robustness Checks 
Table 5-4 examines the robustness of the results estimated for the relationship 
between price shocks and growth for the approaches in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5-3 
to the exclusion of countries whose resource wealth accounts for only a small share 
of GDP. For these countries it is less likely that price changes would represent large 
windfalls, and hence would not provide motivation to engage in self-preservation 
activities or oppose the incumbent government, thus focussing on a sample with 
larger commodity shares is arguably a better test for the sensitivity of the results. 
Columns 1 and 2 exclude countries in the first decile of the average share 
distribution (respectively, 13 and 11 countries); columns 3 and 4 exclude countries in 
the first quartile (35 and 30 countries); and columns 5 and 6 exclude all countries 
below the median average share (69 and 59 countries). Despite the significant drop 
in the sample size, the results from baseline sample remain robust at least at the 10% 
significance level in all cases and are generally reinforced as the threshold to be 
included in the sample progressively increases. In particular, the point estimates for 
the autocracies (democracies) in columns 1, 3 and 5 (columns 2, 4 and 6) become 
more (less) negative (positive) as the analysis focuses on more resource dependent 
countries. 
Table 5-5 addresses the reasonable concern that commodity prices can be affected by 
expectations of economic and political developments in the main world producers, 
and hence shaping the decision-making process of incumbent government regarding 
to make an investment into self-preservation activities, especially in places where 
politics is the only road to riches. The investigation therefore excludes from the 
sample three subsets of countries: (i) those belonging to OPEC; (ii) big energy 
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producers; (iii) and large commodity producers accounting for significant shares of 
total world production.
110
 In all cases, the results remain robust at least at the 10% 
significance level with coefficient estimates of the variables of interest lying mostly 
within one standard deviation of the full sample estimate. 
The potential influence on the results of several additional subsets of countries is 
also considered. The collection of these subsets reflects countries singled out due to 
their resource dependence and political violence experiences across 
autocracy/democracy spectrum during the time period spanned by the sample. The 
results of this exercise are illustrated in Tables 5-6 and 5-7. For each subset, Tables 
5-6 and 5-7 report the list of countries, their 1990 net export shares, political 
contestability and violence levels, growth rates measured over the sample period, 
and the coefficient estimates of variables of interest as specified above for the first 
and the second approach. 
Table 5-6 checks the sensitivity of the results under the first approach to the 
exclusion of resource abundant countries resting at the top and bottom of the 
autocracy/democracy spectrum. The results of this exercise are demonstrated for two 
subsets of countries with high net export shares (above the 75
th
 percentile): (i) 
countries placed at the bottom quartile of political contestability level; (ii) and 
countries located at the top quartile of the autocracy/democracy spectrum. The 
coefficient estimates of the variables of interest change very little given the removal 
of any one of the subsets under consideration, lying within one standard deviation of 
the full sample estimates. What does change somewhat is the statistical significance 
of the interaction term with initial autocracy specific political contestability level in 
the case when the exclusion of the first subset is employed. 
The second collection of subsets includes countries singled out due to their political 
violence experiences among autocratic economies located at the bottom quartile of 
                                                          
110
 The investigation treats Indonesia as an OPEC country, as it belonged to the organisation almost 
during the whole sample period, but excludes Angola and Ecuador who joined the OPEC in 2007, and 
Gabon who was a member of the OPEC only for the period of 1975-1994. Alternative treatments of 
these countries do not alter the results. Big energy (oil, natural gas, gasoline, uranium and coal) 
producers reflect countries whose principal net export commodity production share accounts for more 
than 2.5% of total world supply. The list of large commodity producers instead captures all countries 
whose principal net export commodity production share belongs to the list of top 15 biggest producers 
(according to the latest estimates) in the world by commodity. Please see Appendix Table 5-B3. 
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autocracy/democracy spectrum, whose net exports accounts for above the mean of 
GDP share. Two subsets are considered: the 11 autocratic countries with high 
political violence levels specified as those below the mean; and the 10 relatively 
stable autocracies with political violence levels above the mean. The impact of 
removing these subsets of countries under the second approach is reported in Table 
5-7. Once again, point estimates are not altered greatly, lying within 1.5 standard 
deviations of the full sample estimates, although showing some sensitivity for 
statistical significances across subsets. Overall, the general pattern of results reported 
in Table 5-3 remains apparent given the exclusion of both collection of countries 
from the sample.
111
 
Collectively, the results from Tables 5-4 – 5-7 suggest that the non-linear 
relationship between commodity price shocks and growth does not seem attributable 
to just a number of exceptional countries exerting a large influence. 
Table 5-8 deals with the issue of commodity typology. An important distinction that 
has been made in the literature is the role of point and energy source commodities 
(e.g., Isham et al., 2005; De Soysa and Neumayer, 2007), which is believed to 
induce a higher risk of conflict, foster weaker institutional capacity and provide 
higher pay-offs from non-productive lobbying and rent-seeking activities, as they are 
generally more valuable. Therefore columns 1-2 and 3-4 break down the change in 
commodity price index, respectively, into point and energy sources. Although, the 
significances for energy source commodity price index change show some sensitivity 
across specifications, the coefficient estimates of the variables of interest change 
little lying within one standard deviation of the full sample estimates. Overall, the 
general pattern of results is consistent with findings reported in Table 5-3.
112
  
5.4. Conclusion 
The empirical analysis has confirmed that the impact of resource windfalls on 
economic growth, political system and conflict depends on government performance 
                                                          
111
 An analogous analysis employing the sample restrictions as in Table 5-6 (Table 5-7) under the 
second (first) approach is also considered where the results remain robust at least at the 10% 
significance level in all cases (available upon request).   
112
 An analogous analysis has been carried for diffuse and non-energy source commodity exporting 
countries. The findings reveal that the price shocks are not detrimental within autocracies typically 
illustrating insignificant impact on growth (available upon request).  
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and can lead to slower growth, bad institutions and higher conflict potential if the 
additional revenues from resource shocks are not being spent productively.  
The investigation has illustrated that institutional quality and within-country political 
violence/stability levels, to a large extent, are able to explain the ambiguity behind 
the contradicting results in the resource literature. In particular, reassessing the price 
shock effects on conflict outbreak, the analysis has shown that the resource windfalls 
have no significant consequences in democracies and in politically stable 
autocracies. In contrast, for politically unstable autocracies, the significant impact 
from resource windfalls is conditional on a country’s initial political violence level. 
Specifically, a positive shock to an autocratic country’s flow of resource rents with 
high political threat levels decreases conflict possibility, while leading to higher 
potential for violence if within country political threat level is relatively low. 
The investigation has also contributed to the growth literature showing that resource 
shocks are positively associated with growth in democracies and in politically stable 
autocracies, while undermining a country’s economic performance for politically 
unstable autocracies.      
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Figure 5-1: Summary of Political Violence over Political Regime Types 
 
 
Note: Respective cross-country average statistics of political violence/stability over political regime types are summarized for 
the period of 1984-2010 and a sample of 119 countries. Red bars represent average mean of political violence ± one standard 
deviation, while empty bars correspond to its maximum and minimum value in each interval. Mean line of political violence 
corresponds to the value of 8.7. The number of observations for eight intervals when moving from “autocratic” to “democratic” 
bins is 6, 8, 14, 12, 12, 9, 25 and 33 respectively. 
 
Figure 5-2: Partial Regression Plots for Commodity Price Shocks and Growth 
 
 
Note: The set of regressors includes initial levels of logged income, trade openness, log of inflation rate, international reserves 
ratio, country and time-specific fixed effects. The figures are produced using OLS regressions. 
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Figure 5-3: Estimated Coefficients of Price Shocks on Conflict at Different Bins 
 
 
Note: The graph plots the estimated impact of high and low violence specific price shocks on conflict conditional on initial 
polity2 levels for each bin. Red spikes represent 95% confidence bands for high violence specific price shock estimates, while 
confidence intervals for low violence sample are illustrated with blue colour. The bins are constructed so to maintain the 
symmetry around the zero threshold, while maximising the number of observations and minimizing the differences in 
frequency across them. The number of observations for eight intervals when moving from “autocratic” to “democratic” bins is 
110, 357, 134, 103, 88, 124, 327 and 426 respectively. The eliminated countries for the 1st bin are Oman and Syria; 2nd bin 
China and Cameroon; 3rd bin Gabon and Sudan; 4th bin Gambia and Guinea; 5th bin Mali and Pakistan; 6th bin Malaysia and 
Lebanon; 7th bin Argentina and Columbia; 8th bin Australia, France, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States and 
Israel. The method of estimation is the least squares with robust standard errors clustered by country. 
 
Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics for Growth, Political Regimes, Political Violence and Conflict Onset 
 
Sample split Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Income levels 
Lower Mid./Low Growth 89 1.698 6.579 
 Polity2 89 -0.371 6.684 
 Violence/Stability 74 7.976 2.474 
 Conflict Onset 59 0.049 0.216 
     
High/Upper-Mid. Growth 46 1.739 7.079 
 Polity2 46 5.662 7.114 
 Violence/Stability 45 10.07 1.972 
 Conflict Onset 18 0.035 0.185 
Panel B: Resource Dependence levels 
Low Polity2 101 2.408 7.185 
 Violence/Stability 89 8.784 2.551 
     
High Polity2 34 -1.284 7.248 
 Violence/Stability 30 8.585 2.406 
Note: Summary statistics for growth rates and polity2 are based on country averages for the period of 1963-2010 and a sample 
of 135 countries. Political violence/stability and civil conflict onset statistics are restricted to the period of 1984-2010 and 
summarized for 119 and 77 countries data set respectively. 
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Table 5-2 
 Commodity Price Shocks and Conflict  
Dependent Variable: Civil Conflict Onset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Δ Index -0.612* 
(0.346) 
-4.097* 
(2.146) 
  
Δ Index* Violencet-1  0.389* 
(0.209) 
  
Δ Indexd    -8.254 
(5.692) 
-1.300 
(0.971) 
Δ Indexa    -2.791* 
(1.585) 
-2.072** 
(0.969) 
Δ Indexd* Violencet-1   0.849 
(0.623) 
 
Δ Indexa* Violencet-1   0.256* 
(0.149) 
 
Δ Indexa* Violencelow    2.077*** 
(0.763) 
Violence t-1  -0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Countries/Observations 77/1709 77/1612 77/1597 77/1597 
Note: ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The method of estimation is least 
squares. Robust standard errors clustered by country are presented in the parentheses. The time span for the analysis is based on 
unbalanced dataset for the 1984-2010 period. 
 
 
Table 5-3 
Commodity Price Shocks and Growth 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.043** 
(0.022) 
-0.167** 
(0.068) 
-0.078*** 
(0.015) 
Trade openness 0.022* 
(0.012) 
0.026 
(0.038) 
0.021** 
(0.011) 
Inflation (log) -0.031*** 
(0.011) 
-0.034*** 
(0.013) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
Reserves/GDP ratio 0.179** 
(0.072) 
0.317*** 
(0.111) 
0.088 
(0.056) 
Δ Index 0.326** 
(0.151) 
  
Δ Indexd   0.756** 
(0.349) 
0.995*** 
(0.351) 
Δ Indexa   -0.757** 
(0.338) 
-0.732*** 
(0.215) 
Δ Indexa*Plt-1,a   -0.129** 
(0.058) 
 
Δ Indexa* Violencelow   1.033*** 
(0.262) 
Plt-1,a  -0.011** 
(0.005) 
 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES 
Countries/Observations 135/4337 135/4324 119/2428 
Specification tests 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.561 0.723 0.976 
(b) Serial Correlation:    
     First-order 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     Second-order 0.569 0.237 0.260 
Note: The time span for the analysis in columns 1 and 2 is based on unbalanced dataset for the 1963-2010 period (T=47), while 
in column 3 for the 1984-2010 period (T=26). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 5-4 
 Excluding Low Export Share Countries 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  Above 1st Decile Share Above 1st Quartile Share Above Median Share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.111** 
(0.049) 
-0.068** 
(0.030) 
-0.127** 
(0.052) 
0.126*** 
(0.025) 
-0.134** 
(0.057) 
-0.129*** 
(0.035) 
Δ Indexd 0.944** 
(0.402) 
0.967** 
(0.369) 
0.901** 
(0.401) 
0.962** 
(0.383) 
0.912** 
(0.395) 
0.625** 
(0.236) 
Δ Indexa  -0.777*** 
(0.206) 
-0.698** 
(0.315) 
-0.803*** 
(0.212) 
-0.762*** 
(0.236) 
-0.812*** 
(0.219) 
-0.622* 
(0.334) 
Δ Indexa*Plt-1,a  -0.159*** 
(0.031) 
 -0.163*** 
(0.033) 
 -0.164*** 
(0.034) 
 
Δ Indexa* Violencelow  0.904** 
(0.372) 
 1.052*** 
(0.296) 
 0.829** 
(0.409) 
Plt-1,a -0.007* 
(0.004) 
 -0.009** 
(0.004) 
 -0.011** 
(0.005) 
 
Control Set YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Countries/Observations 122/3885 108/2214 100/3268 89/1810 66/2122 60/1190 
Specification tests 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.925 0.175 0.143 0.723 0.187 0.942 
(b) Serial Correlation:       
     First-order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
     Second-order 0.262 0.183 0.435 0.266 0.100 0.389 
Note: In addition to the variables of interest reported above, all specifications employ an additional control set which includes 
initial levels of trade openness, log of inflation rate and international reserves ratio. Columns 1-2, 3-4 and 5-6 exclude countries 
below the first decile, the first quartile and the median of the average commodity export share distribution, respectively. The 
respective number of countries eliminated in columns 1 (2), 3 (4) and 5 (6) are 13 (11), 35 (30), and 69 (59). The time span for 
the analysis in columns 1, 3 and 5 is based on unbalanced dataset for the 1963-2010 period (T=47), while in columns 2, 4 and 6 
for the 1984-2010 period (T=26).  ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table 5-5 
 Excluding Big Producers 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  Exclude OPEC 
Countries 
Exclude Big Energy 
Producers 
Exclude Large  
Commodity Producers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.086*** 
(0.031) 
-0.075*** 
(0.016) 
-0.067** 
(0.029) 
-0.092*** 
(0.017) 
-0.086* 
(0.045) 
-0.081*** 
(0.019) 
Δ Indexd 0.596* 
(0.339) 
0.907** 
(0.424) 
0.966** 
(0.403) 
1.239*** 
(0.463) 
0.974* 
(0.535) 
1.695*** 
(0.449) 
Δ Indexa  -0.682** 
(0.339) 
-0.711** 
(0.322) 
-0.449* 
(0.234) 
-0.674** 
(0.297) 
-0.458* 
(0.262) 
-0.654** 
(0.294) 
Δ Indexa*Plt-1,a  -0.175*** 
(0.068) 
 -0.101*** 
(0.038) 
 -0.105** 
(0.049) 
 
Δ Indexa* Violencelow  0.938* 
(0.476) 
 0.924** 
(0.401) 
 0.944** 
(0.393) 
Plt-1,a -0.003 
(0.002) 
 -0.003 
(0.002) 
 -0.009 
(0.006) 
 
Control Set YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Countries/Observations 124/4088 108/2267 118/3829 102/2118 72/2155 59/1140 
Specification tests 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.752 0.169 0.313 0.234 0.257 0.982 
(b) Serial Correlation:       
     First-order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     Second-order 0.817 0.537 0.710 0.451 0.339 0.880 
Note: In addition to the variables of interest reported above, all specifications employ an additional control set which includes initial 
levels of trade openness, log of inflation rate and international reserves ratio. The time span for the analysis in columns 1, 3 and 5 is 
based on unbalanced dataset for the 1963-2010 period (T=47), while in columns 2, 4 and 6 for the 1984-2010 period (T=26).  ***, **, * 
represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 5-6  
Exclusion of Countries with Unusual Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country 1990 Net  
Export 
Share 
Average 
Polity2 
Average 
Political 
Violence 
Average 
Growth 
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Autocratic (<25th percentile)  
Countries with High Commodity Export Shares 
Algeria 0.11 -5.67 6.68 0.02    
Cameroon 0.12 -6.15 7.12 0.004    
Congo, Rep. 0.35 -5.19 7.89 0.02    
Cote d’Ivoire 0.24 -6.13 8.52 0.01    
Gabon 0.33 -4.67 9.36 0.01 Δ Indexd 
Iran 0.07 -5.81 7.59 0.02 0.803 0.402 0.048 
Kuwait 0.28 -7.6 8.86 0.01 Δ Indexa 
Libya 0.29 -7 8.90 -0.02 -0.545 0.251 0.032 
Malawi 0.09 -3.77 7.59 0.01 Δ Indexa*Plt-1,a 
Mauritania 0.23 -6.10 N/A 0.03 -0.126 0.088 0.152 
Oman 0.36 -9.29 9.78 0.03    
Qatar 0.29 -10 9.58 0.04    
Saudi Arabia 0.27 -10 8.96 0.001    
Swaziland 0.08 -8.83 N/A 0.02    
Syria 0.08 -8.25 9.52 0.01    
Remove Democratic (>75th percentile)  
Countries with High Commodity Export Shares 
     Δ Indexd 
Mauritius 0.09 9.67 N/A 0.03 0.627 0.351 0.076 
New Zealand 0.08 10 11.79 0.01 Δ Indexa 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.08 8.85 8.71 0.03 -0.649 0.170 0.000 
Venezuela 0.16 7.35 9.19 0.004 Δ Indexa*Plt-1,a 
     -0.137 0.029 0.000 
Note: In addition to the variables of interest reported above, all specifications control for initial levels of logged income, trade 
openness, log of inflation rate, international reserves ratio, autocracy specific polity2, country and time-specific fixed effects. 
The number of countries/observations for each panel is, respectively, 120/3884 and 131/4203. The time span for the analysis is 
based on unbalanced dataset for the 1963-2010 period (T=47). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 5-7  
Exclusion of Countries with Unusual Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country 1990 Net  
Export 
Share 
Average 
Polity2 
Average  
Political 
Violence 
Average 
Growth 
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Resource Dependent Autocratic Countries  
with High  Political Violence Levels 
Algeria 0.11 -5.67 6.68 0.02    
Angola 0.30 -3.23 5.34 0.04    
Bahrain 0.07 -8.98 8.33 0.001 Δ Indexd 
Cameroon 0.12 -6.15 7.12 0.004 1.320 0.385 0.001 
Congo Rep. 0.35 -5.19 7.89 0.02 Δ Indexa 
Cote d’Ivoire 0.24 -6.13 8.52 0.01 -0.469 0.298 0.119 
Iran 0.07 -5.81 7.59 0.02 Δ Indexa* Violencelow 
Morocco 0.03 -7.38 8.41 0.03 0.771 0.297 0.011 
Togo 0.06 -5.13 7.40 -0.001    
Uganda 0.05 -3.17 5.94 0.01    
Zimbabwe 0.27 -3.89 7.34 0.001    
Remove Resource Dependent Autocratic Countries  
with Low Political Violence Levels 
Gabon 0.33 -4.67 9.36 0.01    
Kazakhstan 0.04 -4.62 10.65 0.02    
Kuwait 0.28 -7.6 8.86 0.01 Δ Indexd 
Libya 0.29 -7 8.90 -0.01 1.109 0.357 0.002 
Oman 0.36 -9.29 9.78 0.03 Δ Indexa 
Qatar 0.29 -10 9.58 0.04 -0.476 0.261 0.071 
Saudi Arabia 0.27 -10 8.96 0.001 Δ Indexa* Violencelow 
Syria 0.08 -8.25 9.52 0.01 0.684 0.447 0.129 
Tunisia 0.03 -6.29 9.75 0.02    
Vietnam 0.09 -7 9.43 0.05    
Note: In addition to the variables of interest reported above, all specifications control for initial levels of logged income, trade 
openness, log of inflation rate, international reserves ratio, country and time-specific fixed effects. The number of 
countries/observations for each panel is, respectively, 108/2209 and 109/2297. The time span for the analysis is based on 
unbalanced dataset for the 1984-2010 period (T=26). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 5-8 
Typologies of Commodities 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  Point Source  
Commodity Price Index 
Energy Source  
Commodity Price Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.094** 
(0.037) 
-0.085*** 
(0.019) 
-0.084** 
(0.035) 
-0.077*** 
(0.025) 
Δ Indexd  0.839** 
(0.397) 
1.323*** 
(0.497) 
1.469* 
(0.793) 
0.849* 
(0.506) 
Δ Indexa  -0.685** 
(0.270) 
-0.802*** 
(0.245) 
-0.433 
(0.294) 
-0.684 
(0.494) 
Δ Indexa*Plt-1,a  -0.115*** 
(0.040) 
 -0.124*** 
(0.037) 
 
Δ Indexa* Violencelow  1.127*** 
(0.302) 
 0.804 
(0.625) 
Plt-1,a -0.004 
(0.003) 
 -0.007* 
(0.004) 
 
Control Set YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Countries/Observations 129/4161 116/2404 72/2292 68/1407 
Specification tests 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.867 0.348 0.994 0.985 
(b) Serial Correlation:     
     First-order 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.011 
     Second-order 0.753 0.295 0.109 0.426 
Note: In addition to the variables of interest reported above, all specifications employ an additional control set which includes 
initial levels of trade openness, log of inflation rate and international reserves ratio. The time span for the analysis in columns 1 
and 3 is based on unbalanced dataset for the 1963-2010 period (T=47), while in columns 2 and 4 for the 1984-2010 period 
(T=26).  ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 2-A: Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)  
Letting the subscripts i and t represent country and time period respectively, the 
general equational form of growth regressions can be written as 
                      yit - yi(t-1) = α yi(t-1) + δ´ pit + φ´ dit + μt + ξi + εit                      (2A1) 
where y is the log of per capita income, pit and dit are the vectors of predetermined 
and potentially endogenous regressors, respectively; μt is a period-specific constant, 
ξi is an unobserved country-specific effect, and εit is an error term. Equation (2A1) 
then can be rewritten as  
                              yit = (1+α) yi(t-1) + δ´ pit + φ´ dit + μt + ξi + εit                           (2A2) 
which makes apparent that the estimation of (2A1) is analogous to the estimation of 
a dynamic equation with a lagged-dependent variable on the right-hand side. As 
discussed in Caselli et al. (1996), the consistency of OLS estimators depends on the 
assumption that the country-specific effect ξi is orthogonal to other right-hand side 
variables. This assumption in growth regressions is clearly violated due to the 
presence of lagged income as an explanatory variable: i.e. E[yi(t-1)ξi] ≠ 0. Thus, a first 
step to achieve consistent estimates starts by eliminating the country-specific term. 
In order to achieve consistency, several approaches, such as eliminating the country-
specific term either by taking deviations from period averages (fixed effects 
estimator) or implementation of a country-specific random variable (seemingly 
unrelated regression estimator) and others are applied. These strategies deal 
successfully with estimation inconsistencies only if explanatory variables are strictly 
exogenous. 
Alternative GMM-based approaches are derived by taking the first differences of 
(2A2), which yields 
           yit - yi(t-1) = (1+α) (yi(t-1)- yi(t-2)) + δ´(pit - pi(t−1)) + φ´(dit - di(t−1)) + (μt - μt-1) + (εit - εi(t-1))    (2A3) 
Least squares procedures cannot be used to estimate (2A3) because by construction 
yi(t-1) - yi(t-2) is correlated with εit - εi(t-1). Moreover, one would like to deal with likely 
endogeneity of all the explanatory variables.  
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To deal with inconsistency and likely endogeneity issues, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
proposed the GMM Difference estimator that uses lagged levels of the explanatory 
variables as instruments in the estimation of (2A3). The estimator is based on the 
following identifying assumptions: 
 E [εit εi(t-j)] = 0 for all j ≠ 0 (2A4) 
 E [μt εi(t + s)] = 0 for all t; and s ≥ 0 (2A5) 
 E [yi(t-1) εi(t + s)] = 0 for all t; and s ≥ 0 (2A6) 
 E [pi(t-1) εi(t + s)] = 0 for all t; and s ≥ 0 (2A7) 
 E [di(t-2) εi(t + s)] = 0 for all t; and s ≥ 0 (2A8) 
 
where (2A4) implies that the error term εit is not serially correlated; (2A5) entails 
that the period specific constant μt is strictly exogenous; and as indicated by (2A6), 
(2A7) and (2A8), both the predetermined explanatory variables yi(t-1) and pi(t-1), and 
di(t−2) are weakly exogenous, i.e. past realizations of variables are uncorrelated with 
current and future shocks. Under these assumptions, lagged levels of the explanatory 
variables can be used as instruments as specified by the following moment 
conditions: 
 E [μt-s (εit - εi(t-1)] = 0 for s ≥ 0, t = 3, …., T (2A9) 
 E [yi(t-s) (εit - εi(t-1) )] = 0 for s ≥ 2, t = 3, …., T (2A10) 
 E [pi(t-s) (εit - εi(t-1) )] = 0 for s ≥ 2, t = 3, …., T (2A11) 
 E [di(t-s) (εit - εi(t-1) )] = 0 for s ≥ 3, t = 3, …., T (2A12) 
 
As discussed in Easterly and Levine (2001), the GMM Difference estimator has the 
statistical shortcoming that if the regressors in (2A3) are persistent, then lagged 
levels of y, p and d may be weak instruments, and so the estimated coefficients may 
be biased. Further, taking differences of the original level equation (2A2) reduces the 
time dimension of the sample and leaves information about the level relationship 
between explanatory variables and growth unused. 
To overcome the concerns induced by taking first-differences, Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed the System GMM estimator that 
combines the differenced model (2A3) with the levels model (2A2). In order to be 
able to use lagged differences of the variables on the right-hand side of (2A2) as 
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valid instruments for the regression in levels, the following identifying assumptions 
are introduced: 
 E [ξi (yit - yi(t-1) )] = 0 for all t (2A13) 
 E [ξi (pit - pi(t-1) )] = 0 for all t (2A14) 
 E [ξi (dit - di(t-1) )] = 0 for all t (2A15) 
 E [ξi (μt - μt-1 )] = 0 for all t (2A16) 
 
which imply that there is no correlation between the differences of the regressors and 
the country-specific effect, i.e. interactions between the country-specific effect and 
the regressors are stationary. Given (2A13) - (2A16), the following moment 
conditions can be added to those specified above in (2A9) - (2A12): 
 E [(ξi + εit )(μt-s - μt-s-1 )] = 0 for s = 0 (2A17) 
 E [(ξi + εit )(yi(t-1-s) - yi(t-2-s))] = 0 for s = 1 (2A18) 
 E [(ξi + εit )(pi(t-s) - pi(t-1-s))] = 0 for s = 1 (2A19) 
 E [(ξi + εit )(di(t-s) - di(t-1-s))] = 0 for s = 2 (2A20) 
 
By avoiding inconsistency problems associated with OLS estimators, and weak-
instrument problems associated with the GMM Difference estimator, the System 
GMM estimator seems particularly attractive in this context. However it is of 
emphasis that the move from the difference to the system GMM estimator also 
involves a cost: the adoption of the additional assumptions regarding stationarity 
implicit in (2A13) - (2A16), which are difficult to justify a priori. 
Additional concern regarding employing GMM estimators raised in the literature is 
the effect of instrument proliferation, i.e. a large collection of instruments, even if 
individually valid, can be collectively invalid in finite samples because they overfit 
endogenous variables. This might weaken the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions for the joint validity of moment conditions, which is commonly relied 
upon to check instrument proliferation. To ensure that the estimated effect during the 
analysis is not driven by the number of instruments, investigation under the GMM 
estimators employs the “1 lag restriction” technique followed by Roodman (2009) 
that uses only certain lags instead of all available lags as instruments.  
It is also of note that GMM estimators are designed for situations with “small T and 
large N” panels, implying few time periods and many individuals; and hence 
148 
 
employing small samples during the investigation (especially when the analysis 
stratifies the data set into separate subsamples) can also weaken the Hansen test 
yielding high p-value statistics (e.g., in excess of 0.90). Therefore, the results from 
these specifications must be read with caution since high p-values can be a warning 
signal that too many moment restrictions are in use.  
Furthermore, Roodman (2006) shows how the design of each regressor according to 
their exogeneity levels during the treatment process might alter the estimated results 
of interest. To overcome these concerns, the analysis applies upper and lower bound 
conditions for treatment of each regressor. In particular, these bounds are achieved 
by performing OLS and Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV or Fixed effects) 
estimation which provides the values where good estimates of the true parameter 
should lie in or near the range of these values. Then each regressor is treated either 
as predetermined or endogenous during the GMM analysis depending on which 
treatment approach delivers superior estimate that lies within or the closest to this 
range.   
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Appendix 2-B: List of Countries 
 
Code Country Code Country Code Country 
1 Argentinag 25 Irani 49 Romaniag 
2 Australia 26 Ireland 50 Rwandai 
3 Austria 27 Israel 51 Senegalgi 
4 Belgium 28 Italy 52 Sierra Leone 
5 Botswanai 29 Japani 53 Singapores 
6 Brazils 30 Jordang 54 South Africai 
7 Cameroon 31 Kenya 55 Spain 
8 Canadai 32 Korea Rep. 56 Sri Lankai 
9 Colombia 33 Malaysia 57 Swedeni 
10 Congo Dem. Rep.gi 34 Mauritius 58 Switzerlandi 
11 Costa Rica 35 Mexico 59 Syriai 
12 Cote d`Ivoireg 36 Moroccog 60 Thailand 
13 Denmark 37 Nepali 61 Togogi 
14 Ecuadori 38 Netherlands 62 Trinidad and Tobagog 
15 Egypt 39 New Zealand 63 Tunisia 
16 Fiji 40 Nicaragua 64 Turkeyi 
17 Finland 41 Norway 65 United Kingdom 
18 Francei 42 Pakistan 66 United Statesi 
19 Ghanai 43 Panamagi 67 Uruguayi 
20 Greece 44 Papua New Guinea 68 Venezuela 
21 Hungary 45 Paraguayi 69 Zambiai 
22 Iceland 46 Peru 70 Zimbabwei 
23 India 47 Philippinesi   
24 Indonesia 48 Portugali   
Note: Subscripts g, s and i represent countries, respectively, those are excluded from the analysis of tariffs relationship with 
growth, schooling and infrastructure. 
 
 
Appendix 2-C: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP p.c. (log) 420 8.83 1.02 5.74 10.64 
Tariff rates (%) 374 9.79 8.65 0 48.28 
Fertility rate (log) 420 1.19 0.53 0.17 2.14 
Life expectancy (log) 420 4.17 0.17 3.16 4.39 
Infant mortality (log) 420 3.42 1.04 1.25 5.31 
Real investment ratio (%) 420 22.03 9.79 1.00 56.69 
Real government expenditure ratio (%) 420 16.78 7.17 5.59 61.55 
Years of sec. sch.(male) 420 1.99 1.20 0.13 5.36 
Years of sec. sch. (female) 420 1.80 1.24 0.06 5.36 
Male Prim. Sch.-Enrolment Ratio (%) 363 95.29 10.13 47.24 100 
Female Prim. Sch.-Enrolment Ratio (%) 363 90.16 17.49 16.21 100 
Paved roads (% total roads) 132 56.74 33.47 3.2 100 
Note: All descriptive statistics are based on panel country averages for the period of 1975-2000 and 70 countries sample, except 
the last three. Summary of school-enrolment ratio by gender is restricted to the 68 countries sample. Respective statistics of 
paved roads are summarized for 44 countries data set over the period of 1990-2000. 
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Appendix 2-D: Sample Correlations  
 
Panel A: 70 countries sample (1975-2000) 
  GDP 
per capita 
Tariff 
rates 
Fertility 
rate 
Life  
Expectancy 
Infant 
Mortality 
GDP per capita 1     
Tariff rates -0.67 1    
Fertility rate -0.77 0.70 1   
Life Expectancy 0.79 -0.68 -0.88 1  
Infant Mortality -0.73 0.70 0.87 -0.96 1 
Panel A: 68 countries sample (1975-2000) 
  GDP 
per capita 
Tariff 
rates 
Primary  
sch. enr. (male) 
Primary  
sch. enr.  (female) 
 
GDP per capita 1     
Tariff rates -0.69 1    
Primary sch. enr. (male) 0.33 -0.38 1   
Primary sch. enr. (female) 0.47 -0.55 0.82 1  
Panel C: 44 countries sample (1990-2000) 
 GDP 
per capita 
Tariff 
rates 
Paved 
roads 
  
GDP per capita 1     
Tariff rates -0.73 1    
Paved roads 0.61 -0.52 1   
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Appendix 3-A: List of Countries 
 
Country 
Income 
Rank, 
1970 
Income 
Rank, 
2005 
Country 
Income 
Rank, 
1970 
Income 
Rank, 
2005 
Country 
Income 
Rank, 
1970 
Income 
Rank, 
2005 
Algeria 2 3 Greece 4 4 Pakistan 1 1 
Argentina 3 3 Guatemala 2 3 Panama 2 3 
Australia 4 4 Guyana 1 2 Papua New Guinea 1 1 
Austria 4 4 Honduras 1 2 Paraguay 1 2 
Bangladesh 1 1 Hungary 3 4 Peru 2 3 
Belgium 4 4 India 1 1 Philippines 1 1 
Bolivia 2 2 Indonesia 1 2 Portugal 3 4 
Botswana 1 3 Iran 3 3 Rwanda  1 1 
Brazil 2 3 Ireland 3 4 Senegal 1 1 
Burundi  1 1 Israel 4 4 Sierra Leone 1 1 
Cameroon 1 1 Italy 4 4 Singapore 3 4 
Canada 4 4 Jamaica 3 3 South Africa 2 3 
Central Afr. Rep.  1 1 Jordan 2 2 Spain 4 4 
Chile 2 3 Kenya 1 1 Sri Lanka 1 2 
China 1 2 Korea, Rep. 2 4 Sudan 1 1 
Colombia 2 3 Liberia 1 1 Sweden 4 4 
Congo, Dem. 1 1 Malawi 1 1 Switzerland 4 4 
Congo, Rep.  1 1 Malaysia 1 3 Syria 1 2 
Costa Rica 3 3 Mali 1 1 Thailand 1 3 
Cote d’Ivoire 1 1 Mauritania 1 1 Togo 1 1 
Cyprus 3 4 Mauritius 1 3 Tunisia 1 2 
Ecuador 2 3 Mexico 3 4 Turkey 2 3 
Egypt 1 2 Morocco 1 2 Uganda 1 1 
El Salvador 2 3 Mozambique 1 1 United Kingdom 4 4 
Fiji  1 2 Nepal 1 1 United States 4 4 
Finland 4 4 Netherlands 4 4 Uruguay 2 3 
France 4 4 New Zealand 4 4 Venezuela 3 3 
Gambia 1 1 Nicaragua 2 1 Zambia 1 1 
Germany 4 4 Niger 1 1 Zimbabwe 1 1 
Ghana 1 1 Norway 4 4    
 
 
Appendix 3-B: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP p.c. (log) 801 8.32 1.33 4.77 10.82 
GDP per capita growth rate 796 0.02 0.03 -0.36 0.19 
Military Expenditure over GDP 778 0.028 0.028 0 0.29 
Population Growth rate 801 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.14 
Real Investment ratio 801 0.23 0.09 0.04 0.72 
Life Expectancy (log) 801 4.13 0.19 3.16 4.40 
Schooling (log) 801 1.61 0.67 -1.24 2.57 
Openness (log) 801 3.99 0.62 2.21 6.06 
Note: All descriptive statistics are based on panel country averages for the period of 1970-2010 and 89 countries sample.  
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Appendix 4-A: Robustness Checks for Threat Levels Analysis 
Beyond the robustness checks described in Tables 4-2 and 4-A1 for the analysis 
conditional on threat levels, special attention is paid to the potential influence on the 
results of several subsets of countries. The collection of these subsets features 
countries singled out due to the maintenance of high shares of military expenditure 
and on the basis of certain unusual aspects of their conflict experiences during the 
time period spanned by the sample. Results of this exercise are reported in Tables   
4-A2 and 4-A3 for four subsets of countries: (i) high military expenditure share 
countries, specified as those which spend more than approximately one standard 
deviation from the mean in military sector; (ii) countries with high level of threat, 
defined as those experienced threat more than approximately three standard 
deviations from the mean of cumulative conflict incidence; (iii) the poorest countries 
with high military expenditure shares and high levels of threat, stipulated as those are 
in the bottom of income distribution, which spend more than average in the military 
sector and experienced an external threat above the mean of cumulative conflict 
incidence;
113
 and (iv) the union of these subsets. For each subset, Table 4-A2 and    
4-A3 report the list of countries, the cumulative number of threat incidences during 
the time period spanned by the sample, their average military expenditure shares and 
growth rates measured over the entire sample period, and the coefficient estimates 
obtained for the interaction of military spending with threat given their removal from 
the sample in addition to outlier countries. For ease of comparison, the estimates 
obtained given the exclusion of the outlier countries, are also reported. 
The coefficient estimates of the interaction term with internal and external threat 
incidence change very little given the removal of any one of the subsets under 
consideration; and generally, enter significantly at conventional levels. For both 
cases, the estimates obtained given the removal of each subsample lie within 
approximately one standard deviation of the estimate when the potential outliers are 
removed. Statistical significance in the case when military expenditure is interacted 
with internal conflict onset also changes very little, indicating strong qualitative 
                                                          
113
 The cut-off level for countries in the bottom of income distribution is taken as in DeJong and 
Ripoll (2006), where country classifications are obtained by mapping classification thresholds as 
defined by the World Bank’s income measures into the corresponding Penn World income measures. 
The resulting definition is specified as those with real per capita GDP level less than $2,650.  
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effects. What does change somewhat is the magnitude of the coefficient estimates of 
the interaction term when the third and the fourth subsets are excluded. The 
significance of the coefficient estimates of the interaction term with war intensity 
also exhibits sensitivity to the exclusion of particular subsets, with the magnitude of 
estimates lying within approximately two standard deviations of the estimate given 
the exclusion of potential outliers.  
Overall, these findings suggest that the negative and significant relationship is only 
apparent among countries facing low threats, while in the presence of sufficiently 
high threats military expenditure is not materially detrimental for growth. 
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Table 4-A1 
Military Expenditure and External Threat 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
 External threat: War intensity External  
Threat 
Incidence 
 Main 
Model 
Outliers 
Removed 
Alternative  
Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Mil*Threat 0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
 0.0025* 
(0.0014) 
Mil*High Threat   -0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Mil*Low Threat   -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
Threat 0.019 
(0.045) 
-0.062 
(0.064) 
0.016 
(0.041) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
Pop. growth (log) -0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.0067) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.088*** 
(0.012) 
0.088*** 
(0.013) 
0.087*** 
(0.013) 
0.044** 
(0.022) 
Investment/GDP 0.111*** 
(0.013) 
0.097*** 
(0.013) 
0.099*** 
(0.013) 
0.156*** 
(0.021) 
Openness (log) -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
Schooling (log) -0.006* 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
Countries/Observations 89/695 85/665 85/665 83/649 
Threshold Analysis 
Threat 0.376 
(0.064) 
0.144 
(0.006) 
 2.23 
(2.74) 
Note: Columns 1 estimates military expenditure and economic growth relationship conditional on war intensity levels, while 
column 2 runs the same exercise excluding the potential outlier countries. Column 3 applies the alternative approach to estimate 
the impact of military expenditure for countries with different threat levels by interacting military expenditure with two 
separate dummy variables: one for countries facing low threats, and the other for countries with high threat levels where the 
average threshold value of 0.260 ((0.376+0.144)/2) is used for the analysis. Column 4 employs an alternative external threat 
incidence measure constructed using UCDP/PRIO data. The analysis of military expenditure and growth relationship 
conditional on external threat levels using GMM estimator demonstrates marginally insignificant impact for the interaction 
terms. Therefore column 4 reports Fixed effect estimates for the analysis of non-linear relationship conditional on external 
threat incidence following the majority of research analyses in the defence literature. Since the external threat measure of war 
intensity by construction is constant over time within a country, and thus is dropped when FE estimator is used, columns 1-3 
employ seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) estimator instead of FE for the analysis of non-linear relationship conditional 
on war intensity levels. All specifications control for time fixed effects. Eliminated countries in column 2 are Botswana, China, 
Israel, and Singapore; in column 3 are Botswana, China, Egypt, and Singapore; and in column 4 are Botswana, China, Egypt, 
Israel, Korea Rep. and Singapore. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. The time span for the analysis is based 
on balanced dataset for the 1970-2010 period (T=8). ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4-A2 
Exclusion of Countries with Unusual Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country No. of 
 Internal Threat 
Incidence 
Average  
Mil. Exp. 
 Share 
Average 
Growth  
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Outliers 
Botswana 0 3.32 5.75    
China 0 1.73 6.90 Mil*Threat (Onset) 
Egypt 6 8.66 3.04 0.251 0.141 0.078 
Israel 45 14.96 2.42 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Korea Rep. 0 3.85 5.47 0.0019 0.0009 0.043 
Mali 5 2.19 1.79    
Singapore 0 4.61 5.27    
Remove High Military Exp. Share Countries 
Egypt 6 8.66 3.04 Mil*Threat (Onset) 
Israel 45 14.96 2.42 0.351 0.147 0.020 
Jordan 0 11.25 -0.02 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Syria 5 9.05 1.48 0.0029 0.0009 0.002 
United States 9 5.37 1.68    
Remove High Internal Threat Level Countries 
Colombia 45 2.31 2.39 Mil*Threat (Onset) 
    0.252 0.139 0.075 
Israel 45 14.96 2.42 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
    0.0018 0.0009 0.052 
Philippines 42 1.66 1.51    
Remove Poorest Countries with High Military Exp. Shares 
and High Internal Threat Levels 
    Mil*Threat (Onset) 
Mozambique 16 4.76 1.21 0.493 0.207 0.019 
    Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Pakistan 15 4.99 2.34 0.0023 0.0011 0.060 
Remove All Subsets 
Colombia 45 2.31 2.39    
Egypt 6 8.66 3.04    
Israel 45 14.96 2.42 Mil*Threat (Onset) 
Jordan 0 11.25 -0.02 0.603 0.195 0.003 
Mozambique 16 4.76 1.21 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Pakistan 15 4.99 2.34 0.0032 0.0013 0.012 
Philippines 42 1.66 1.51    
Syria 5 9.05 1.48    
United States 9 5.37 1.68    
Note: In addition to variables of interest reported above, all specifications control for log of initial income, internal threat 
(either onset or incidence measure), log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and 
schooling, and time fixed effects. High military expenditure share countries are specified as those which spend more than 1 
standard deviation from the mean in military sector. High internal threat level countries are specified as those experienced 
internal threat more than 3 standard deviations from the mean of cumulative internal conflict incidence. The poorest countries 
with high military expenditure shares and high external threat levels are specified as those are in the bottom of income 
distribution (income rank 1) which spend more than 1 standard deviation from the mean in military sector and experienced 
internal threat above the mean of cumulative internal conflict incidence. The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag 
restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). The number of countries/observations for the military spending and internal 
conflict onset (incidence) interaction analysis in each panel is, respectively, 82/478 (82/642), 79/460 (79/618), 80/466 (80/626), 
80/467 (80/626) and 75/437 (75/587). The time span for the military spending and internal conflict onset interaction analysis is 
based on balanced dataset for the 1970-2000 period (T=6), while the investigation for the incidence analysis is for the 1970-
2010 period (T=8).     
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Table 4-A3 
Exclusion of Countries with Unusual Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
Estimation: Fixed Effects Estimator 
Country No. of 
 External Threat 
Incidence 
Average  
Mil. Exp. 
 Share 
Average 
Growth  
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Outliers 
Botswana 0 3.32 5.75    
China 12 1.73 6.90 Mil*Threat (Intensity) 
Egypt 4 8.66 3.04 0.047 0.015 0.002 
Israel 4 14.96 2.42 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Korea Rep. 0 3.85 5.47 0.0025 0.0014 0.078 
Singapore 0 4.61 5.27    
Remove High Military Exp. Share Countries 
Egypt 4 8.66 3.04    
Israel 4 14.96 2.42 Mil*Threat (Intensity) 
Jordan 1 11.25 -0.02 0.011 0.019 0.596 
Syria 2 9.05 1.48 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
United States 3 5.37 1.68 0.0027 0.0015 0.071 
Remove High External Threat Level Countries 
China 12 1.73 6.90 Mil*Threat (Intensity) 
India 16 2.97 3.48 0.084 0.019 0.000 
Iran 10 4.69 0.89 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Pakistan 15 4.99 2.34 0.0036 0.0019 0.067 
Remove Poorest Countries with High Military Exp. Shares 
and High External Threat Levels 
Egypt 4 8.66 3.04 Mil*Threat (Intensity) 
India 16 2.97 3.48 0.035 0.017 0.043 
Pakistan 15 4.99 2.34 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Syria 2 9.05 1.48 0.0035 0.0018 0.050 
Remove All Subsets 
China 12 1.73 6.90    
Egypt 4 8.66 3.04    
India 16 2.97 3.48 Mil*Threat (Intensity) 
Iran 10 4.69 0.89 0.075 0.136 0.579 
Israel 4 14.96 2.42 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Jordan 1 11.25 -0.02 0.0035 0.0022 0.113 
Pakistan 15 4.99 2.34    
Syria 2 9.05 1.48    
United States 3 5.37 1.68    
Note: In addition to variables of interest reported above, all specifications control for log of initial income, external threat 
(either intensity or incidence measure), log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and 
schooling, and time fixed effects. High military expenditure share countries are specified as those which spend more than 1 
standard deviation from the mean in military sector. High external threat level countries are specified as those experienced 
external threat more than 3 standard deviations from the mean of cumulative external conflict incidence. The poorest countries 
with high military expenditure shares and high external threat levels are specified as those are in the bottom of income 
distribution (income rank 1) which spend more than average in military sector and experienced external threat above the mean 
of cumulative external conflict incidence. The number of countries/observations for each panel is, respectively, 83/649, 80/625, 
80/625, 80/625 and 77/601. The time span for the analysis is based on balanced dataset for the 1970-2010 period (T=8).       
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Appendix 4-B: List of Countries 
 
Code Country Code Country Code Country 
1 Algeria 31 Greece 61 Pakistan 
2 Argentina 32 Guatemala 62 Panama 
3 Australia 33 Guyana 63 Papua New Guinea 
4 Austria 34 Honduras 64 Paraguay 
5 Bangladesh 35 Hungary 65 Peru 
6 Belgium 36 India 66 Philippines 
7 Bolivia 37 Indonesia 67 Portugal 
8 Botswana 38 Iran 68 Rwanda c 
9 Brazil 39 Ireland 69 Senegal 
10 Burundi c 40 Israel 70 Sierra Leone 
11 Cameroon 41 Italy 71 Singapore 
12 Canada 42 Jamaica 72 South Africa 
13 Central African Rep. c 43 Jordan 73 Spain 
14 Chile 44 Kenya 74 Sri Lanka 
15 China 45 Korea, Rep. of 75 Sudan 
16 Colombia 46 Liberia 76 Sweden 
17 Congo, Dem. Rep. 47 Malawi 77 Switzerland 
18 Congo, Rep. of 48 Malaysia 78 Syria 
19 Costa Rica 49 Mali 79 Thailand 
20 Cote d’Ivoire 50 Mauritania c 80 Togo 
21 Cyprus 51 Mauritius c 81 Tunisia 
22 Ecuador 52 Mexico 82 Turkey 
23 Egypt 53 Morocco 83 Uganda 
24 El Salvador 54 Mozambique 84 United Kingdom 
25 Fiji c 55 Nepal c 85 United States 
26 Finland 56 Netherlands 86 Uruguay 
27 France 57 New Zealand 87 Venezuela 
28 Gambia 58 Nicaragua 88 Zambia 
29 Germany 59 Niger 89 Zimbabwe 
30 Ghana 60 Norway   
Note: Subscripts c represent countries those are excluded from the analysis when the corruption variable is employed. 
 
 
Appendix 4-C: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP p.c. (log)  801 8.32 1.33 4.77 10.82 
GDP per capita growth rate  796 0.02 0.03 -0.36 0.19 
Military Expenditure over GDP (%) 778 2.81 2.81 0 28.62 
Natural Resource Rents 797 0.04 0.08 0 0.64 
Energy Resource Rents  797 0.03 0.08 0 0.64 
Oil Rents  667 0.03 0.07 0 0.64 
Population Growth rate 801 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.14 
Real Investment ratio 801 0.23 0.09 0.04 0.72 
Life Expectancy (log) 801 4.13 0.19 3.16 4.40 
Schooling (log) 801 1.61 0.67 -1.24 2.57 
Openness (log) 801 3.99 0.62 2.21 6.06 
War Intensity 799 0.01 0.04 0 0.29 
External Conflict Incidence 801 0.12 0.56 0 5 
Internal Conflict Incidence 801 0.93 1.75 0 5 
Cumulative Incidence of Ext. Conflict 801 1.11 2.99 0 16 
Cumulative Incidence of Int. Conflict 801 8.38 11.83 0 45 
Dist. to major navigable river (    km) 783 1.55 1.33 0.001 9.1 
Soil 801 0.37 0.21 0 0.98 
Tropical 801 0.43 0.45 0 1.00 
Democracy 799 4.84 4.29 0 10 
Polity2 799 2.58 7.15 -10 10 
Probability of civil conflict onset 618 0.013 0.032 0 0.327 
Corruption 491 3.16 1.40 0 6 
Note: Descriptive statistics are based on panel country averages for the period of 1970-2010 and a sample of 89 countries, 
except the last two. Summary of civil conflict onset probability is restricted to the period of 1970-2000. Respective statistics of 
corruption are summarized for 82 countries data set over the period of 1985-2010.  
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Table 5-A1 
Long and Short-Run Impact of Commodity Price Index 
Dependent Variable: Log difference of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Estimates of Long-Run Coefficients 
Trade openness t-1 0.027*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
Inflation (log) t-1 -0.025*** 
(0.009) 
-0.024*** 
(0.009) 
-0.023** 
(0.010) 
Reserves/GDP ratio t-1 0.066** 
(0.033) 
0.063* 
(0.034) 
0.049 
(0.041) 
Commodity export price index t-1 -0.085*** 
(0.027) 
  
Points export price index t-1  -0.086*** 
(0.029) 
 
Diffuse export price index t-1  0.136 
(0.379) 
 
Energy export price index t-1   -0.187*** 
(0.057) 
Non-energy export price index t-1   0.301** 
(0.116) 
 Estimates of Short-Run Coefficients 
GDP per capita (log)t-1 -0.047*** 
(0.006) 
-0.046*** 
(0.006) 
-0.045*** 
(0.008) 
Δ GDP per capita (log)t-1 0.089** 
(0.034) 
0.103*** 
(0.037) 
0.135** 
(0.053) 
Δ Trade openness t-1 -0.005 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
-0.013 
(0.017) 
Δ Inflation (log) t-1 0.004 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
Δ Reserves/GDP ratio t-1 0.171** 
(0.079) 
0.173** 
(0.079) 
0.176 
(0.140) 
Δ Commodity export price index t 0.342** 
(0.155) 
0.336** 
(0.158) 
0.356** 
(0.153) 
Δ Commodity export price index t-1 0.311*** 
(0.104) 
0.314*** 
(0.103) 
0.335*** 
(0.114) 
Δ Commodity export price index t-2 0.424*** 
(0.152) 
0.413*** 
(0.153) 
0.505*** 
(0.163) 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES 
Countries/Observations 135/4200 126/4041 70/2225 
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.26 
Note: The time span for the analysis is based on unbalanced dataset for the 1963-2010 period. ***, **, * represent significance 
of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors clustered by country are presented in the 
parentheses. 
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Appendix 5-B: Principal Commodity Price Shocks and Political Regimes 
For the replication analysis of the relationship between resource windfalls and 
political system, the investigation employs changes in principal export commodity 
price measurement constructed following Caselli and Tesei (2011). In particular, the 
measurement of resource windfalls at country level is computed as follows. First, for 
each country and for each year that data is available, all commodities are ranked by 
their value (share) of exports. The commodity that is ranked first in the largest 
number of years within country is identified as country’s principal commodity (see 
Appendix Table 5-B1). Finally, each country’s principal commodity is matched with 
an annual time series of that commodity’s world prices (not indices). The data for 
export values and commodity prices are from the United Nation’s Comtrade and 
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) dataset respectively.   
The estimated specification used is identical to the one employed in columns 3 and 4 
of Table 3 as in Caselli and Tesei (2011) where the dependent variable, measured as 
one year change in polity2, responses to the lagged change in the price of the 
principal commodity averaged over the previous three years, i.e. if the change in 
polity2 is measured between years t-1 and t, the change in commodity prices is the 
average over the years t-4, t-3, t-2 and t-1. The construction of interaction terms is 
accomplished firstly by separating out the price change variable into two variables 
according to the initial levels (measured as four year lags or year t-4 in order to be 
consistent with starting date for the price shock) of political contestability: the first is 
an interaction between the change in principal export commodity price and a dummy 
for autocracy, and the second is an interaction with a dummy for democracy. Then 
the full specification includes initial levels of polity2 (separated into two by 
interacting with autocracy and democracy dummies) both, by themselves and 
interacted with the (autocracy/democracy specific) principal commodity price 
change.  
The first two columns in Appendix Table 5-B2 present the results from this 
replication exercise where column 1 estimates the non-linear relationship between 
resource windfalls and political system using OLS, while column 2 employs the 
GMM system estimator. The results are consistent with original findings where 
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commodity price shocks have significant negative impact on politics only in 
autocratic countries, which is decreasing in initial level of autocracy.  
In addition to the replication analysis, the subsequent two columns estimate this 
relationship non-linearly conditional also on initial political violence/stability levels. 
Firstly, the specification reported in column 3, in addition to separating the resource 
shocks into autocracy/democracy specific price changes according to a country’s 
initial political contestability levels, also includes the initial level of political 
violence/stability, both by itself and interacted with the autocracy/democracy 
specific principal commodity price change; while column 4 re-estimates the effect of 
price shocks for the subsamples with high (low) political violence levels by 
interacting autocracy/democracy specific price shocks with a dummy that takes the 
value of unity if a country’s initial political violence level is below (above) the 
sample mean and zero otherwise.  
The results from the non-linear estimation of these relationships provide support for 
the original findings, and indicate that positive shocks in commodity prices have a 
negative direct impact on political system in politically violent autocracies, which is 
marginally increasing while within-country political violence level decreases. 
Stratifying this association for the subsamples reveals that the significant 
consequences from price shocks is only the case for politically unstable autocratic 
countries, while resource windfalls have no impact on politics when they occur in 
democracies and in politically stable autocracies. 
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Table 5-B1: Countries by Principal Commodity 
Princ. Comm. No. Countries Countries 
Aluminium 9 Bahrain, Germany, Guinea, Jamaica, Lebanon, Mozambique, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Switzerland 
Bananas 2 Honduras, Panama 
Beef 4 Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ireland, Mali 
Coal 3 Australia, Czech Republic, Poland 
Cocoa 2 Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana 
Coconut oil 1 Philippines 
Coffee 13 Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Madagascar, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda 
Copper 5 Botswana, Chile, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Zambia 
Cotton 2 Lesotho, Pakistan 
Fish 5 Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Denmark, Korea Rep., Namibia 
Gasoline 1 Italy 
Groundnuts 3 Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan 
Groundnuts oil 1 Senegal 
Pig iron 6 Albania, Armenia, Bhutan, Georgia, Japan, Ukraine 
Iron ore 3 Liberia, Mauritania, Sierra Leone 
Jute 1 Nepal 
Natural Gas 3 Belgium, Bolivia, Netherlands 
Oil 31 Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, China, Congo Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, 
Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, 
Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, UAE, 
United Kingdom, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen  
Oranges 2 Israel, Spain, Turkey 
Palm kernel oil 1 Benin 
Phosphates 3 Jordan, Morocco, Togo 
Pulp 1 Portugal 
Rice 1 Thailand 
Rubber 2 Cambodia, Singapore 
Silver 1 South Africa 
Soybean 2 Paraguay, United States 
Sugar 5 Dominican Rep., Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius, Swaziland 
Sunflower oil  1 Moldova 
Tea 3 India, Kenya, Sri Lanka 
Tobacco 5 Cyprus, Greece, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Zimbabwe 
Uranium 1 Niger 
Wheat 2 Argentina, France 
Wood 8 Austria, Canada, Central African Rep., Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Sweden 
Wool 2 New Zealand, Uruguay 
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Table 5-B2 
Commodity Price Shocks and Political Regimes 
Dependent variable: Change in Political System (Δ polity2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Δ Prd -0.042 
(0.516) 
-0.208 
(0.631) 
-2.030 
(1.365) 
 
Δ Pra -1.629** 
(0.765) 
-1.898** 
(0.761) 
-3.316* 
(1.872) 
 
Δ Prd*Plt-4,d 0.031 
(0.057) 
0.059 
(0.076) 
  
Δ Pra*Plt-4,a -0.185* 
(0.111) 
-0.221** 
(0.110) 
  
Δ Prd * Violencet-4    0.190 
(0.143) 
 
Δ Pra * Violencet-4   0.356* 
(0.202) 
 
Δ Prd * Violence high    -0.896 
(1.116) 
Δ Prd * Violence low    0.098 
(0.343) 
Δ Pra * Violence high    -1.710* 
(0.939) 
Δ Pra * Violence low    0.628 
(0.620) 
Plt-4,d -0.095*** 
(0.015) 
-0.144** 
(0.067) 
  
Plt-4,a -0.074*** 
(0.017) 
-0.044 
(0.041) 
  
Violence t-1   -0.088 
(0.064) 
 
Estimation method OLS GMM GMM GMM 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Countries/Observations 135/5036 135/5036 119/2419 119/2419 
Specification tests 
(a) Hansen Test:  0.993 0.483 0.772 
(b) Serial Correlation:     
     First-order  0.000 0.000 0.000 
     Second-order  0.242 0.746 0.730 
Note: The time span for the analysis in columns 1 and 2 is based on unbalanced dataset for the 1963-2010 period (T=47), while 
in columns 3 and 4 for the 1984-2010 period (T=26).  ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels. The dependent variable is the t-1 to t change in polity2. The method of estimation in columns 1 and 2-4 are, 
respectively, least squares and system-GMM. Robust standard errors presented in the parentheses for the least squares 
estimation are clustered at country level, while system-GMM estimation applies the Windmeijer (2005) small-sample 
correction. 
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Table 5-B3: Big Producers by Principal Commodity 
Princ. Comm. No. Countries Countries 
Aluminium 4 Bahrain, Germany, Lebanon, Mozambique 
Beef 1 Ireland 
Coal 2 Australia, Poland 
Cocoa 2 Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana 
Coconut oil 1 Philippines 
Coffee 7 Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Uganda 
Copper 4 Chile, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Zambia 
Cotton 1 Pakistan 
Fish 2 Bangladesh, Korea Rep. 
Groundnuts 2 Gambia, Sudan 
Groundnuts oil 1 Senegal 
Pig iron 2 Japan, Ukraine 
Iron ore 1 Mauritania 
Jute 1 Nepal 
Natural Gas 1 Netherlands 
Oil 12 Algeria, China, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Venezuela 
Oranges 2 Spain, Turkey 
Phosphates 2 Jordan, Morocco 
Rice 1 Thailand 
Rubber 1 Cambodia 
Soybean 2 Paraguay, United States 
Tea 3 India, Kenya, Sri Lanka 
Tobacco 2 Malawi, Zimbabwe 
Uranium 1 Niger 
Wheat 1 France 
Wood 3 Canada, Finland, Sweden 
Wool 1 New Zealand 
Note: Large producers reflect countries (63) whose principal net export commodity production share belongs to the list of top 
15 biggest producers in the world by commodity. Data for production of commodities by country are obtained from the 
following sources: aluminium, copper, pig iron and iron ore from the United States Geological Survey; phosphates and uranium 
from the British Geological Survey; beef, cocoa, coconut oil, cotton, fish, jute, oranges, rice, tea, tobacco, wheat, wood and 
wool from the Food and Agricultural Organization; rubber from the Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries; 
groundnuts, groundnuts oil and soybeans from the US Department of Agriculture; coffee from the International Coffee 
Organization; oil, natural gas and coal from the US Energy Information Administration. 
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Appendix 5-C: Data Description, Sources and Coverage 
Commodity export and import values for 1990 are collected from the United 
Nation’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database. For countries with missing 1990 net 
export values, the analysis employs net export values available in the year closest to 
1990 where the maximum distance from 1990 ranges in ±10 years interval.
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Annual world commodity price indices are initially collected for 59 commodities 
from International Financial Statistics (IFS series 74 and 76), except for the natural 
gas and gasoline, which are from the United States Energy Information 
Administration (EIA 2013, 9.4 and 9.10); and pig iron obtained from the United 
States Geological Survey. However, commodities of olive oil, poultry, swine meat, 
urea and uranium were left out of the sample due to lack of adequate data in the early 
sample periods. Therefore the results for countries, in which the weights of these 
commodities over the export share are relatively important (e.g., Niger), should be 
interpreted with caution. 
IFS price series have gaps for some commodities. Since the identical sample length 
is an important consideration for constructing the commodity price index measure, 
the analysis employed a combination of methods to generate missing values. For 
instance, the IFS price series for bananas and pepper are available only from 1975 
and 1983 respectively; therefore missing values for the previous periods were 
replaced with the data from UNCTAD since the price series from both sources are 
almost identical. Three price series (coal, plywood and tobacco) have short gaps at 
the beginning of the sample period. Following Dehn (2000), these gaps were filled 
by holding the price constant at the value of the first available observation. Palm-
kernel oil series have one missing value in the middle which was filled by linear 
interpolation. Missing values for oranges and barley (1962-1975) are replaced first 
with the rescaled price data available from FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture 
Organisation) for the period 1966-1975, where the gap for 1962-1966 period was 
then filled by holding the price constant at the 1966 value.  
                                                          
114
 Any biases that might be generated by this choice are checked by re-estimating the main findings 
for the sample where countries with missing 1990 net export shares are removed. In all cases, the 
results remain robust at conventional significance levels. 
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For price series with missing values for which other highly correlated price series are 
available, the missing values are generated using partial adjustment regression 
equation: 
ln (
  
   
) = θ0 + θ1 ln (
  
   
) + θ2 ln(Yt-1) + εt 
where Xt is the series with missing early values and Yt is a highly correlated series 
with a full set of observations. The regression is run on overlapping observations, 
and the coefficients are then used to “backcast” the missing observations. This 
method is used to fill the initial gap of 17 observations in the fish series and 8 
observations in pulp series. The close correlates used were IFS fishmeal prices and 
plywood prices respectively. 
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Appendix 5-D1: List of Countries 
 
Code Country Code Country Code Country 
1 Albania c 46 Ghana 91 Norway c 
2 Algeria 47 Greece c 92 Oman 
3 Angola 48 Guatemala 93 Pakistan 
4 Argentina 49 Guinea 94 Panama 
5 Armenia c 50 Guinea-Bissau 95 Papua New Guinea 
6 Australia 51 Guyana c 96 Paraguay 
7 Austria c 52 Haiti 97 Peru 
8 Azerbaijan 53 Honduras 98 Philippines c 
9 Bahrain c 54 India c 99 Poland c 
10 Bangladesh 55 Indonesia 100 Portugal 
11 Belgium c 56 Iran 101 Qatar c 
12 Benin cg 57 Ireland c 102 Romania 
13 Bhutan cg 58 Israel c 103 Russia 
14 Bolivia 59 Italy c 104 Rwanda cg 
15 Botswana c 60 Jamaica c 105 Saudi Arabia c 
16 Brazil c 61 Japan c 106 Senegal 
17 Burkina Faso 62 Jordan 107 Sierra Leone 
18 Burundi cg 63 Kazakhstan c 108 Singapore c 
19 Cambodia cg 64 Kenya 109 Slovak Rep. c 
20 Cameroon 65 Korea Rep. c 110 Slovenia 
21 Canada c 66 Kuwait 111 South Africa 
22 Cape Verde cg 67 Kyrgyzstan cg 112 Spain 
23 Central African Rep. cg 68 Latvia c 113 Sri Lanka 
24 Chile 69 Lebanon 114 Sudan c 
25 China 70 Lesotho cg 115 Swaziland cg 
26 Colombia c 71 Liberia 116 Sweden c 
27 Congo, Rep. 72 Libya 117 Switzerland c 
28 Costa Rica c 73 Lithuania c 118 Syria 
29 Cote d’Ivoire 74 Madagascar 119 Tanzania 
30 Cyprus 75 Malawi c 120 Thailand 
31 Czech Republic c 76 Malaysia 121 Togo 
32 Denmark c 77 Mali 122 Trinidad and Tobago 
33 Djibouti cg 78 Mauritania cg 123 Tunisia 
34 Dominican Republic 79 Mauritius cg 124 Turkey 
35 Ecuador 80 Mexico 125 Uganda 
36 Egypt 81 Moldova 126 Ukraine c 
37 El Salvador 82 Morocco 127 United Arab Emirates c 
38 Ethiopia 83 Mozambique 128 United Kingdom 
39 Fiji cg 84 Namibia c 129 United States 
40 Finland c 85 Nepal cg 130 Uruguay 
41 France 86 Netherlands 131 Venezuela 
42 Gabon 87 New Zealand c 132 Vietnam 
43 Gambia 88 Nicaragua 133 Yemen 
44 Georgia cg 89 Niger 134 Zambia c 
45 Germany c 90 Nigeria 135 Zimbabwe 
Note: Subscripts c and g represent countries those are excluded, respectively, from the conflict onset and growth analysis when 
political violence/stability variable is employed. 
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Appendix 5-D2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita (log) 5735 8.29 1.31 5.08 11.82 
GDP per capita growth rate  5735 0.02 0.07 -0.81 0.64 
Trade over GDP 5399 0.69 0.45 0.05 5.62 
Inflation (log (1+inflation rate)) 4800 0.12 0.28 -0.12 4.77 
Reserves over GDP  5397 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.52 
Polity2 5654 1.51 7.37 -10 10 
Δ Polity2 5642 0.09 1.78 -18 16 
Δ Principal Commodity Price  5717 0.04 0.25 -1.04 1.58 
Composite Commodity Price Index 5735 1.09 0.17 1.00 2.75 
Unlogged unweighted index (1980=100) 5735 82.37 43.06 3.89 693.06 
Commodity Exports to GDP (net) 5735 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.54 
Δ Commodity Price Index 5735 0.001 0.011 -0.184 0.193 
Δ Point source Commodity Price Index 5519 0.001 0.010 -0.127 0.193 
Δ Diffuse source Commodity Price Index 5735 0.000 0.001 -0.017 0.035 
Δ Energy source Commodity Price Index 3023 0.001 0.013 -0.069 0.192 
Δ Non-Energy source Comm. Price Index 5735 0.000 0.005 -0.061 0.084 
Political Violence/Stability 3036 8.73 2.52 0 12 
Civil Conflict Onset 1709 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Note: Summary statistics are based on panel country averages for the period of 1963-2010 and a sample of 135 countries, 
except the last two. Political violence/stability and civil conflict onset statistics are restricted to the period of 1984-2010 and 
summarized for 119 and 77 countries data set respectively. 
 
 
Appendix 5-D3: List of Commodities 
 
Non-agricultural 
Aluminium Gasoline Lead Oil Tin 
Coal Pig Iron Natural Gas Phosphatrock Zinc 
Copper Iron ore Nickel Silver  
Agricultural 
Bananas Cotton Linseed oil Pulp Soybeans 
Barley Fish Maize Rice Sugar 
Beef Fishmeal Oranges Rubber Sunflower oil 
Butter Groundnuts Palm-kernel oil Shrimp Tea 
Cocoa Groundnuts oil Palm oil Sisal Tobacco 
Coconut oil Hides Pepper Sorghum Wheat 
Coffee Jute Plywood Soybean meal Wood 
Copra Lamb Potash Soybean oil Wool 
Note: The categorisation of point source commodities is identified as all non-agricultural commodities plus coffee, cocoa, sugar 
and bananas. Energy source categorisation includes coal, gasoline, natural gas and oil. 
 
 
